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I
Job Mobility
and 
Pension Portability
Movement and change enliven American culture. Nowhere is that 
more evident than in the labor market. But employers create a conflict 
between job mobility and retirement security when they cut future pen 
sion benefits for workers who quit a job before reaching retirement 
age. Presumably, employers do this to discourage workers from chang 
ing jobs.
Neither U.S. workers nor employers commit to a lifetime contract. 
After several early-career job changes, however, workers often do stay 
permanently with one employer. Once they reach age 40, one of two 
male and one of four female workers remain on the same job until 
retirement 20 to 25 years later (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990, p. 
34). Jobs with pensions promote even more job stability, especially for 
women.
Job change contributes to an efficient labor market, increasing mar 
ket flexibility and aiding economic growth and competitiveness. Pen 
sions, conversely, bind workers to jobs, and possibly allocate resources 
inefficiently. Employers, some argue, should be encouraged to restruc 
ture pension plans so that they no longer discourage workers from 
changing jobs. Need for such restructuring is heightened by the aging 
of the U.S. workforce, since job mobility declines as workers grow 
older.
Many employers favor little job change, however, preferring a sta 
ble workforce. Longevity is the benefit employers expect in exchange 
for their investment in worker skills. Workers do leave jobs, however. 
They quit for personal or family reasons, such as the relocation of a 
spouse or the need to care for a child or an elderly parent, or they are 
laid off frequently for reasons beyond their control.
2 Job Mobility and Pension Portability
HISTORY OF U.S. PENSIONS
A brief history of pension coverage in the United States provides 
background for the discussion of pension portability. Private pension 
plans began during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 1 By 1930 
many large employers, including AT&T, General Electric, and DuPont, 
had pension plans. The number of plans stopped growing during the 
Depression, but resumed growth in the 1940s. From 1940 to 1972 pen 
sion coverage of full-time workers rose from 17 to 52 percent.
Pension coverage grew through 1970 due to union collective bar 
gaining in retail, construction, manufacturing, transportation, and min 
ing industries. In industries with many small unionized firms, 
multiemployer defined benefit plans administered jointly by a union 
and an employer-appointed board of trustees are the most common 
plan type. Large unionized firms typically have defined benefit plans, 
as well.
Since the early 1970s pension coverage has fallen slightly, and basic 
coverage has shifted from defined benefit toward defined contribution 
plans. Firms also increasingly have provided defined contribution 
plans to supplement benefits for workers already covered by a defined 
benefit plan.
Defined contribution plans covered one-third of the workers in plans 
started before 1975, but they have covered four-fifths of the workers in 
plans started after 1975. In 1975,78 percent of the participants in pen 
sion plans were in primary defined benefit plans. By 1989 that number 
had fallen to 64 percent, and a projection suggests that by 2000 the fig 
ure will have fallen to 51 percent (Hay/Huggins 1990a).
Pension coverage changes since the early 1970s have been due 
largely to changes in the labor force. Coverage remains high among 
large firms and among unionized firms. Such firms are employing a 
falling share of the labor force, however, and employment has grown 
rapidly in small nonunionized firms in service industries. Pension cov 
erage has always been low among workers in these firms.
The fastest growing industries from 1979 to 1988 were services and 
specifically finance, insurance, and real estate. Pension coverage rates 
also rose most rapidly in those groups: from 30 to 38 percent for ser 
vice industry workers, and from 54 to 59 percent for finance, insur-
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ance, and real estate workers. Those industry coverage gains offset 
somewhat a drop in workers employed in manufacturing, where cover 
age had been high. The large shift in jobs to the service sector, how 
ever, with its below-average coverage rate, depressed pension 
coverage rates.
PRIVATE PENSIONS AND JOB CHANGE
When private pensions were started in the late 1800s, firms used 
them to charitably retire older workers whose productivity was wan 
ing. The plans also helped maintain a loyal workforce. Firms fre 
quently did not provide pensions to "early leavers" workers leaving 
before retirement.
Expectations have changed. Workers now commonly view pensions 
as deferred pay that even short-tenure employees have a right to 
accrue. These expectations, plus concern about retirement income ade 
quacy, make pension benefit loss incurred by job leavers a public pol 
icy issue affecting the majority of the workforce. In 1988, 68 percent 
of males and 51 percent of females working full time were in a private 
pension plan in either their current or a past job. Of all full-time work 
ers with over 15 years on their current job, 78 percent had participated 
in a pension in a current or past job. Twenty-three percent of full-time 
workers age 45 to 54 had been in a pension plan on a prior job (Piacen- 
tini 1990b).
Worker myopia when changing jobs may cause low retirement 
income. Due to the growth of defined contribution plans, which com 
monly allow job leavers to cash out, employers frequently pay prere 
tirement lump sums to departing employees. In the late 1980s, 60 
percent of vested job leavers received at least partial lump sum cash- 
outs of their pension benefits. Fifty-one percent of vested job leavers 
received lump sum benefits for their entire pension (Piacentini 1990b).
Because so many job leavers cash out their pensions, some policy- 
makers argue that federal law on pension policy should lock-in pension 
benefits. When workers and employers do not react to this restriction 
by reducing the generosity of plans, locking-in pension benefits raises 
net savings in pensions. Higher savings via pensions not offset by a fall 
in other savings raise gross individual and national savings.
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Because pensions often reward long tenure through various plan 
features, and because there is little or no portability, job leavers fre 
quently end up with lower benefits than job stayers, even when they do 
not cash out their pensions. Consider two workers with equal incomes 
through their careers. Worker A spends his/her career with one 
employer, while worker B changes employers several times. Worker A 
will receive a much larger pension than B, even if B's employers had 
pension plans identical to those of A. The benefits differ solely due to 
B having changed jobs.
PENSION REFORM FOR A MOBILE LABOR FORCE
Three labor market changes form the background against which 
pension reform is considered. First, intermittent workers have diffi 
culty accumulating adequate retirement income. With more women 
entering the workforce, federal retirement income policy is challenged 
by some women's small retirement incomes due to their discontinuous 
work histories. Also, workers in some industries have high job turn 
over, making it less likely that they will accumulate sufficient pension 
benefits to ensure adequate retirement income.
Second, social security expansion has ended, and a slight contrac 
tion is predicted. Social security is projected to pay less generous bene 
fits relative to earnings during the early part of the twenty-first century 
(Doescher and Turner 1988). This places pressure on private pensions 
and individual savings to raise retirement income in order to offset the 
contraction. Third, jobs have shifted to economic sectors having low 
pension coverage rates and relying less on defined benefit plans. These 
changes affect the options available to job leavers who are covered by 
a pension.
Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Plans
To understand pension policy, one must understand the basic ways 
defined contribution and defined benefit plans differ. Defined contribu 
tion plans allocate employer contributions to individual accounts like 
savings or mutual funds accounts. Such plans require employers to 
contribute a fixed share of pay or allow employers to vary contribu-
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tions (as in a profit-sharing plan). Defined contribution plans may 
accept worker contributions, and often require them as a condition for 
matching employer contributions. Assets are typically pooled for 
investing. Investment gains and losses are allocated pro rata to worker 
accounts, and the worker bears the investment risk. In these plans, a 
worker's pension benefit at retirement equals the accumulated contri 
butions plus investment earnings and losses allocated to the account. 
The employer may pay the account balance to the worker as a lump 
sum, pay it out over a period of time, or use it to purchase an annuity 
paying benefits for a specified period, like 20 years, or for life.
Defined benefit plans promise a retirement benefit figured by a for 
mula, which usually includes earnings and tenure. The formula, for 
example, might be $20 a month times years of tenure with the 
employer, or it might be 1 percent of final salary times tenure. In 
defined benefit plans, the employer must make contributions figured 
by an actuary under government regulation sufficient to fund the 
promised benefits. When investment earnings fall short of promised 
benefits, the employer is financially responsible for the shortfall. Pen 
sion beneficiaries may share risk, however, by receiving smaller cost- 
of-living increases when the firm or the plan does poorly.
Effects of Benefit Loss from Job Change
When job leavers lose pension benefits they also lose tax benefits 
afforded by pensions. This raises questions about tax equity. Should 
tax benefits reward job tenure? Because long job tenure has been more 
common among men than women, does this policy discriminate 
against women?
Pension benefit loss deters workers from changing jobs or careers. 
The "golden handcuff effect may lower economic efficiency by pre 
venting workers from moving to their most productive job situation. 
This problem may be critical in declining industries that need to shrink 
but have tied workers to jobs by pensions. Similarly, if pensions have 
inhibited job change, they have hampered the labor market's ability to 
adjust.
Rather than worrying about golden handcuffs, however, some ana 
lysts are concerned about short job tenure. They argue that Japanese 
lifetime jobs encourage employers and workers to invest in worker
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productivity. Long tenure with an employer may be needed to recoup 
the investment from job-specific training. Thus, while both training 
and eliminating barriers to worker mobility are critical for fully using 
U.S. human resources, the goals conflict.
Pension Portability
Pension portability has been defined as the capacity to carry pension 
benefits from one job to the next. It has been closely linked to preserv 
ing vested benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement. The 
portability concept has recently been expanded to include accrued but 
unvested benefits. Of more importance, analysts have recognized that 
even when vested, job leavers' benefits erode in value due to inflation, 
reducing the real value of vested pension benefits; thus, the portability 
concept has expanded to mean preserving the real value of pension 
benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement. 2 Portability loss 
is the shortfall of actual retirement benefits from benefits that would 
have been paid had the worker not changed jobs.
Pension portability is achieved in three ways: through portability of 
benefits, service, or assets. Benefits are portable when the worker has a 
vested right to accrued benefits. With vesting, a worker changes jobs 
without losing nominal pension benefits, but the benefits can erode in 
real value due to inflation. Service is portable when years of service 
under a prior employer's plan count in figuring pension benefits with a 
new employer. Service portability is found in multiemployer plans, but 
also could be achieved by wage or price indexing the benefits of job 
leavers. These options reduce real benefit loss for workers changing 
jobs.
Pension assets are portable when the worker receives a cash distri 
bution of accrued benefits and rolls it over to an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) or another employer-provided pension plan. Asset port 
ability is commonly available in defined contribution plans, and is 
increasingly available in defined benefit plans. Asset portability is 
often called "preservation" because the rollover or interplan transfer 
preserves preretirement cashouts as retirement savings.
Corresponding to the three avenues to pension portability, there are 
three ways a job leaver may lose pension benefits. First, workers lose 
benefits by not having worked long enough to vest (deferred vesting).
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Second, workers lose benefits because plans offer lower benefits for 
workers who quit before retirement (design aspects of pension plans). 
This loss includes those cases where employers base cost-of-living 
adjustments on tenure. Third, workers lose benefits by treating the pen 
sion plan as severance pay rather than a retirement plan (consuming 
benefits before retirement). All three losses may be the result of a vol 
untary decision to change jobs or may be due to a layoff.
Legislative changes requiring vesting after five years for most work 
ers have reduced portability losses incurred from nonvesting. Approxi 
mately one-third of the remaining portability losses are due to other 
aspects of plan design, while two-thirds are due to workers cashing out 
benefits before they retire. Options for reducing portability losses due 
to plan design, on the one hand, and worker behavior, on the other, 
would distribute benefit costs differently. Plan design options could be 
expected to raise benefits accrued by short-term workers. Worker 
behavior options, by contrast, do not affect accrued benefits, but influ 
ence what workers do with these benefits.
Other countries have reduced pension portability losses more than 
the United States. Such policies include shorter vesting (Canada), a 
government or private clearinghouse for job leaver benefits (Nether 
lands, Japan), indexed benefits in defined benefit plans for workers 
quitting prior to retirement (United Kingdom), and a ban on lump sum 
payments to job leavers (Netherlands, Canada).
In 1972, Dan McGill wrote a book analyzing U.S. pension portabil 
ity and focusing largely on pension vesting. When McGill wrote, non- 
vesting caused a major share of portability losses. Since 1972, the U.S. 
pension system has changed dramatically. The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) set minimum vesting standards 
which have since been tightened; now most workers vest within five 
years in a private pension plan.
Pension analysts have increasingly realized that vested workers lose 
benefits by changing jobs, however, and that those losses greatly 
reduce the benefit protection that vesting was thought to provide. 
Though pension portability has been an issue for many years, the 
remarkable changes in the U.S. pension system, the changes in the 
U.S. labor market, and better understanding of pension economics 
have raised the portability issues this book addresses.
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OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
This book analyzes what happens to the pension benefits of workers 
who quit or are laid off jobs. Presenting empirical evidence wherever 
possible, the book progresses from an overview to an informal analysis 
using simple logic and descriptive data, then proceeds to a more formal 
analysis using economic theory and econometric studies.
The first six chapters of the book describe why pension benefit 
losses are a significant problem and examines the number of workers 
affected and the amount of loss they incur. As background on quits and 
layoffs, chapter 2 portrays a labor market undergoing changes that 
often result in reductions in retirement benefits. Chapter 3 further 
describes job change by examining data on individual workers, and the 
particular impact of mobility on women's pension benefits. Job mobil 
ity often reduces future pension benefits, and chapter 4 investigates the 
size of these losses. Chapter 5 examines receipt and subsequent use of 
preretirement lump sum distributions, which constitute two-thirds of 
portability losses. Chapter 6 discusses issues concerning the pension 
benefits of laid-off workers.
Chapters 7 through 12 analyze possible policy responses to the pen 
sion benefit loss of job changers. Chapter 7 describes pension plan fea 
tures that already reduce portability losses. Chapter 8 debates the pros 
and cons of pension portability reform in five areas: equity, tax and 
budget policy, regulation, economic effects, and financial responsibil 
ity. Chapter 9 describes and evaluates policy options designed to 
reduce portability losses. Chapter 10 examines how policies mandating 
portability would affect employers and workers. It also surveys studies 
relating pensions and job change, because some portability policies 
may increase job change. Chapter 11 examines the role of layoffs in 
portability losses. Chapter 12 discusses policies towards pension porta 
bility in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
These countries have pension systems similar to that of the United 
States, yet each has dealt differently with portability. Chapter 13 con 
cludes the book with a selective list of policies that would reduce the 
pension benefit losses of job changers.
Several issues related to pension portability have been omitted from 
the discussion. The first is greater pension coverage. While it would
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further a goal of portability to raise retirement benefits it is not 
itself a portability issue. The second is pension loss when a plan ends. 
Like the loss when a worker separates from an employer, some policies 
for dealing with those losses such as indexing benefits are the 
same. But as with coverage, considering these issues would greatly 
expand the book. The third issue is firm-initiated early retirement for 
older workers. Though not considered here, many pension issues for 
these older workers are the same as those for younger workers facing a 
layoff. The fourth omitted issue is pension portability in the public sec 
tor. The book deals only with the private sector, although public sector 
workers face similar pension issues.
NOTES
1. Much of the discussion of pension coverage is based on Beller and Lawrence (1992).
2. Some analysts define portability more narrowly, distinguishing the ability to transfer benefit 
rights between jobs from the preservation of real vested benefit rights with a former employer.

The Changing 
U.S. Labor Market
The U.S. labor market changed greatly during the 1980s and early 
1990s, causing many workers to switch jobs and affecting the way in 
which firms provide pensions. These shifts created the context and 
need for pension portability. This chapter describes economic changes 
that have caused workers to seek new jobs and explores the magnitude 
of that mobility. The chapter provides background information on 
changes in employment by industry and changes in unionization fac 
tors that affect the need for pension portability. It also discusses 
changes in the pension system over the past decade, in particular the 
trend towards defined contribution plans and away from defined bene 
fit plans.
LABOR MARKET SHIFTS
Shifts in the U.S. economy have affected how workers accumulate 
benefits for retirement. One of these changes is the shift toward the ser 
vice sector and away from manufacturing. Three-fourths of new jobs in 
the 1980s were in services and retail trades. 1 From 1979 to 1988 the 
percentage of full-time private-sector wage and salary workers 
employed in services rose from 19 to 24 percent. The percentage 
employed in finance, insurance, and real estate rose from 7 to 9 per 
cent. By contrast, factory jobs in 1988 fell to 1.7 million below the 
peak in 1979. From 1972 to 1988 the share of the full-time employed 
labor force in manufacturing fell from 34 to 28 percent (Beller and 
Lawrence 1992).
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Changes in Employment by Industry
During the 1980s the mining industry suffered an astounding 25 per 
cent job loss, while manufacturing suffered a 7 percent loss. In con 
trast, government, transportation, and public utilities, the slowest- 
growing service sector industries, each grew 11 percent.
Job shifts for narrower industrial classifications were even greater. 
Half of mining jobs are in oil and gas extraction, which grew by 50 
percent during the decade's first three years as the price of crude petro 
leum soared. The number of wells drilled and oil rigs erected, as well 
as the price of crude oil all peaked in 1982 and then plummeted to less 
then half the peak by 1987. Jobs in oil and gas extraction followed the 
same pattern, hitting an all-time high in 1982 and then falling: all jobs 
gained earlier in the decade, plus 75,000 more, were lost by 1987. Coal 
mining suffered even more than oil and gas during the 1980s, with job 
loss reaching 46 percent. Copper and iron mining jobs fell 60 percent 
over the decade.
In contrast, construction employment grew during the 1980s. Being 
sensitive to business cycles, the industry lost jobs during the two reces 
sions early in the decade, but expanded rapidly over the next three 
years with the onset of economic recovery and a sharp drop in interest 
rates. Growth continued throughout the rest of the decade, with jobs in 
the special trades category carpentry, masonry, electrical work, and 
roofing growing by 850,000.
The long 1980s expansion triggered growth in other areas. Chang 
ing lifestyles, such as women working more outside the home, contrib 
uted to retail trade growth. More spending power and less free time 
affected services trades, with eating and drinking establishments head 
ing the industries adding the most jobs in the 1980s: one of every 10 
jobs added over the decade. One of every 20 jobs gained over the 
decade was in a grocery store.
Gross Employment Flows
These employment changes, dramatic though they are, understate 
total job changes. These shifts in industry employment are net 
changes the net workers leaving or entering. 2
Since in most industries workers are continuously entering and leav 
ing, net employment changes are smaller than gross changes. Within
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industries some firms grow while others decline. Within firms, workers 
are fired or quit in some departments while workers are hired in others. 
Several studies find large gross employment flows caused by firms 
opening, growing, shrinking, and closing (Leonard 1987; Dunne, Rob 
erts, and Samuelson 1989).
During the early 1980s, one in eight jobs every year was new, while 
one in nine jobs was destroyed. Job creation is defined as the share of 
net jobs added at growing firms, while job destruction signifies jobs 
lost at shrinking firms (Leonard 1987). In an average quarter during the 
early 1980s, 6 percent of manufacturing jobs disappeared and 5 percent 
were created (Davis and Haltiwanger 1989).
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSIONS
These labor market changes have affected a number of pension vari 
ables: which employers provide pensions; which workers are covered; 
and what plans are used. The changes also have affected the amount of 
pension benefits lost with job change and the types of policy changes 
that would prevent these losses from occurring.
Changes in worker coverage rates by industry from 1972 to 1988 
varied by gender, union status, and firm size. Within each industry the 
coverage rate for women gained relative to men the coverage rate 
among women workers rose from 25 to 35 percent in services, and 
from 46 to 60 percent in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector. 
For females, who are disproportionately in the service industry and the 
finance, insurance, and real estate sector, the coverage rate rise in these 
industries contributed to the rise in rate of overall female coverage. 
The rise in percentage of males working in low-coverage service 
industry jobs resulted in the fall of male coverage rate.
While the pension coverage rate for nonunionized workers rose 
from 40 to 44 percent from 1979 to 1988, the rate for full-time workers 
in a collective bargaining unit remained at 78 percent. Coverage 
among nonunionized workers rose in all major industry divisions 
except for transportation, communications, and utilities. This increase, 
however, offset the loss of high-coverage union jobs. The percentage 
of the labor force that was unionized fell from 27 to 17 percent
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between 1979 and 1988. The decline in union coverage took place in 
all major industries, with the greatest drop occurring in services.
Pension plan coverage also closely correlates with firm size. In 
1988, coverage rates ranged from 16 percent for workers in firms 
employing fewer than 25 workers to 73 percent for firms with 1,000 or 
more employees. Workers reporting employment in firms with 1,000 or 
more employees fell from 41 to 39 percent of the labor force from 
1979 to 1988.
Type of Plan
While the primary pension plan for most workers is a defined bene 
fit plan, defined contribution plans are becoming increasingly popular. 
In the late 1980s, primary defined benefit plans covered one-third of 
workers, while primary defined contribution plans covered one-sixth 
(1\irner and Beller 1992); however, 73 percent of primary defined ben 
efit plans were offered in combination with secondary defined contri 
bution plans by 1984 (Bodie and Papke 1990).
Defined benefit plans, which are found predominantly in union 
firms, large firms, and manufacturing firms (Kotlikoff and Smith 
1983), have fallen in importance as a source of pension coverage. After 
reaching a peak coverage rate of 40 percent of private full-time work 
ers in the early 1970s, defined benefit coverage declined to 31 percent 
in 1987. Between 1980 and 1989 this coverage dropped from 30.1 mil 
lion to 27.2 million workers, and the decline has continued into the 
early 1990s.
In contrast, defined contribution plan popularity has risen in recent 
years, due in large part to the popularity of 401 (k) plans. In 1975, only 
15 percent of full-time workers participated in defined contribution 
plans. By 1987, 30 percent were covered by a defined contribution 
plan. The Revenue Act of 1978 added Section 401(k) to the IRS Tax 
Code, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1979. 
Under a 401(k) plan, workers choose between cash or contributions to 
a trust. The latter are made before taxes. Data for 1988 show 12.3 mil 
lion workers, or 17 percent of full-time private wage and salary work 
ers, were in a 401 (k) plan. The 401 (k) plans covered 18 percent of full- 
time male workers and 15 percent of full-time female workers. One 
policy concern is that the shift toward defined contribution plans,
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boosted by 401 (k) plans, could lead to lower future pension benefits 
because job leavers often cash out those plans.
Several reasons have been advanced for the shift from defined bene 
fit to defined contribution coverage, including employment shifts from 
industries with large and unionized firms, but also legislation which 
imposed costly compliance for defined benefit plans but improved tax 
treatment for some defined contribution plans. Firms with a defined 
benefit plan have, on average, cut 3 percent of covered workers 
between 1975 and 1987. They cut more than 10 percent in mining, 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, and wholesale trade. Cov 
erage under the defined benefit plans of the big three U.S. automakers 
alone fell 22 percent from 1975 to 1987 (a 210,000 worker loss).
Dual Coverage
Many workers are covered both by a defined benefit plan and a sup 
plemental defined contribution plan. Supplemental coverage of work 
ers by a second plan is highest in industries with a high coverage rate 
under primary plans. Manufacturing industry workers have a 65 per 
cent coverage rate. Of those covered, 50 percent are also enrolled in a 
supplemental plan. Only mining has a high coverage rate (64 percent) 
combined with a below average supplemental coverage rate (37 per 
cent). Supplemental defined contribution plans enable employers to 
offer extra benefits at reduced cost; 56 percent of these plans are 
funded to some extent by worker contributions.
Concluding Comments
Major economic changes have significantly affected the way in 
which firms provide pensions. This chapter has examined job changes 
and the characteristics of employers providing and workers covered by 
pensions from an aggregate perspective. The next chapter examines 
these issues from the perspective of individual workers, focusing on 
the attributes of employees changing jobs. Taken together, these two 
chapters describe changes in the U.S. labor market and provide the 
background for understanding the pension issues arising from these 
changes.
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NOTES
1. This discussion is drawn from Plunkert (1990).
2. Net changes are the difference between total workers entering an industry and total workers 
leaving the industry. Gross changes are the total workers entering and leaving
Characteristics of Job Changers
Because portability issues directly concern job changers, it is impor 
tant to examine the characteristics of workers who change jobs and to 
understand the dynamics of job mobility. Is job change increasing over 
time? How does it vary across age groups and by gender?1 If the rate of 
job change were to decrease, would we still need to formulate pension 
policies to reduce benefit losses incurred by job changers? How do 
portability policies affect men and women differently? This overview 
discusses these and related questions by looking at job tenure studies, 
with particular attention to the impact of portability policies on 
women.
JOB TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES
Job change can be studied by examining actual tenure and estimat 
ing eventual tenure for jobs in progress. Hall (1982) documented the 
prevalence of lengthy completed job tenure for males and concluded 
the following:
1. The typical worker holds a job that will last about eight years. 
Over one-quarter of all workers are employed in jobs that will continue 
20 years or more; 60 percent hold jobs that will last five years or more.
2. The jobs held by middle-aged workers with more than 10 years 
of tenure are extremely stable. Over a decade, only 20 to 30 percent of 
these workers move.
3. Among workers aged 30 and older, 40 percent are currently 
working in jobs at which they will remain for 20 or more years. Three- 
quarters are in jobs at which they will remain for five or more years.
4. The duration of employment among blacks is as long as that 
among whites. Even though jobs held by blacks are worse along 
almost every other dimension, they are no less stable than those held 
by whites.
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5. Women remain on jobs a substantially shorter period of time than 
men. Only one-quarter of women over age 30 are employed in jobs 
they will occupy for more than 20 years, whereas over one-half of men 
over age 30 hold these near-lifetime jobs.
While Hall found that by age 44 workers had held an average of 8.5 
jobs, he also found that one-half of those age 40 to 44 who have been 
in their current jobs for 5 to 10 years will retain these jobs an additional 
10 years. Job changes generally occur in the first few years after 
employment begins. Young workers change jobs a great deal until they 
find a good career match.
Sehgal (1984) states that employment data from the January 1983 
CPS support the contention that mature American workers, on average, 
show substantial job stability. The survey asked whether participants 
were engaged in the kind of work they had been doing a year earlier, 
how long they had done that kind of work, and how long they had been 
working continuously for their current employer. Sehgal's principal 
findings on tenure are the following:
1. One worker in six has been with his/her employer for at least 15 
years.
2. Among workers age 45 and over, nearly one-third have been with 
their current employer for 20 years or more.
3. Tenure with one's employer is closely linked to tenure in one's 
occupation.
Looking at gender differences in tenure, Sehgal's findings show that 
one male worker in five has been with his employer for at least 15 
years, while one female worker in 10 has been with her employer for 
that period. Among workers age 45 and over, 38 percent of men and 16 
percent of women have been with their current employer 20 years or 
more.
Mitchell (1986) discusses job attachment among older workers 
while focusing on gender differences in job tenure. She also uses data 
from the January 1983 Current Population Survey and a methodology 
similar to that of Hall (1982). Table 3.1 presents differences in tenure 
by sex. It shows the greatest contrast among men and women workers 
to be found in the longer-tenure groups. Only 4 percent of working 
women have been on their jobs for 20 or more years, compared to 12 
percent of men. In addition, 38.8 percent of all males but only 13.3 per-
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cent of all females are likely to complete 20 or more years. This sup 
ports Hall's 1978 data, which show these figures as 37.3 percent and 
15.1 percent. At the other extreme, the table shows 54 percent of males 
and 67 percent of females spending fewer than five years with their 
current employers.
Table 3.1 
Tenure to Date and Eventual Tenure by Sex, 1983
Tenure
(years)
Less than 1
1-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 or more
Males 
(percent)
Actual
24.5
29.9
16.6
19.2
7.0
11.9
Eventual)
14.2
22.3
10.6
7.5
7.6
38.8
Females 
(percent)
Actual
30.3
36.6
16.3
8.4
4.3
4.2
Eventual
17.9
31.7
16.0
11.7
9.8
13.3
F/M
Actual
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.4
0.6
0.4
Eventual
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.3
0.3
SOURCE: January 1983 Current Population Survey data as compiled in Mitchell (1986). 
NOTE- All figures are adjusted by sex-specific survival rates as in Horvath (1983) The survival 
rate is the ratio of Ix values from a standard life table. These values represent the number of per 
sons of 100,000 born alive still living at the beginning of the age interval.
Table 3.2 presents eventual tenure of prime age and older workers 
and shows clearly that tenure is shorter for women than men across all 
age groups. Women aged 40 and over are only half as likely as men to 
complete 20 or more years of tenure 23.3 percent versus 56.4 per 
cent.
These tables suggest the following conclusions:
1. The majority of jobs last fewer than five years for both sexes; rel 
atively short-term employment is not confined to women.
2. The most striking gender differences in actual tenure patterns are 
concentrated not in the short-tenure groups, (e.g. fewer than five 
years), but rather in the longer-tenure groups. Using eventual tenure 
data, sex differences become more pronounced between five and ten 
years, and grow larger thereafter. This means that sex differences in 
tenure are not primarily due to more "churning" among females start 
ing new jobs.
Table 32 
Distribution of Eventual Tenure by Sex for Prime Age and Older Workers
Eventual 
years of 
tenure
0-4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20 or more
Percent age 40-49 Percent age 50-59 Percent age 60+
Male Female F/M
15.3 26.8 1.8 
9.3 16.2 1.7 
9.7 18.9 1.9 
10.0 15.7 1.6 
56.4 23.3 0.4
Male Female F/M
14.4 20.3 1.4 
10.6 18.0 1.7 
10.9 22.3 2.1 
8.2 14.3 1.7 
56.5 26.7 0.5
Male Female F/M
15.3 20.6 1.3 
16.2 20.3 1.3 
11.1 17.6 1.6 
6.3 10.2 1.6 
51.0 31.3 0.6
SOURCE: January 1983 Current Population Survey data as compiled in Mitchell (1986).
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3. Older women are proportionately more likely to have five or 
more years of eventual tenure (on their current job) than are their 
younger counterparts, while the male ratios remain relatively constant 
across age groups. Therefore, the sex differential in medium- and long- 
term eventual tenure shrinks with age. However, women age 40 and 
over are still only half as likely to complete 20 or more years of tenure 
as men. If women workers in the 1990s follow the same tenure patterns 
as their predecessors, the labor market will experience reduced average 
tenure and greater job change in response to the influx of women into 
the workforce during the last 20 years.
FREQUENCY OF JOB CHANGE
Studies already discussed have alluded to the increasing number of 
women in the labor force and their effect on job change and labor turn 
over. To put this in perspective, their share of the total labor force has 
increased from 32 percent to 46 percent over the 1955-1990 period 
(Economic Report of the President 1992, p. 338).
Table 3.3 indicates that men and women of all age categories have 
displayed a relatively constant job tenure during the 26-year period 
from 1951 to 1987, even though the common perception is that people 
now change jobs more frequently. Women do have lower job tenure 
than men, however, and the greater proportion of the labor force that is 
female has increased turnover in the labor force.
Korczyk's (1990) analysis of portability issues for women, however, 
challenges the standard view of female workers as less attached to the 
labor force than men. Her review of the literature on portability dis 
cusses a study by Haber, Lamas, and Green (1983), which indicates 
that in 1977 the separation rate for women would have been 1.9 per 
centage points less than the rate for men if women working full time 
had been distributed among wage groups in the same way as men. In 
her own analysis, Korczyk finds that women workers display more job 
and labor force mobility than men. After controlling for economic and
Table 3.3 
Median Years with Current Employer, by Age, Sex, and Race, Selected Years 1951-1987
1951 
Worker characteristics
Aged 16 years and over 8
Men
Women
Difference
25-34 years
Men
Women
Difference
35-44 years
Men
Women
Difference
45-54 years
Men
Women
Difference
3.9
2.2
1.7
2.8
1.8
1.0
4.5
3.1
1.4
7.6
4.0
3.6
1963
5.7
3.0
2.7
3.5
2.0
1.5
7.6
3.6
4.0
11.4
6.1
5.3
1966
5.2
2.8
2.4
3.2
1.9
1.3
7.8
3.5
4.3
11.5
5.7
5.8
1968 1973 1978 
Years with employer
4.8
2.4
2.4
2.8
1.6
1.2
6.9
2.9
4.0
11.3
5.1
6.2
4.6
2.8
1.8
3.2
2.2
1.0
6.7
3.6
3.1
11.5
5.9
5.6
4.5
2.6
1.9
2.7
1.6
1.1
6.9
3.6
3.3
11.0
5.9
5.1
1981
4.0
2.5
1.5
2.9
2.0
0.9
6.6
3.5
3.1
11.0
5.9
5.1
1983
5.1
3.7
1.4
3.8
3.2
0.6
7.7
4.6
3.1
13.2
6.9
6.3
1987
5.0
3.6
1.4
3.7
3.1
0.6
7.6
4.9
2.7
12.3
7.3
5.0
White, 16 years and over
Men
Women
Difference
Black, 16 years and over a>b
Men
Women
Difference
4.0
2.3
1.7
3.1
1.7
1.4
5.9
3.0
2.9
4.1
2.9
1.2
5.5
2.8
2.7
3.4
2.8
0.6
5.0
2.4
2.6
3.3
2.0
1.3
4.7
2.8
1.9
4.0
3.3
0.7
4.6
2.6
2.0
3.7
3.6
0.1
4.0
2.4
1.6
4.0
3.3
0.7
5.3
3.6
1.7
4.7
4.4
0.3
5.2
3.5
1.7
4.4
4.3
0.1
SOURCE: Compiled by Andrews (1989) from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Labor Force Senes P- 
50, no. 36 (5 December 1951); Special Labor Force Reports, Bureau of Labor Statistics series on job tenure, nos. 36, 77,172, and 235; and Bulletin 2162 
as quoted for years 1951-1981 by June O'Neill, Journal of Labor Economics (January 1985); 1983 data from Ellen Sehgal, "Occupational Mobility and 
Job Tenure in 1983," Monthly Labor Review (October 1984). 
a. Age 14 years and over in 1951,1963, and 1966. 
b. Includes other nonwhite races through 1968.
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job characteristics, however, these mobility differences narrow, and 
even change direction.
JOB CHANGE, PORTABILITY, AND WOMEN
Women's mobility makes them more vulnerable to portability loss 
than men. 2 As their participation in the workforce increases, their need 
for pension portability grows. The labor force participation rate of 
women age 20 and older grew from 34 to 58 percent from 1955-91, 
while that for men declined from 88 to 78 percent (Economic Report of 
the President 1992, p. 338). These figures show women's labor force 
participation rate relative to men's rose from 38 to 74 percent.
As women's labor force participation has risen and they work more 
years, their pension coverage rates have also risen. The coverage gap 
by gender has closed more rapidly than the earnings gap. From 1972 to 
1988, women's pension coverage rate rose from 70 to 88 percent of 
men's. For that period, median weekly earnings of full-time women 
workers grew from 62 to 72 percent of men's.
Women retiring with pension coverage have lower tenure than men, 
thus reducing their pension replacement rates because pensions reward 
long tenure. Data for workers retiring in 1977 and 1978 show a median 
tenure for female pension beneficiaries of 20 years, compared to 26 for 
men. Women had a median replacement rate of 18 percent, compared 
to 22 percent for men (McCarthy 1985). 3 More recent data on replace 
ment rates show that this gap has increased. In 1989, the figures were 
17 percent for women and 26 percent for men (Beller and McCarthy 
1992).
Women's share of employment differs widely from men's by indus 
try (table 3.4). Women represent more than 40 percent of workers in 
finance, retail trade, and services, but are represented at a lower rate in 
other industries. Two-thirds of working women are employed in 
finance, retail trade, and services, while two-thirds of men are 
employed in the remaining industries. Because of gender segregation 
in the labor force, finance, retail trade, and services are referred to as 
female-dominated industries, while the remaining industries in table 
3.4 are referred to as male-dominated.
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Table 3.4
Employment and Pension Coverage Rates 
by Industry and Gender, 1988
Pension coverage rates 
(percent)
Industry8
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Trade
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Professional
Business and personal
Transportation and public utilities
Construction
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Mining
Percent male
80
74
61
74
54
35
54
73
92
37
86
Women
15
64
50
38
28
43
19
65
25
59
72
Men
13
68
66
52
31
55
30
60
32
59
62
SOURCE; Korczyk (1992, tables 6.7 and 6 8). 
a. Includes self-employed.
The gender mix of an industry's workers dramatically affects pen 
sion coverage rates for both sexes. The male pension coverage advan 
tage 6 percentage points for all private sector wage and salary 
workers narrows to 2 percentage points in male-dominated industries 
and disappears in female-dominated industries. For men, working in a 
male-dominated industry raises the probability of pension coverage 
from 38 to 55 percent, while working in a male-dominated industry 
raises the probability for women from 38 to 53 percent.
Vesting and Service Portability
Though women change jobs more frequently than men, vesting rates 
among women are close to men's. In 1988, 75 percent of women and
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80 percent of men in a pension plan had vested benefit rights in their 
current plan (table 3.5). For workers with a pension on a prior job, 72 
percent of women and 70 percent of men were vested in that pension.
Table 3.5
Pension Coverage and Vesting Among Full-Time
_________Private Sector Workers, by Gender, 1988_________
Women Men
Number Number 
Employee group8 (millions) Percent (millions) Percent
Total
Pension participants in
current or prior job
Current job
Vested
Prior job
Vested
Received lump sum
Current and prior job
No participants in any job
29.0
14.9
12.6
9.5
4.3
3.1
2.3
2.0
14.1
100
51
43
33
15
11
8
7
49
43.5
29.7
21.9
17.4
8.7
6.2
3.3
4.9
13.8
100
68
50
40
20
14
8
11
32
SOURCE: Korczyk (1992, table 6.1). 
a. Includes self-employed workers.
Policymakers seeking to reduce pension losses through portability 
of service presume that a worker leaving a pension-covered job goes to 
a job with similar coverage. That pattern of job change is less likely to 
occur for women. The gender distribution among industries suggests 
that options for continuing pension coverage on later jobs favor men. 
Women with pensions concentrate in female-dominated industries, 
where coverage is less common than in male-dominated industries.
If skills, contacts, and other job-related resources are industry-spe 
cific, women with pension coverage who change jobs will be less able 
than men to use employer-oriented portability options because they 
will be less likely to find another pension-covered job. Portability poli 
cies that rely on employers for benefit continuity thus would be less 
effective for women than policies operating independently of the new
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employer having a plan such as indexing vested benefits of job leav 
ers.
Over 70 percent of male pension participants work in male-domi 
nated industries. Nearly 60 percent of female pension participants 
work in female-dominated industries. Men working full time in male- 
dominated industries have a coverage rate of 55 percent, versus 38 per 
cent for women working full time in female-dominated industries. 
Under similar circumstances, therefore, a male pension participant in a 
male-dominated industry changing jobs within his industry has a 45 
percent greater chance of finding a new job with coverage than a 
female participant in a female-dominated industry [45 = (55 percent/38 
percent) -1]. Considering all male and female pension-covered work 
ers, if (1) they change jobs within their industry, and (2) they have a 
chance equal to the coverage rate for their industry and gender of get 
ting another pension-covered job, 50 percent of males will find cover 
age compared to 44 percent of females. These figures give males a 6 
percentage point, or 14 percent, advantage in odds of finding another 
job with a pension.
Survey data support the hypothesis that women leaving a pension- 
covered job are less likely than men to find another pension-covered 
job. The 1988 Current Population Survey data show 47 percent of 
female workers with pension coverage on a former job were working 
on a pension-covered job as of the survey, versus 55 percent of males. 
Thus, the advantage to males of finding a pension-covered job after 
leaving one is 17 percent [17 = (55 percent/47 percent) -1], close to the 
figure estimated above using coverage rates in different industries.
Men with pension coverage are less mobile among jobs than those 
without coverage, but there is evidence that women's quits are unaf 
fected by pension coverage. Mitchell (1982), using data from the Qual 
ity of Employment Survey collected during the 1970s, found men's 
quit rates were reduced by pension coverage, but women's were not. 
She conjectures that the women's results may reflect the lower value of 
pensions for many covered women who only worked intermittently 
and counted more on spouse retirement benefits than on their own. It 
could also be explained by women at that time being more likely to 
work in small firms. Thus, women's greater mobility makes them more 
vulnerable to portability loss than men.
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Preretirement Distributions
Women who have participated in pension plans on prior jobs are far 
more likely to have received preretirement lump sum distributions than 
men. For women, 53 percent received a lump sum when they left a 
pension-covered job, versus 38 percent of men (Korczyk 1992). Thus, 
portability policy banning lump sum distributions would affect women 
more. Consistent with their lower earnings, women's preretirement 
benefit distributions are also much smaller. Although traditionally 
small distributions are rolled over less frequently than larger distribu 
tions, women invest their smaller lump sums and make more use of 
tax-deferred rollovers. Nearly $3 out of every $10 received by women 
is rolled over into an IRA or qualified plan, compared to $2 of every 
$10 received by men.
JOB TENURE AND PENSIONS
Table 3.6 shows job tenure in the context of pension coverage status. 
This table suggests that pensions are used as a personnel tool to keep 
workers on the job. The workers covered and participating in a pension 
in 1988 averaged 10 years of job tenure, while those without coverage 
averaged 5 years.
Piacentini (1990b) also examined job tenure in relation to pension 
coverage status. He finds that among full-time private-sector wage 
and salary workers, one-fourth of pension participants reported current 
job tenure of 15 or more years, while only 7 percent reported similar 
tenure when the employer did not sponsor a plan. Twice as many work 
ers with at least 15 years of tenure were in defined benefit plans than 
defined contribution plans (31 percent versus 16 percent).
In another study, which also examines job tenure as related to pen 
sion coverage, Korczyk (1990) found that pension coverage rises sig 
nificantly with job tenure (table 3.7). With less than one year on the 
job, fewer than one in eight women are covered by a pension plan, 
compared to one in six men. In the l-to-4 years category, the coverage 
rate rises to just over one in three employees.
Table 3.6 
Percentage Distribution of Workers by Tenure at Current Job, 1988
Years of tenure at current job
Worker 
characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or over
Total 
(OOOs)
72,491
43,491
29,000
63,403
7,011
2,078
3,429
7,837
24,476
17,788
11,476
4,040
2,385
1,060
Less 
thanl
18
17
19
18
18
18
49
33
19
13
9
10
6
8
1-4
34
33
37
34
34
39
39
51
43
29
23
18
17
16
5-9
18
17
18
17
17
19
2
8
23
20
16
13
17
14
10-14
11
11
10
11
12
10
b
c
10
17
13
11
11
14
15 or 
more
15
18
11
16
15
8
b
b
2
19
36
44
45
44
Not 
reported
4
4
4
4
5
6
10
8
4
3
3
4
3
4
Mean 
tenure8
(years)
7
8
6
7
7
5
1
2
4
8
12
14
16
16
Table 3.6 (continued) 
Percentage Distribution of Workers by Tenure at Current Job, 1988
Years of tenure at current job
Worker 
characteristics
1988 earnings
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
Union status*
Union
Nonunion
Firm size
Fewer than 10
10-24
Total
(OOOs)
2,168
8,085
13,542
11,388
9,648
6,742
11,369
3,465
6,085
10,283
56,810
10,344
6,440
Less 
thanl
53
32
22
16
13
10
9
7
18
8
20
22
20
1-4
24
41
43
39
33
27
28
25
28
22
37
38
42
5-9
8
10
15
19
20
21
21
20
16
17
18
16
15
10-14
3
4
7
12
14
16
14
17
11
17
10
8
8
15 or 
more
5
6
8
12
17
23
26
29
15
34
12
10
10
Not 
reported
8
7
5
2
3
3
2
2
11
2
4
5
4
Mean 
tenure8
(years)
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
8
12
6
6
6
25-49
50-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported
May 1988 pension
status6
Noncovered
Coverage unknown
Covered
Nonparticipant
Participation
unknown
Participant
Defined benefitf
Defined
contribution
Plan type not
reported
5,462
4,342
5,637
34,248
6,019
26,842
4,575
44,566
4,782
1,802
34,490
20,484
6,756
7,250
19
22
19
13
29
26
74
13
b
26
6
5
6
10
41
36
38
30
34
41
5
31
75
42
27
23
36
33
18
17
18
19
13
14
1
20
15
14
23
22
25
22
9
8
9
13
8
7
b
13
5
6
16
18
15
13
10
12
12
21
9
7
1
20
5
7
25
31
16
18
4
3
4
4
7
5
20
3
c
5
2
2
1
4
6
6
6
9
5
5
1
9
4
5
10
11
8
8
SOURCE: Data from ftacentini (1990b).
a Mean tenure calculations exclude workers not reporting tenure. Workers reporting "less than one year" of tenure are arbitranly assumed to have one-half
year of tenure.
b. No observations in category.
c. Less than 0.5 percent.
Table 3.6 (continued)
d. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.
e. A worker is considered to be covered if his or her employer sponsors a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type plan for any employ 
ees, or if he or she reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh. A worker is considered to be a current pension partici 
pant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k>type plan at a wage and salary job, or if he or she reported a 
secondary self-employed job and contnbution to an IRA or Keogh. 
f. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type.
Characteristics of Job Changers 33
Table 3.7 
Job Tenure and Pension Coverage by Gender, 1988
All employees8
(%)
Years with primary employer
Less than 1
1-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20 or more
All
Women Men
20.4 17.3
38.7 34.1
18.5 18.1
10.6 11.7
6.1 7.0
5.7 11.9
100.0 100.0
With pension coverage
Less than 1 
1-4
5-9
1-14
15-19
20 or more
All
13.4 18.3 
36.6 38.7
62.5 62.4
69.9 72.6
71.9 77.5
75.3 82.2
44.6 51.3
SOURCE: Korczyk (1990). 
a. Includes self-employed.
MOBILITY AND PENSIONS
A study by Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1990) looks at 
the extent to which workers with current pensions are also likely to be 
covered on successive jobs. Their findings indicate that one-half to 
two-thirds of male job changers age 31 to 50 and initially covered by a 
pension, moved to a job that did not provide coverage. This pattern is 
found in both the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and in the Sur 
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
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Finally, the U.S. Department of Labor has derived the following sta 
tistics from the Form 5500 for 1987 on the extent to which workers are 
protected against pension benefit loss when they change jobs.4
  Fourteen percent of covered workers are in multiemployer plans 
and thus suffer no pension benefit loss for a job change to another 
firm covered by their multiemployer plan.
  An additional 29 percent of covered workers have a defined contri 
bution plan as their primary plan and thus suffer no pension benefit 
loss on that plan when they change jobs and are vested.
  An additional 25 percent of covered workers are covered by a sec 
ondary defined contribution plan and suffer no pension benefit loss 
on that plan when they change jobs.
  An additional 4 percent of covered workers are in a defined benefit 
plan that provides preservation of benefits when changing to 
another employer within a portability network, such as the Bell 
Telephone plans.
To summarize these findings, 72 percent of covered workers have 
some provision for portability or for preservation of benefits with job 
change. Even with this degree of portability and benefit preservation, 
an estimated $7 billion in present value of accrued benefits (excluding 
lump sum cashouts) was lost due to job changes in 1986. 5
NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Phyllis Fernandez and John Turner.
2. This discussion is largely based on Korczyk 1990.
3. This replacement rate is calculated as annual pension benefits divided by the average of the 
high consecutive three years of earnings.
4. The Form 5500 series report is filed with the Internal Revenue Service annually by each 
pension plan in order to disclose information needed to monitor compliance with Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) standards.
5. Compiled from the Form 5500 for 1987 by Daniel J. Seller of the Office of Research and 
Economic Analysis, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
4 
Retirement Benefit Loss
\Vhen workers change jobs, they often lose retirement benefits. This 
chapter discusses various pension plan features that cause job leavers 
to lose pension benefits and the amount of money lost as a result.
MEASURING PORTABILITY LOSS
To clarify alternative measures of portability loss, consider this 
example. Assume that a worker is in a defined benefit plan, where ben 
efits are based on final pay and years of work. Based on current pay 
and years of work to date, the worker has accrued a present value of 
pension benefits of $100. Because retirement is 15 years off and the 
worker's annual pay increase is about 5 percent, the worker expects 
final pay to be twice as high as current pay. Based on expected final 
pay and current years of work, he/she has accrued $200.' The $100 is 
the amount the employee has accrued to date if he/she leaves today. 
The $200 is the amount the employee has accrued to date if he/she 
stays until retirement.
Portability loss can be measured three ways: lost net pension 
wealth; lost gross pension wealth; and lost retirement benefits. The 
value of net pension wealth depends on whether a "free lunch" exists. 
The economic argument of no free lunch implies that a worker must 
exchange higher wages for pension benefits, a tradeoff known as the 
theory of equalizing differentials.
When a job leaver has given up wages equal to a pension's present 
value at job change ($100), he/she has no net pension wealth and thus 
the portability loss is zero. The worker only loses wealth if he/she has 
overpaid in foregone wages for the retained benefit. If he/she has sacri 
ficed $200 of wages in expectation of a pension based on pay at retire 
ment, the worker suffers a portability loss of $100 by leaving.
The second portability loss metric is lost gross pension wealth in 
comparison to no job change. Gross pension wealth based on no job
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change is the present value of accrued expected pension benefits based 
on expected pay at retirement and current tenure. This measure does 
not net out the wages the worker has foregone to earn the pension ben 
efit. The loss is measured as lost accrued pension benefits, regardless 
of whether the worker had actually expected to receive those benefits 
and had paid for them through foregone wages. The worker's gross 
pension wealth is $200 based on no job change. However, if the worker 
changes jobs, his/her gross pension wealth is $100. Thus, the portabil 
ity loss is $100.
A preretirement cashout of benefits is included in net and gross pen 
sion wealth because it is a pension payment received by the worker. 
The worker receives $100 in the cashout, but this is not considered a 
portability loss because it is not a financial loss to the worker. The 
receipt of a preretirement cashout thus does not affect portability loss 
as calculated by the first two measures.
The third metric is the loss of future retirement benefits. Policymak- 
ers use this measure most commonly because it stresses the importance 
of retirement income. By this metric, if a worker changes jobs, he/she 
loses $100 in future pension benefits a portability loss. If he/she 
takes a preretirement cashout and does not reinvest it, he/she suffers a 
further portability loss of $100 because future retirement benefits are 
reduced. If the worker changes jobs, cashes out a pension, and does not 
put the money in another vehicle for retirement savings, he/she has a 
portability loss of $200. If, however, the cashout is rolled over for 
retirement savings, it is not considered a portability loss.
Under this metric, job leavers with defined benefit plans lose ben 
efits by changing jobs even if they do not cash out because such plans 
are based, explicitly or implicitly, on final salary and favor long ten 
ure. 2 Though it may be argued that the short-tenure worker has not yet 
accrued the benefits awarded to long-tenure workers (because those 
benefits are based on future salary not yet earned), the worker would 
have accrued those benefits based on tenure to date had he/she stayed 
until retirement: the lost benefits are a clear cost of job change.
Some analysts, accepting the first or second measure, argue that if a 
worker chooses to cash out there is no financial loss. Other analysts 
argue that a preretirement cash distribution from a pension plan would 
not be a portability loss if the worker saved it for retirement. Money 
used to pay down the mortgage, they argue, does not constitute a porta-
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bility loss because the worker saves the money, albeit in an illiquid 
form, for retirement. For laid-off unemployed workers, using a cashout 
to pay the mortgage may be a necessity.
Yet others contend that a worker consuming a cashout could reflect 
the fact that a given plan had forced the worker to save too much. 
Cashing out allowed the worker to bring his/her retirement savings in 
line with expected retirement needs.
A worker losing benefits from one plan may not have reduced his/ 
her retirement income by moving to another, since the pension from 
the succeeding employer may offset the loss. The worker could further 
offset a pension loss by raising his/her personal savings, perhaps aided 
by higher income from the new job.
Thus, while portability losses are commonly considered as losses in 
a worker's retirement income from a pension, they are not necessarily 
forfeitures in real wealth because the worker may not yet have paid for 
those future benefits through lower wages, or may have taken the bene 
fits as a preretirement lump sum payment. Neither is a portability loss 
necessarily a loss in total retirement income when a worker offsets the 
portability loss through higher pension benefits on a future job.
WHO SUFFERS PORTABILITY LOSSES?
Workers covered by a pension on a prior job often have suffered a 
portability loss by changing jobs. Of the full-time 1988 workforce, 18 
percent had been covered by a pension on a prior job (table 4.1). Work 
ers who are more likely to be covered by a pension on their current 
jobs are those who would have been more commonly covered by a 
pension on a prior job. A higher percentage of male than female full- 
time workers were covered on a prior job (20 versus 15 percent). The 
share of workers covered by a pension on a prior job is higher at older 
ages and higher incomes: of those age 45 to 54,23 percent were previ 
ously covered; of those earning more than $50,000, 33 percent were 
previously covered. The odds of having lost benefits due to a job 
change also vary by occupation. Twenty-five percent of managers ver 
sus 11 percent of service workers were previously covered.
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An indicator of economic loss by workers with pension coverage on 
a prior job is their current coverage status. Of all workers reporting a 
pension on a prior job, 69 percent reported having a pension on the 
current job (table 4.2). The figure is similar for males and females, at 
70 and 67 percent. The figure is also similar by age 70 percent for 
workers 25 to 34 and for workers 55 to 59. The results differ by earn 
ings, however. For those earning $5,00049,999,43 percent with prior 
pension coverage were currently covered. The percentage was twice 
that, 86 percent, for workers earning more than $50,000. The figures 
also vary greatly by industry, 84 percent in manufacturing and 54 per 
cent in retail trade. The figures vary greatly by size of current 
employer. For workers in firms with 25 or fewer workers, 29 percent 
with prior pension coverage were currently covered, versus 89 percent 
for workers in firms with 250 or more workers.
TYPES OF PORTABILITY LOSS
Pension benefits are lost due to job change for three reasons: (1) 
workers change jobs before vesting; (2) plans provide lower benefits 
per year of service for job leavers; or (3) job leavers cash out their pen 
sions and spend the money.
Vesting Losses
A worker with a vested pension is guaranteed to receive the nominal 
value of those funds at retirement. Thus, when a worker who is fully 
vested in pension benefits worth $100 a month quits, he/she will 
receive $100 a month at retirement. When the worker is 50 percent 
vested, he/she will receive $50 a month. Workers who are not vested 
receive nothing.
Before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), federal law did not set minimum years for vesting. Many 
pension plans vested workers' rights to benefits after they had reached 
age 45 and had 15 years of service. This meant that a worker with 
many years of service could be laid off or change jobs and receive no 
pension.
In passing ERISA, Congress wished to ensure that long-service 
pension-covered workers would receive their retirement benefits. Prior
Table 4.1 
Pension Coverage Rates on Current and Prior Jobs, 1988
Current participants"
Worker 
characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Earnings
$1-54,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000424,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
Workers 
(thousands)
72,491
43,491
29,000
63,403
7,011
2,078
2,168
8,085
13,542
11,388
9,648
6,742
11,369
3,465
6,085
Total 
(%)
48
50
43
48
42
48
7
15
35
49
60
68
74
79
24
Defined 
benefit6
(%)
28
30
25
29
26
28
5
7
19
27
38
42
47
48
10
Defined 
contribution15 
(%)
9
10
9
10
6
8
1
3
8
11
10
12
13
16
6
Prior 
participants 
(%)
18
20
15
19
13
11
12
11
13
17
18
23
25
33
15
Current8 and 
prior 
participants
(%)
10
11
7
10
7
6
1
2
5
9
10
14
17
27
4
Current8 or 
prior 
participants
(%)
56
59
51
57
48
54
18
24
43
57
68
77
81
85
34
Table 4.1 (continued)
Current participants8
Worker 
characteristics
Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or older
Occupation
Professional/ 
technical
Managers/officials
Sales
Administrative 
support
Craftsmen
Operatives
Transportation
Workers 
(thousands)
3,429
7,837
24,476
17,788
11,476
4,040
2,385
1,060
9,494
10,285
8,388
11,067
11,061
7,223
Total
(%)
12
26
46
56
58
57
55
33
60
56
40
51
52
53
Defined 
benefit6 
(%)
6
14
26
34
37
39
39
18
34
31
21
31
34
36
Defined 
contributionb
(%)
2
5
11
11
10
7
8
6
13
12
8
11
10
7
Prior 
participants 
(%)
2
6
15
24
23
21
27
26
24
25
21
17
16
10
Current8 and 
prior 
participants
(%)
1
2
8
14
13
12
14
7
15
15
10
9
9
5
Current" or 
prior 
participants
(%)
13
31
54
67
68
67
68
52
69
66
51
60
60
58
equipment operator 3,617 44 27 19 55
Nonfarm laborers
Service workers
Other
Tenure
Less than 1 year
1-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 years or more
Not reported
Union status0
Union
Nonunion
Not reported
Firm size
Fewer than 25
25-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported
3,332
6,656
1,417
12,853
24,952
12,693
7,840
11,131
3,023
10,283
56,810
5,398
16,784
9,804
5,637
34,248
6,019
36
22
13
16
38
62
72
78
23
78
44
25
16
35
47
68
36
23
11
6
7
19
36
47
56
11
57
25
11
7
17
23
45
18
6
4
4
3
10
13
13
10
2
9
10
6
4
10
12
11
7
10
11
8
23
21
18
13
9
15
14
19
15
15
19
18
19
16
5
4
2
7
11
13
10
7
6
11
10
4
3
8
10
14
7
41
29
19
32
48
67
74
80
33
81
53
36
28
47
56
74
44
SOURCE: May 1988 Current Population Survey; Piacentim (1990b).
a. A worker is considered to be a current pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401 (k>type
plan at a wage and salary job, or reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
b. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type. See discussion of this issue in this paper.
c. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.
Table 4.2 
Pension Coverage of Workers Covered on a Prior Job
Worker 
characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Earnings
$1 -$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000-$ 14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000429,999
$30,000449,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
Participant at 
any prior job 
(thousands)
12,998
8,706
4,292
11,850
915
232
270
887
1,792
1,909
1,773
1,530
2,787
1,150
900
Proportion 
currently 
covered1*
(%)
69
70
67
69
71
73
25
43
57
70
71
79
84
86
40
Proportion currently participating8
Total
(%)
53
56
47
53
51
53
9
16
35
52
55
63
71
81
29
Defined 
benefit'
(%)
30
32
24
30
29
32
9
6
17
25
33
39
40
48
12
Defined 
contribution0
(%)
12
13
11
13
8
d
d
4
7
13
12
12
16
19
8
Plan type not 
reported 
(%)
12
12
12
11
14
21
d
5
11
13
10
11
15
14
9
Age
16-20
21-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
60-64
65 or older
Industry
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Total
Nondurable
Durable
Trade
Total
Wholesale
Retail
Services
Total
Professional
Business and personal
Transportation
81
496
3,766
4,226
2,655
868
632
273
90
3,550
1,394
2,155
2,383
847
1,536
3,354
2,176
1,178
591
79
49
70
73
68
70
66
47
38
84
79
88
57
63
54
62
68
50
60
42
25
51
58
57
54
54
26
28
67
60
72
41
52
34
44
48
37
50
37
15
26
32
32
32
39
12
15
40
37
42
20
26
17
19
21
16
33
d
3
15
13
12
7
4
5
8
12
9
14
11
13
10
14
15
10
9
5
7
9
13
12
15
12
9
5
15
13
16
9
13
7
11
12
10
8
Table 4.2 (continued)
Participant at 
Worker any prior job 
characteristics (thousands)
Communication and
utilities
Construction
Finance, insurance, and
real estate
Mining
Tenure
Less than 1 year
1-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 years or more
Not reported
Union status6
Union
Nonunion
Not reported
Firm size
Fewer than 25
418
850
1,581
181
2,950
5,305
2,274
1,010
994
466
1,446
10,718
833
2,559
Proportion 
currently 
covered1* 
(%)
87
48
79
74
59
66
78
82
82
63
91
68
40
29
Proportion currently participating8
Total 
(%)
74
41
61
60
30
50
72
78
78
37
78
52
29
21
Defined 
benefit0 
(%)
58
22
35
41
15
24
44
50
53
20
53
28
12
8
Defined 
contribution0 
(%)
10
11
12
5
6
14
17
12
12
3
12
12
9
8
Plan type not 
reported 
(%)
6
7
14
14
8
12
12
16
12
14
13
12
9
6
25-99
100-249
250 or more
Not reported
1,868
1,018
6,618
936
55
71
89
64
41
53
70
48
18
24
43
24
13
15
14
11
10
14
14
13
SOURCE: May 1988 Current Population Survey; PiacenUm (1990b).
a. A worker is considered to be a current pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type
plan at a wage and salary job, or reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
b. A worker is considered to be currently covered by a pension if his or her employer sponsored a pension, retirement, profit-shanng, stock, or 401 (k>
type plan for any employees, or if he or she reported a secondary self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
c. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type. See discussion of this issue in this paper.
d. No observations in category.
e. Workers are classified as union if they reported union membership or coverage under a union contract.
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to 1989, ERISA required private pension plans to at least partially vest 
after 10 years. 3 Most plans offered 10-year cliff vesting, with zero vest 
ing up to 10 years, and then 100 percent vesting after that plateau. 
Starting in 1989, ERISA required firms to at least partially vest work 
ers after five years in single-employer pension plans, which cover 
about 90 percent of participants. Most single-employer defined benefit 
plans now offer five-year cliff vesting. Workers with less than five 
years of tenure lose all rights to benefits under these plans, and firms 
offering cliff vesting can thus avoid paying pension benefits for short- 
term workers. By law, worker contributions vest immediately.
Plan Design Losses
Fully vested workers in defined benefit plans still lose retirement 
benefits when changing jobs due to the ways employers design pension 
benefit formulas.
Defined Benefit Plans
Under defined benefit plans, employers figure benefits using various 
earnings and service formulas (table 4.3), and losses vary with each 
plan design.
Final-pay benefit formulas are the most common defined benefit 
plans. In 1989, 64 percent of enrolled workers in large and medium- 
sized firms were enrolled in final-pay defined benefit plans.
Between the time a vested worker leaves and the time a plan begins 
paying benefits, the fixed nominal benefit declines in real value due to 
inflation. Consider a worker earning $25,000 leaving a job at age 45 
with 10 years of service. Under a defined benefit plan, his/her vested 
benefit might be 1 percent of final salary times the number of years of 
service. Thus, the vested annual pension benefit, which a worker could 
begin collecting in this plan at age 65, is $2,500 a year (figured as .01 x 
$25,000 x 10 years of service).
If the same worker had worked under the plan from age 55 to 65, 
rather than from 45 to 55, he/she would receive much higher benefits 
for 10 years of work. If the worker's income only kept pace with infla 
tion, and if inflation were 4 percent a year, the salary at 65 would be 
$55,000. Thus, the annual retirement benefit from the plan would be 
$5,500.
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Table 43
Benefit Formulas in Defined Benefit Plans, 1989 
(percent of full-time participants)
Professional
and Technical Production
All administrative and clerical and service
Basis of payment8 participants participants participants participants
Total
Terminal earnings
formula
No alternative
formula
Terminal earnings
alternative
Career-earnings
alternative
Dollar-amount
alternative1*
Percent of
contributions
alternative
100
64
35
10
3
17
c
100
77
42
11
4
20
c
100
76
45
9
4
18
c
100
51
25
10
2
14
_
Career-earnings formula 11 
No alternative formula 6
Career-earnings 
alternative c
Dollar-amount 
alternative15 5
Dollar-amount formula*5 22 
No alternative formula 19
Dollar-amount 
alternative15 2
Percent of 
contributions 
alternative 1
Percent of contributions 
formula 1
Cash account 2
15
8
10
7
3
11
9
10
4
5
37
32
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1990).
NOTES: Excludes supplemental pension plans. Because of founding, sums of individual items
may not equal totals. Dash indicates no employees in this category.
a. Alternative formulas are generally designed to provide a minimum benefit for employees with
short service or low earnings.
b. Includes formulas based on dollar amounts for each year of service and flat monthly benefit
varying by service.
c. Less than 0.5 percent.
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This worker has the same real earnings (adjusted for inflation) and 
the same tenure. But work between ages 55 and 65 yielded a benefit 
worth over twice that earned between ages 35 and 45. The two retire 
ment benefits differ because the plan did not index the salary used in 
figuring the job leaver's benefit. Inflation between ages 45 and 65 cuts 
the real value of the wages used to figure the benefit
The worker also would have earned over twice the benefit per year 
for the earlier 10-year period had he/she continued working with the 
same employer until age 65. This follows because the benefit earned 
during that decade also would have been figured using the $55,000 
final earnings. The worker lost 55 percent of pension benefits for work 
from age 35 to 45 that he/she would have earned had he/she worked 
until retirement.
This illustrates that even moderate inflation, like that experienced 
during the early 1990s, causes large portability losses for workers cov 
ered by final-pay benefit formulas. Other sources of wage growth  
general productivity growth, promotion, and merit pay raises cause 
added portability loss. With a 4 percent annual increase due to inflation 
and a 1.5 percent annual increase due to productivity growth, the work 
er's salary at age 65 is $75,000 In this case, the worker loses 66 percent 
of the benefits he/she would have received for the earlier period had 
he/she stayed with the employer until retirement.
Benefit losses are even larger than those losses due to wage growth 
in plans where the eligibility age for full retirement benefits depends 
on minimum service (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a). These plans 
reward continuing employment by lowering or removing the penalty 
for early retirement and by crediting extra service and higher salary 
when figuring benefits.
Plans based on a career-average benefit formula covered 11 percent 
of workers in defined benefit plans in large and medium-sized firms in 
1989. Workers in these plans would appear to maintain benefits when 
changing jobs because the pension benefit is figured as a share of aver 
age (nominal) pay over the worker's career. Such plans count pay 
earned each year with the employer; therefore, job change would 
appear not to affect the value of benefits accrued to date.
In career-average plans, however, preretirement inflation erodes the 
real value of benefits. Erosion occurs equally for those who leave and 
those who stay until retirement. While final earnings generally keep
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pace with inflation, earlier earnings, which are fixed in nominal terms, 
do not. Inflation lowers the real value of the career-average salary 
because nominal earnings are used to compute the career average.
To counteract inflationary loss, most employers periodically update 
the career-average earnings base, amending the plan to raise pay bases 
in order to counteract the effect of inflation. Typically, employers 
adjust the base only for workers they employ as of the adjustment date. 
Thus, job leavers in career-average plans suffer portability losses 
because they do not benefit from subsequent pay adjustments used for 
benefit calculation.
Collectively bargained plans, negotiated between management and 
labor, generally figure benefits as a flat sum per year of service. In 
1989, 22 percent of workers in defined benefit plans in medium-size 
and large firms were covered by flat-dollar benefit formulas.
In a flat-dollar plan, a retiring worker might receive a monthly bene 
fit of $18 times years of service. If the worker had worked 30 years 
under the pension plan, the monthly benefit would be $540.
It might appear that job leavers do not lose benefits in this type of 
plan. The dollars per year of service would be the same for those who 
leave and those who stay. But employers typically raise the dollar units 
(per year of service) used in calculating benefits each time they renego 
tiate the union contract. Job leavers in this type of plan lose benefits 
because former workers who have not reached retirement age rarely 
share in the dollar unit increases.
In sum, even though some defined benefit pension formulas do not 
explicitly adjust for final earnings, most do in practice. This results in 
pension benefit losses for job leavers, because they have relatively low 
final earnings and lose benefits primarily due to inflation. During infla 
tionary periods, creditors lose and debtors gain when assets are fixed in 
nominal terms. Job leavers who were enrolled in defined benefit plans 
on prior jobs are creditors with assets fixed in nominal terms. They 
lose.
Defined Contribution Plans
Under a defined contribution plan, the employer, the worker, or both 
contribute. The plan credits contributions and investment earnings to 
an employee account where workers' contributions vest immediately. 
When an employee has worked long enough for the employer's contri-
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butions to vest, the account balance plus all future earnings provide 
retirement income for the worker, even if he/she changes jobs. Most 
defined contribution plans treat short- and long-term workers equally; 
thus, vested short-term workers do not lose benefits when changing 
jobs if they leave the money with the plan. However, job leavers in 
some defined contribution plans do lose benefits due to backloading. In 
these plans, the employer contributes a higher percentage of pay for 
long-service workers.4
Losses Due to Preretirement Distributions
Fully vested job leavers may lose retirement benefits if they receive 
a lump sum cash distribution from their pension plan. Employers with 
defined benefit plans figure lump sum payments according to actuarial 
tables the employer chooses with the plan actuary's advice (within lim 
its set by the federal government). Under defined contribution plans, 
the distributed lump sum is the amount of money in the worker's retire 
ment account.
Employers who cash out terminating workers sidestep administra 
tive burdens and are not required to pay the yearly premiums to the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In 1992 those premi 
ums ranged from $19 to $72 per participant in defined benefit plans, 
with underfunded plans charged the higher rates by PBGC. Typically, 
plans pay lump sum distributions directly to the job leaver, who then 
has several options. He/she can (1) spend the money, (2) transfer it to 
another tax-qualified pension arrangement such as an IRA, or (3) save 
it in a nonretirement account.
If the worker spends the distribution, it provides no retirement bene 
fits. If the worker transfers the money to another tax-qualified arrange 
ment or saves it in a nonretirement account, he/she can use the sum for 
retirement. Saving it in a tax-qualified retirement account yields a 
higher return because the worker benefits from tax preferences.
In the three cases, however, the job leaver loses benefits if the distri 
bution is from a defined benefit plan, due to the benefit being calcu 
lated using termination rather than retirement age wages. Also, when 
taking a lump sum cashout, the worker surrenders the survivor protec 
tion and ad hoc cost-of-living increases that a defined benefit plan 
might have paid.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires plans to figure lump sum dis 
tributions for small and medium-sized amounts using the Pension Ben 
efit Guaranty Corporation interest rate for calculating deferred 
liabilities. Because this rate is less than a market rate, workers will 
receive a generous lump sum. This generosity prompts workers to take 
lump sum distributions. 5 However, for large distributions the firm may 
use an interest rate closer to a market rate.
If job leavers take a lump sum distribution and roll over the money 
into an IRA, they may lose benefits even from a defined contribution. 
First, individuals tend to invest conservatively. Second, employers 
sometimes pay plan administrative expenses rather than charging them 
against plan assets; the individual bears the expenses of an IRA. Third, 
economies of scale make administering an employer plan less costly 
than an individual plan. Fourth, employer plans can invest in large 
denomination securities with a better rate of return. Individual IRAs 
have too few assets to make investing in large denomination securities 
feasible.
Workers who are not changing jobs may also incur losses from pre 
retirement distributions. A worker may be eligible for a preretirement 
hardship withdrawal from a defined contribution plan. The IRS allows 
this exception for unreimbursed medical expenses, purchase of a prin 
cipal residence, educational expenses, and prevention of eviction/fore 
closure. Hardship withdrawals cut future retirement benefits, but are 
not a portability loss because the employee has remained with the com 
pany.
A worker whose firm or division is sold also may receive a distribu 
tion without changing jobs.6 In 1986 the IRS took the "same desk" 
position: if an employee leaves work Friday and returns Monday to the 
same desk but is working for a different employer, he/she cannot claim 
a distribution from the pension plan. In 1990, the IRS changed its 
mind.7 Now the employee may take a distribution of benefits in the 
same desk scenario if the old employer permits it, unless pension 
assets and liabilities transfer to the new employer. The decision enables 
employers to control whether they will make preretirement distribu 
tions. If the pension assets and liabilities are not transferred to the pur 
chaser, preretirement distributions arising from the sale are allowed.
Distributions to affected workers are now allowed for stock sales of 
businesses. In a stock sale, the worker's corporate employer stays the
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same, though corporate employer ownership changes. The employ 
ment relationship with the employer maintaining the plan is severed if, 
among other conditions, the pension plan is maintained by the original 
parent but is no longer maintained by the subsidiary in the new owner's 
hands.
HOW IMPORTANT ARE PORTABILITY LOSSES?
The size of portability losses has been examined by an actuarial 
consulting firm, Hay/Huggins Incorporated (1988), under contract to 
the U.S. Department of Labor. To do this, they derived job mobility 
patterns from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which includes 
extensive pension and job tenure data. Workers with differing lifetime 
job mobility patterns were assigned pension coverage based on cover 
age data by pension plan type.
The Hay/Huggins study used a simplified model of U.S. career pat 
terns and pension plans, including only primary plan coverage. (About 
40 percent of pension-covered workers are also covered by a supple 
mentary defined contribution plan (Turner and Beller 1992).) Workers 
initially enrolled in a pension plan were assumed to have coverage on 
all successive jobs. Thus, workers with career gaps in pension cover 
age were not considered. The simulation used a five-year cliff-vesting 
rule for all plans. (While most single-employer plans use five-year cliff 
vesting, multiemployer plans commonly use 10-year cliff vesting.) The 
study estimated expected portability losses caused by pension cover 
age patterns for representative job histories.
Ignoring preretirement cashouts of pension benefits, pensioners 
lose, on average, 15 percent of lifetime benefits they would have 
earned if all pension-covered work had fallen under the last pension 
plan in which they were enrolled (table 4.4). This figure applies to all 
pension-covered workers, including those who do not change jobs. It 
considers portability loss due to failure to vest completely and failure 
to index deferred vested benefits.
The percentage loss figure is for primary plans only and ignores 
social security and secondary private pension plans. As social security 
causes no portability loss, including social security benefits reduces the
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portability loss to 10 percent of retirement benefits. Because secondary 
plans are typically portable defined contribution plans, including them 
would indicate that the percentage of all retirement benefits workers 
lose due to vesting and plan design is smaller. However, because of the 
lump sum option for terminating workers in defined contribution plans, 
to include supplementary plans probably would raise the portability 
loss relative to benefits.
Table 4.4
Loss in Portability Model 
Percentage of benefits as
portability loss Percentage of covered workers
40-49 63 
30-39 13.4 
20-29 19 4 
10-19 15.2 
1-9 46 
None 38.4 
Gain 2.7 
Total 100.0 
Average loss for all workers 14.8 
Average loss for workers with a loss 23.3
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the 
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last 
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least 
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition since the 
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35 
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."
Of pension-covered workers, 41 percent suffered no portability loss. 
They either stayed with the same employer for 35 or more years and 
then retired, or they were covered by primary defined contribution 
plans (considered in the study to cause no portability losses). The 59 
percent of pension-covered workers who did suffer portability loss, on 
average lost 23 percent of retirement income.
While 5 percent of workers losing benefits lost less than 10 percent 
of their benefits, 6 percent lost between 40 and 49 percent of their ben 
efits. In 1988 dollars, workers losing benefits lost, on average, $5,000 
of future annual income per year of retirement.
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Portability losses are higher for pension-covered workers with mul 
tiple job changes (table 4.5). Workers with one job change lost 10 per 
cent, those with two changes lost 20 percent, and those with three 
changes lost, on average, 25 percent of the benefits they would have 
received had they stayed with one employer.
Table 4.5
Portability Loss by Number of Jobs 
Number of jobs Percentage loss
1 OO
2 10.0
3 13.9
4 21.3
5 24.4
6 31.1
___________7______________________42.4__________ 
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
Losses also vary by plan type (table 4.6). Workers covered by multi- 
employer and defined contribution plans have little, if any, loss regard 
less of how many times they change jobs. They lose benefits in those 
plans primarily because they move before vesting. (Job leavers in mul- 
tiemployer plans were assumed to go to another employer in the same 
multiemployer plan.) Workers who were covered by single-employer 
defined benefit plans and who changed jobs had losses from 16 to 24 
percent, depending on plan type. Those who suffered the highest losses 
were enrolled in final-salary plans
Table 4.6
Portability Loss by Type of Plan 
Type of plan Percentage loss
Multiemployer 1.5 
Flat-dollar 16.1 
Final-pay
Offset 24.6
Step rate 23.8
Career-average 18.1
Defined contribution 1.0
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
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Preretirement Distributions
Evidence suggests that portability losses due to preretirement lump 
sum distributions are growing because these distributions are becom 
ing more common. Of the 8.5 million civilian workers in May 1988 
reporting a lump sum distribution from a prior job's plan, 4.4 million 
indicated that they had received a distribution since 1983 (Piacentini 
1990b). A total of 1.1 million workers reported having received multi 
ple distributions. Between 1983 and 1988, the share of workers who 
reported having received a lump sum distribution from a prior job rose 
from 6.6 to 7.5 percent. In May 1988,21.6 million nonfarm workers  
21 percent reported being eligible for a lump sum distribution from 
the primary retirement plan at a current job.
Hay/Huggins estimated that average portability losses of covered 
workers would rise from 15 to 39 percent if job leavers cashed out all 
vested benefits from primary plans. But they estimated that only 25 
percent of primary plans allowed cashouts of $3,500 or more. If work 
ers consumed all lump sum distributions available, the average 
employee would lose 21 percent, instead of the 15 percent now attrib 
uted to inflation and failure to vest. Thus, Hay/Huggins estimated, 25 
percent of portability losses are due to workers consuming lump sum 
benefits before retirement. The U.S. Department of Labor, by including 
supplemental defined contribution plans, estimates that lump sum dis 
tributions are, in fact, much larger. The DOL suggests that these distri 
butions constitute two-thirds of the portability losses incurred (Ball 
1990).
Projecting Portability Loss
In deciding how to cut portability loss, policymakers must consider 
the future. If workers are expected to lose little in the future, then the 
need for portability diminishes.8 Projecting pension benefit losses is 
speculative, but nonetheless may aid policymakers in deciding what 
types of portability policies to pursue.
Table 4.7 contains projected portability loss to the year 2000. A 
straight line projection of the shift from defined benefit to defined con 
tribution plans is used. The 15 percent portability loss in 1987 falls to 9 
percent by the year 2000.
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Table 4.7 
Projection of Portability Loss to the Year 2000
1987
defined Year 2000 
benefit/ defined benefit/ 
defined defined 
contribution contribution 
mix mix 
(*)
Primary Benefit
Primary + Supplemental*
Primary + Supplemental* + Social Security
14.7 9.0 
8.0 
6.1
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
* Assumes 90 percent of employees covered by single employer primary defined benefit plan
have a supplemental defined contribution plan.
Including supplemental defined contribution plans and social secu 
rity permits figuring the share of total retirement benefits lost to job 
change. The projections indicate that by the year 2000 workers will 
lose 6 percent of their total retirement benefits due to job change. This 
estimate excludes preretirement lump sum payments, the subject of the 
next chapter.
NOTES
1. This calculation is based on the worker's expected salary at retirement. The worker's 
expected benefits at normal retirement age, early retirement age, and the age that maximizes the 
present value of benefits all may affect his/her expected retirement age.
2. Final salary refers to final average salary, often the average of the workers highest five years 
of salary.
3. Years of participation in a pension plan do not necessarily equal years of work for an 
employer. However, later in the text, the term "years of work" is used rather than the more techni 
cally precise term "years of participation."
4. In the past, a portability loss was suffered in some defined contribution plans due to class- 
year vesting, which is no longer permitted. With class-year vesting, regardless of the number of 
years of service, an employer's contributions for the current year did not vest until a later year.
5. To determine the value of the lump sum payment, an interest rate is used to discount future 
benefits.
6. This section draws on matenal presented in Wyatt (1990).
7. In a general counsel memorandum discussed in Chernoff (1990, p. 18).
8. This section is based on "Projection of Total Portability Loss," a report by Hay/Huggins to 
the Department of Labor, February 1991.
Preretirement Use 
of Retirement Benefits
\Vorkers cashing out their pension plans when they change jobs is the 
major cause of lost retirement benefits. The practice has raised concern 
that the current generation of workers will have insufficient retirement 
income when it retires. This chapter examines who cashes out and how 
much they receive. 1 Two U.S. Bureau of the Census surveys provide 
data on these preretirement lump sum distributions: the May 1983 Cur 
rent Population Survey Pension Supplement (CPS PS) and the May 
1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement (CPS 
EBS). Each of these surveys included questions about receipt and use 
of lump sum distributions by civilian workers.
The chapter begins by providing a framework for discussion of pre 
retirement lump sum distributions. It is followed by more detailed 
examinations of the availability, receipt, and use of the distributions as 
reflected in the 1983 and 1988 CPS pension supplements.
BACKGROUND
The growth of defined contribution plans as primary retirement 
options and as supplemental plans has increased the availability and 
receipt of preretirement lump sum distributions. Unlike defined benefit 
plans, defined contribution plans typically pay lump sum distributions 
at retirement or preretirement job separation. The trend toward defined 
contribution plans coincides with enactment of the Employee Retire 
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which provides a conve 
nient reference point. Total active participants in defined contribution 
plans increased from 9.8 million in 1975, before ERISA fully took 
effect, to 27.5 million in 1987 a 281 percent increase. Active partici 
pants in defined benefit plans increased only 6 percent over the same
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period, gaining 1.5 million for a total of 28.0 million participants in 
1987.
ERISA permits defined benefit plans to cash out job leavers with 
small accrued benefits, set at a maximum of $3,500, without requiring 
consent of the participants. Laws regulating pensions enacted since 
ERISA continue to permit lump sum distributions, at the same time 
discouraging workers from consuming cashouts by imposing excise 
taxes or other economic disincentives.
With the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, Congress mandated sev 
eral changes to encourage workers to save distributions for retirement. 
It imposed a 10 percent excise tax on all preretirement distributions 
from qualified retirement plans, including Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs). This tax does not apply to distributions rolled over to 
another qualified plan, to an IRA, or to distributions of employee con 
tributions.
In another move inducing workers not to cash out, Congress, in the 
TRA, repealed 10-year forward averaging and substituted one-time 5- 
year tax averaging for a lump sum distribution after the individual has 
reached age 59 1/2. The TRA also phased out, over six years, the long- 
term capital gains tax treatment of lump sum distributions. In 1992 
Congress imposed a 20 percent withholding on lump sum distributions 
that were not rolled over.
LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
Availability
Data show substantial availability of lump sum distributions before 
retirement, with the greater proportion available from defined contribu 
tion plans. Using May 1988 data, Piacentini (1990b) finds that one- 
fifth of full-time private sector wage and salary workers reported cur 
rent eligibility to receive a preretirement lump sum distribution from 
their primary retirement plan.
Recipients in 1983
In 1983, 6.6 million currently employed workers reported receiving 
a lump sum from a prior employer's pension or capital accumulation
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plan at some time. This means that three out of every five workers who 
had changed jobs and were vested in the prior employer's plan took a 
lump sum distribution upon job change (Atkins 1986).
Definite patterns emerge in analysis of the 6.6 million recipients 
(table 5.1). One-half of the men and three-quarters of the women who 
were vested in a previous plan took a lump sum upon job change. 
Among age groups, younger workers had the highest percentages of 
lump sum receipt, with workers between ages 25 and 34 showing the 
highest rate (76 percent). Workers in the ascending age groups that fol 
low show a pattern of decreasing lump sum receipt through the 65 and 
over age group, which had only a 21 percent rate of receipt.
Receipt by income level shows consistency in the four middle 
ranges covering between $5,000 and $30,000. These four categories 
show rates of lump sum receipt ranging from 62 to 64 percent. Workers 
earning less than $5,000 had the highest rates of lump sum receipt (71 
percent), and those earning $50,000 or more had the lowest (46 per 
cent).
Regarding the amount of the distribution, although a greater per 
centage of women than men took a lump sum upon job change, they 
also more commonly received smaller amounts than men. Eighty-four 
percent of workers received a lump sum of less than $5,000, and only 8 
percent of women received $5,000 or more versus 20 percent of men 
(table 5.2). While these amounts appear small, it should be remem 
bered that they would be considerably larger if left in the plan until 
retirement. At 3 percent real interest, a lump sum distribution of $5,000 
taken at age 30 would grow to $14,300 in real dollars at age 65. Among 
other characteristics, age and income had the greatest association with 
lump sum distribution amounts. Older workers and high-income indi 
viduals received the largest amounts.
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Table 5.1
Percentage of Workers with a Pension from a Previous Job Receiving 
a Lump Sum by Characteristic of Worker, 1983
Worker 
characteristics
Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-64
65 or over
Income
Missing
$0 or negative
$l-$4,999
$5,000-59,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Total
Received lump sum 
<*)
50.9
76.7
51.2
75.5
68.9
54.8
41.5
20.9
57.5
44.1
71.3
63.9
610
63.2
61.7
52.4
45.6
60.1
Total 
(thousands)
7,033
3,902
319
2,867
3,091
2,285
1,781
590
489
139
753
1,338
1,882
1,704
2,356
1,594
676
10,935
SOURCE: Data from Atkins (1986).
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Table 5.2 
Amount of Lump Sum Received by Characteristic of Worker, 1983
Worker 
characteristics
Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35^14
45-54
55-64
65 or over
Income
Missing
$0 or negative
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Total
Received 
less than 
$5,000 
(*)
78.3
91.1
99.5
91.9
83.7
78.9
71.2
67.6
84.7
57.8
91.1
91.7
89.1
85.4
84.7
73.5
62.2
84.3
Received 
$5,000 and 
over 
(%)
19.9
8.2
0.5
7.0
15.6
18.9
26.4
32.4
12.0
37.5
6.7
7.3
10.4
14.3
13.4
24.8
37.4
14.5
Don't 
know Total 
(%) (thousands)
1.8
0.7
0.0
1.1
0.7
2.2
2.4
0.0
3.3
4.7
2.2
1.0
0.5
0.3
1.9
1.6
0.4
1.3
3,580
2,993
163
2,164
2,130
1,253
739
123
282
61
537
855
1,147
1,076
1,453
835
308
6,574
SOURCE: Data from Atkins (1986).
NOTE: Numbers may not add to 100 due to founding.
Uses in 1983
Analysis of the 1983 CPS pension data shows that the uses of prere 
tirement lump sums are strongly associated with the dollar amount. 
Only 26 percent of those receiving distributions of less than $5,000 
saved some of the money (table 5.3). This percentage more than dou 
bles for the $5,000 to $9,999 distribution range (58 percent), rises to 79 
percent in the $10,000 to $19,000 range, and peaks at 87 percent in the 
$20,000 and over range. The greatest number of recipients, 84 percent, 
received less than $5,000, and 77 percent of these spent some or all of
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the sum. The $5,000 to $9,999 category had the next highest number of 
recipients, 9 percent, and 52 percent of these spent some or all of the 
sum.
Defining retirement savings to include only rollover of the lump 
sum into another tax-qualified retirement vehicle, an IRA, or a tax- 
deferred annuity, only recipients of large lump sums who were either 
older or college educated had high rates of retirement savings (Atkins 
1986). Andrews (1985) calculated that 4.4 percent of recipients save 
for retirement in this way (table 5.3).
Recipients in 1988
The May 1988 CPS pension supplement showed that there were 20 
million civilian workers age 16 and over who reported participating in 
a private pension or retirement plan at a prior job (Piacentini 1990b). 
The workers reporting a lump sum distribution from a prior employer's 
plan increased to 8.5 million in 1988 from the 6.6 million in 1983 
when there were 16.9 million workers reporting coverage by a pension 
in a previous job. This increase in number of recipients is an increase 
in the percentage of employees participating in a prior employer's plan 
who reported receiving a lump sum (39 and 43 percent). The average 
amount of the sum in real terms did not change substantially over time. 
Distributions received after 1984 in constant 1988 dollars averaged 
$8,300, versus $7,700 for 1975-79, and $6,600 for 1960-69.
In 1988, 60 percent of lump sums were received before age 35, and 
85 percent were received before age 45, perhaps because most job 
changes occur at younger ages (table 5.4). This pattern resembles that 
shown in 1983 data. The change in preretirement lump sum distribu 
tion between 1983 and 1988 when examined by characteristics of 
recipients is no more than 5 percent in almost every category under 
gender, age, and income. The 1983 and 1988 sets of lump sum recipi 
ents closely resemble each other when distribution is compared 
according to the characteristics of the workers (table 5.5).
Although small lump sums are a relatively low percentage of the 
total dollar amount of distributions, they represent most of the distribu 
tions. Of the total amount distributed in preretirement lump sum distri 
butions, 8 percent are in amounts of less than $2,500 and 17 percent 
are distributed in amounts of less than $5,000 (table 5.4). At the same 
time, one-half of lump sum recipients receive payments of less than
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$2,500. Those receiving less than $5,000 are 70 percent of total recipi 
ents. Thus, allowing workers to cash out amounts of $5,000 or less 
would not affect 70 percent of workers receiving distributions, but 
would preserve most of the pension money taken in lump sum distribu 
tions until retirement.
Uses in 1988
The increase in the rollover of distributions into tax-qualified vehi 
cles is one of the chief findings from the 1988 data. The 4.4 percent of 
recipients reported to have used some of the distribution for a retire 
ment program or tax deferred annuity in 1983 under the narrowest def 
inition of savings (Andrews 1985) increased to 13 percent in 1988.
The May 1983 and May 1988 CPS benefit supplements cannot be 
compared exactly on lump sum use because the two sets of recipients 
were asked different questions. The high number of recipients—63 
percent—indicating the "other" uses category in 1983 prompted a 
change in the 1988 questionnaire in order to target these uses in more 
detail. The effort successfully reduced the other uses choice to 27 per 
cent in 1988. The following lists compare the two sets of options con 
cerning use of any part of the recipient's distribution.
1983 1988
• Invested in a retirement program • Invested in an IRA
• Invested in an insurance annuity or
• Invested in an insurance annuity other retirement program
• Invested in other financial • Invested in other financial 
instruments instruments
• Put into a savings account
• Started or purchased a business
• Bought a house • Bought a house or paid a mortgage
• Bought a car • Bought a car
• Went on vacation
• Paid off loans or other debts
• Paid educational expenses for self or 
others
• Paid expenses during a period of 
unemployment
• Other uses • Other uses
Table 5.4 
Distribution of Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Payments, 1983
Recipients
Worker characteristics
Total
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$500-$999
$l,000-$2,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,OOQ-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
Year in which most recent LS was
received
1985-1988a
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
(thousands)1*
$8,478
1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
449
211
335
160
3,391
2,403
1,191
579
Percentage 
oftotalc
100
15
13
23
17
16
6
3
5
2
41
29
14
7
Aggregate amount8
(billions)b
$48.1
0.3
0.7
2.7
4.4
7.9
5.4
3.6
9.7
13.5
19.7
13.8
7.5
3.4
Percentage 
of total0
100
1
1
6
9
16
11
7
20
28
41
29
16
7
Average amount 
per recipient*1
$6,800
300
700
1,200
3,600
7,100
12,000
16,900
29,100
67,200
6,500
6,600
7,700
7,200
Table 5.4 (continued) 
Distribution of Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Payments, 1983
Recipients
Worker characteristics
1960-1969
Before 1960
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age of recipient in May 1988
16-24
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-59
60 or over
(thousands)
558
156
4,597
3,881
7,941
426
110
161
2,348
3,149
1,666
545
608
Percentage 
oftotalc
7
2
54
46
94
5
1
2
28
37
20
6
7
Aggregate amount8
(billions)b
2.7
0.5
32.9
15.2
46.5
1.1
0.4
0.1
6.0
14.7
12.2
7.7
7.4
Percentage 
of total0
6
1
68
31
97
2
1
0
12
31
25
16
15
Average amount 
per recipient
6,600
5,400
8,600
4,600
6,900
3,600
4,000
800
2,900
5,500
9,200
18,900
15,600
Age of recipient when most recent LS 
was received
16-24
25-34
35^14
45-54
55-59
60 or over 
1988 earnings of recipient
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
1,225
3,755
2,042
850
214
171
345
616
954
1,113
1,045
818
1,761
561
15
45
25
10
3
2
5
9
13
15
14
11
24
8
2.3
13.3
15.2
10.1
4.7
2.0
3.0
1.8
3.0
4.7
4.6
4.6
8.8
4.9
5
28
32
21
10
4
8
5
8
13
13
13
25
14
2,100
4,100
8,500
14,500
26,800
15,400
10,500
3,300
3,600
5,100
5,000
6,400
6,200
10,300
Table 5.4 (continued)
SOURCE: Piacentini (199%).
NOTES: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement, 
a. Aggregate and average amounts may be understated. While 8.5 million workers are estimated to have received LSs as of May 1988, data on the amount 
of the most recent LS received are available for just 7.1 million of these individuals. Therefore, the aggregate amount of most recent LSs received 
excludes the LSs received by the remaining 1.4 million workers, leading to an understatement of aggregate amounts received. However, if no systematic 
relationship exists between the amount of LS received and whether or not the amount is reported, distributions and averages will not be affected. (With 
out evidence of the nature of such a relationship, the effect on estimated averages is ambiguous.) In addition, in the May 1988 CPS EBS public use data 
base, all LSs reported to be greater than $99,999 in nominal dollars have been topcoded at $99,999. An estimated 36,800 workers had received LSs equal 
to or in excess of this amount as of May 1988. Therefore, both aggregate and average amounts may be understated to the degree that the amounts 
received by these workers actually exceeded this amount.
b. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics of recipients or lump sum distributions, 
c. Bases of percentages exclude respondents for whom recipient and lump sum distribution characteristics were not reported, 
d. Rounded to nearest $100. 
e. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four or five months of 1988.
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Table 5.5
Distribution of Lump Sum Recipients by Demographic Characteristics 
of Recipients, 1983 and 1988
Worker characteristics
Sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Income
$l-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,OOO-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
1983
%
55
46
3
33
32
19
13
8
13
17
16
22
13
5
1988
%
54
46
2
28
37
20
13
5
9
13
15
25
24
8
Change
-1
0
-1
-5
5
1
0
-3
-4
-4
-1
3
11
3
SOURCE; Atkins (1986); Piacenum (1990b).
NOTE: Individual items may not add to total due to founding. Bases of percentages exclude
respondents for whom recipient and lump sum characteristics were not reported.
Table 5.6
Distribution of Preretirement Lump Sum (LS) Recipients by Amount of Lump Sum Received, 
by Selected Economic and Demographic Characteristics, 1988
Worker characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age in May 1988
16-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Total 
receiving LS 
distributions 
(thousands)8
8,478
4,597
3,881
7,941
426
110
2,509
2,042
850
385
Amount of most recent LS distribution (constant 1988 dollars)
Not 
reported
(%)
6
16
16
16
13
9
10
18
20
23
$14999 
(%)
24
19
29
23
25
42
41
15
13
6
$1,000- 
$4,999
(%)
34
33
34
34
33
32
38
29
28
23
$5,000- 
$9,999
(%)
13
14
13
14
9
1
6
16
18
13
$10,000- 
$19,999
(%)
8
9
6
8
5
10
4
12
8
13
$20,000 
or more 
(%)
6
9
3
6
15
6
2
9
13
23
Age when most recent LS was
received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over 
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988C
1987
1986
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970 
1988 earnings
$149,999
$10,000-$ 14,999
$15,000419,999
$20,000424,999
$25,000429,999
1,225
3,775
2,042
850
385
451
1,220
920
2,403
1,191
579
624
1,577
954
1,113
1,045
818
18
20
18
20
23
10
10
10
14
18
19
28
48
14
16
13
12
38
24
15
13
6
28
33
30
24
20
17
8
17
33
29
28
20
37
34
29
28
23
41
31
29
35
38
38
35
19
35
34
32
42
6
12
16
18
13
7
11
14
13
13
14
16
11
11
11
15
11
b
7
12
8
13
8
9
9
9
4
5
9
2
4
7
10
11
1
2
9
13
23
6
6
8
6
6
7
4
3
3
3
2
4
Table 5.6 (continued)
Amount of most recent LS (constant 1988 dollars)
Worker characteristics
30,000-549,999
$50,000 or more
Not reported
May 1988 pension statusd
Nonparticipant
Participant
Defined benefit*
Defined contribution*
Not reported
Total 
receiving LS 
(thousands)"
1,761
561
1,265
2,672
4,500
2,370
1,022
1,108
Not 
reported
(%)
20
15
19
16
16
18
11
19
$l-$999 
(*)
20
13
17
24
23
22
28
20
$1,000- 
$4,999
34
35
28
33
34
34
39
31
$5,000- 
$9,999
14
12
13
14
13
14
11
11
$10,000- 
$19,999
7
11
9
8
8
8
5
10
$20,000 
or more
(%)
5
13
13
5
6
4
6
10
SOURCE: Piacentim (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some information.
b. Less than 0.5 percent.
c. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSDs received m the first four to five months of 1988.
d. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit shanng, stock, or 401(k>tvpe plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
e. A large degree of response error may be present in worker responses on plan type.
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Recipient choices for lump sum distributions in 1988 can be divided 
among savings and consumption categories. Of the 13 percent of recip 
ients who reported rolling at least part of a distribution into tax-quali 
fied savings, 11 percent invested in IRAs and 2 percent invested in a 
deferred annuity or other retirement plan (table 5.7). When the broad 
est definition of savings is used, including all financial savings, buying 
a house, paying a mortgage, and paying loans or debts, 65 percent of 
recipients reported some savings. Forty percent of recipients reported 
consuming part of a distribution. They defined that consumption as car 
purchase, education expense, unemployment expenses, and "other" 
uses.
The 1983 data show that young recipients more commonly consume 
some of their distribution, and the 1988 data indicate this also. Half of 
those age 16 to 24 reported some consumption, while 4 percent 
reported some tax-qualified savings (table 5.7). Consumption drops to 
39 percent in the next two age categories (25-34 years and 35-44 years) 
and to 29 percent in the age 55 and over category. Figures for tax-qual 
ified savings show the opposite pattern, rising steadily over the age cat 
egories to 36 percent in the age 55 and over category.
There is a marked increase in use of tax-qualified financial savings 
over the years in which the most recent lump sums were received. 
Almost 25 percent of recipients reporting a lump sum in 1988 used 
some for tax-qualified savings and 74 percent reported using some por 
tion for savings as broadly defined (table 5.7). This compares to 15 and 
66 percent in 1980-84 and 2 and 61 percent in 1970-74.
Use of tax-qualified savings drops from 13 to 11 percent when use 
of the total lump sum distribution rather than a part is examined, and 
under this condition the broadest definition of savings drops from 65 to 
59 percent (table 5.8). Thirty-four percent of recipients report consum 
ing the entire lump sum distribution. These 34 percent represent only 
21 percent of total distributions (table 5.9). The much smaller group 
who reported using only tax qualified vehicles for lump sums, 11 per 
cent, account for 22 percent of the total amount of the money distrib 
uted in lump sums.
The determinants of using a preretirement lump sum for savings in 
1988 differ from those found in 1983 data. Andrews (1990b) used 1988 
data to determine that when retirement savings are narrowly defined as 
savings placed in an IRA, a deferred annuity, or in another retirement
Table 5.7
Proportion of Lump Sum (LS) Recipients Reporting Various Uses for Any 
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution, 1988
Proportion of recipients using any of their LS
Worker characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$5004999
$1, 00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000419,999
$20,000 or more
Received LS 
from prior job 
(thousands)8
8,478
4,597
3,881
7,941
426
110
1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
660
495
Insurance
annuity or Tax-qualified 
retirement financial 
IRA plan savings6 
(%) (%) (%)
11
12
10
11
6
17
3
6
8
16
17
23
22
2
3
2
2
f
f
g
1
1
1
4
5
10
13
15
11
14
6
17
3
6
8
17
21
28
29
Financial 
savings0 
(%)
35
36
34
36
24
26
21
31
28
38
44
54
57
Savings'1 Consumption* 
(%) (%)
65
67
62
65
59
76
50
62
62
68
74
80
81
40
38
41
40
42
24
50
40
43
37
33
33
30
Age when most recent LS 
was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988h
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1988 earnings
$l-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-524,999
$25,000429,999
1,225
3,755
2,042
850
385
451
1,220
920
800
2,403
1,191
579
694
961
954
1,113
1,045
818
3
9
13
22
31
18
18
15
15
13
6
1
r
6
6
11
11
10
1
2
2
5
7
5
3
3
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
4
10
15
26
36
23
20
18
17
15
7
2
1
7
8
12
12
11
24
32
38
50
61
46
46
39
45
36
22
25
24
32
24
31
35
35
51
67
66
70
75
74
72
70
72
66
57
61
47
63
56
68
62
66
50
39
39
35
29
31
37
38
30
38
46
40
55
45
46
37
44
39
Table 5.7 (continued)
Proportion of recipients using any of their LS
Worker characteristics
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
May 1988 pension status1
Nonparticipants
Participants
Received LS 
from prior job 
(thousands)8
1,761
561
3,977
4,500
IRA
(%)
14
20
10
12
Insurance
annuity or 
retirement 
plan
(%)
3
6
2
3
Tax-qualified 
financial 
savings1"
(%)
16
25
12
15
Financial 
savings' 
(%)
38
55
34
36
Savings'1 
(%)
63
78
65
65
Consumption* 
(%)
40
30
40
39
SOURCE: Data from ftacentini (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some information.
b. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
c. Includes tax qualified savings savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
d. Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
e. Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a period of unemployment, and other uses.
f. No observations in category.
g. Less than 0.5 percent.
h. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
i. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit shanng, stock or 401(k>type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
Table 5.8
Proportion of Lump Sum Recipients Reporting Various Uses for All 
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution by Demographic Characteristics, 1988
Proportion of recipients using all of their lump sum distribution8
Worker characteristics
Total
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$14499
$5004999
$1,00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,00049,999
$10,000419,999
$20,000 or more
Received LS Tax-qualified Financial 
from prior job financial savings0 savings'1 
(thousands)6 (%) (%)
8,478
4,597
3,881
7,941
426
110
1,042
955
1,627
1,220
1,114
660
495
11
12
10
11
4
9
3
6
7
14
18
23
22
30
30
30
31
21
24
21
28
24
33
36
42
44
Savings' 
(%)
59
61
57
59
52
76
50
59
56
62
67
67
70
Consumption'
(%)
34
32
36
34
36
24
49
37
38
31
25
20
19
Mixed 
consumption 
and savings
(%)
5
6
5
5
7
g
1
3
5
5
7
13
12
Table 5.8 (continued)
Proportion of Lump Sum Recipients Reporting Various Uses for All 
of Their Most Recent Lump Sum Distribution by Demographic Characteristics, 1988
Proportion of recipients using all of their lump sum distribution8
Received LS Tax-qualified 
from prior job financial savings' 
Worker characteristics (thousands)1* (%)
Age when most recent LS 
was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988"
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1,225
3,755
2,042
850
385
451
1,220
920
800
2,403
1,191
579
694
4
9
13
20
28
21
16
15
15
13
5
1
1
Financial 
savings'1 
(%)
23
28
30
41
53
43
39
32
39
30
19
21
21
Savings' 
(%)
49
61
60
62
70
69
61
61
69
60
53
59
44
Consumptionr
(%)
47
33
33
27
23
26
27
30
27
33
42
38
52
Mixed 
consumption 
and savings 
(%)
2
6
6
8
6
5
11
9
3
5
4
2
3
1988 earnings
$1 -$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000429,999
$30,000-$49,999
$50,000 or more
May 1988 pension status1
Nonparticipants
Participants
961
954
1,113
1,045
818
1,761
561
3,978
4,500
6
5
11
10
9
14
22
10
12
28
19
26
31
30
34
45
28
32
54
52
62
56
60
59
69
58
60
36
42
32
38
34
36
21
51
27
9
4
5
6
5
4
9
6
5
SOURCE: Data from Piacentim (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. For purposes of determining exclusive uses of LSs, "don't know" and missing responses were taken as "no" responses. For example, a worker whose
only "yes" response was to the IRA option was classified here as using his or her entire LS for "tax-qualified savings" even if the worker's response to one
or more nontax-qualified options was "don't know" or missing. Some workers did not respond "yes" to any of these options; therefore, mutually exclusive
horizontal percentages may add to less than 100 percent.
b. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics.
c. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
d.Includes tax-qualified savings, savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
e. Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
f. Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a period of unemployment, and other uses.
g. Less than 0.5 percent.
h. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
i. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401(k)-type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
Table 5.9 
Proportion of Aggregate Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Distributions Used Entirely for Selected Purposes, 1988
Proportion of aggregate LS amounts reportedly used entirely for:8
Worker characteristic1*
Total 
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Amount of most recent LS
$l-$499
$500-5999
$1,00042,499
$2,500-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000 or more
Not reported
Received LS Tax-qualified 
from prior job financial savings'1 
(billions)6 (%)
48.1
32.9
15.1
46.5
1.1
0.4
0.3
0.7
2.7
4.4
7.9
8.9
23.2
12.7
22
19
29
22
4
34
3
7
7
15
17
25
26
24
Financial 
savings'
(%)
44
44
46
45
18
57
19
28
23
34
35
43
53
49
Mixed 
consumption 
Savings' Consumption8 and savings
(%) (%) (%)
70
71
68
70
49
69
48
57
57
63
68
68
75
76
21
19
26
21
31
30
50
39
38
31
24
19
16
16
9
11
6
9
15
b
1
3
5
5
8
13
9
7
Age when most recent LS was received
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or over
Year in which most recent LS
was received
1988'
1987
1986
1985
1980-1984
1975-1979
1970-1974
Before 1970
1988 earnings
$1-59,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000-$29,999
$30,000-549,999
$50,000 or more
2.3
13.3
15.2
10.1
6.8
2.5
6.3
5.8
5.1
13.8
7.5
3.4
3.2
4.8
3.0
4.7
4.6
4.6
8.8
4.9
6
13
20
25
41
36
23
26
14
23
26
14
25
10
24
21
11
27
21
17
28
41
55
75
59
49
36
61
45
39
47
14
58
25
41
34
28
54
42
38
65
67
78
82
71
65
58
78
74
75
78
44
74
56
77
63
56
72
65
57
26
24
7
14
26
18
23
15
18
21
17
49
17
32
18
28
33
22
13
3
9
9
15
3
3
16
19
7
8
4
5
5
9
11
5
9
11
5
21
Table 5.9 (continued)
Proportion of Aggregate Amount of Lump Sum (LS) Distributions Used Entirely for Selected Purposes, 1988
Proportion of aggregate LS amounts reportedly used entirely for:8
Mixed
Received LS Tax-qualified Financial consumption 
from prior job financial savings'1 savings' Savings' Consumption8 and savings
Worker characteristic1*
May 1988 pension status1 
Nonparticipants 
Participants
(billions)'
21.5 
26.6
(%)
21 
22
(%)
41 
47
(%)
70 
69
(%)
20 
22
(%)
9 
9
SOURCE: Data from Piacenuni (1990b).
NOTE: Tabulations by the Employee Benefit Research Institute of the May 1988 Current Population Survey Employee Benefit Supplement.
a. Aggregate amounts are understated by an unknown amount. While 8.5 million workers are estimated to have received LSs as of May 1988, data on the
amount of the most recent LS received are available for just 7.1 million of these individuals; therefore, the aggregate amount of most recent LSs received
excludes the LSs received by the remaining 1.4 million workers. In addition, in the May 1988 CPS EBS public use database, all LSs reported to be
greater than $99,999 in nominal dollars have been topcoded at $99,999. An estimated 36,800 workers had received LSs equal to or in excess of this
amount as of May 1988; therefore, aggregate amounts are understated to the degree that the amounts received by these workers actually exceeded this
amount.
b. For purposes of determining exclusive uses of LSs, "don't know" and missing responses were taken as "no" responses. For example, a worker whose
only "yes" response was to the IRA option was classified here as using his or her enure LS for "tax-qualified savings" even if the worker's response to
one or more nontax-qualified options was "don't know" or missing. Some workers did not respond "yes" to any of these options; therefore, mutually
exclusive horizontal percentages may add to less than 100 percent.
c. Individual items may not add to total because some respondents did not report some characteristics.
d. Includes IRAs, insurance annuities, and other retirement programs.
e. Includes tax-qualified savings, savings accounts, and other financial instruments.
f.Includes all financial savings, purchase of a house, payment of a mortgage, and payment of loans or debts.
g.Includes purchase of a car, education expenses, expenses incurred during a penod of unemployment, and other uses.
h. Less than 0.5 percent
i. Because the survey was conducted in May 1988, includes only LSs received in the first four to five months of 1988.
j. A worker is considered to be a pension participant if he or she reported inclusion in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, stock, or 401 (k>type plan at a
wage and salary job, or reported a self-employed job and contributions to an IRA or Keogh.
Table 5.10
Use of Lump Sum Distributions Before and After Major IRA Legislation, 1960-1988
Year received
Number rolling entire 
Recipients distribution
Percentage rolling 
entire distribution
Estimated 90 percent 
confidence interval8
(weighted estimates)
1988"
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1975-1979
1970-1974
1960-1969
Before 1960
Don't know
Missing
Total
450,590
1,219,609
919,929
800,486
474,866
485,851
493,629
484,848
463,352
1,191,413
579,015
558,033
135,805
185,928
34,275
8,477,629
93,758
199,021
136,160
117,964
69,612
62,152
64,465
51,774
59,826
62,069
5,077
7,149
507
11,588
0
941,122
20.81
16.32
14.80
14.74
14.66
12.79
13.06
10.68
12.91
5.21
0.88
1.28
0.37
6.23
0.00
11.10
7.02
3.88
4.30
4.60
5.96
5.56
5.57
5.15
5.72
2.36
1.42
1.75
1.92
6.51
0.00
1.25
Table 5.10 (continued)
Number rolling entire 
Year received Recipients distribution
Groupings and differences
Tax reform
1987-1988 1,670,199
1982-1986 3,174,761
Difference
IRA deduction expansion and IRA marketing
1982-1986 3,174,761
1975-1979 1,191,413
Difference
ERIS A and inception of IRAs
1975-1979 1,191,413
Before 1975 1,272,853
Difference
Percentage rolling 
entire distribution
Estimated 90 percent 
confidence interval0
(weighted estimates)
292,779
450,353
450,353
62,069
62,069
12,733
17.53
14.19
3.34
14.19
5.21
8.98
5.21
1.00
4.21
3.41
2.27
4.10
2.27
2.36
3.28
2.36
1.02
2.58
SOURCE: Unpublished Employee Benefit Research Institute tabulations prepared by Joseph S. Piacentini for the U.S. Department of Labor, 
a. Based on formula provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as part of CPS documentation, 
b. Part-year data—survey conducted in May 1988.
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Table 5.11
Calculation of Estimated Value of Preretirement Lump Sum 
Distributions Not Placed in Retirement Savings, 1990
(Dollars in millions)_________________
Pension payments administrative data, 1987
Trusteed defined benefit payments paid to participants 
(Form 5500) $44,935
Insurance payments (not including individual policies) $16,390
Total pension payments $61,325
Pension payments survey data, 1987
December 1989 Current Population Survey
Retirees (private and self-empoyed) $36,386
Spouses of retirees (private estimate) $5,724
Total pension payments $42,110
Ratio of administrative to survey data (estimate of undercount) 1.456
Preretirement distributions survey data, 1987
December 1989 Current Population Survey
Workers age 40-54—private sector $2,823 
Nonworkers age 40-54—private sector $ 127 
All individuals age 40-54 $2,950
May 1988 Current Population Survey 
Workers under age 40—private sector $ 1,854
All preretirement distributions $4,805
Preretirement distributions, 1987
Adjusted for undercount $6,998
Preretirement distributions, 1990
Rough adjustment to 1988 CPI $7,638
Rough adjustment to 1989 DC assets $8,393
Distributions not rolled over, 1990
Based on CPI adjustment $5,958
Based on DC asset adjustment $6,547
SOURCE: Fu Associates, Lump-Sum Distributions- A Comparison of Administrative and Survey 
Dote. Arlington, VA: 1990.
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program, workers most likely to have invested lump sum distributions 
in this way were older, were more recent recipients of a distribution, 
were owners of an IRA in 1988, received dividends in 1988, and were 
homeowners. The 1983 data found relatively high rates of savings for 
retirement, using a similarly narrow definition, only among those who 
received large lump sums and were either older or were college edu 
cated (Atkins 1986).
Analysis of 1988 data found that recipients increasingly used tax- 
qualified savings vehicles. Those who contributed to a current IRA 
more commonly used a lump sum for retirement savings than for cur 
rent spending. Since 1975, the use of IRAs as a repository for distribu 
tions has steadily increased. Table 5.10 shows the use of rollovers to 
IRAs by lump sum recipients pre- and post-major legislation. Follow 
ing the imposition in 1987 of a 10 percent excise tax on lump sum dis 
tributions that were not rolled over into another tax-qualified 
retirement vehicle, the percentage of recipients making rollovers 
increased, but the increase was not sufficiently large to be statistically 
significant. Based on patterns in prior years, plans paid an estimated 
$6.0 to $6.5 billion in 1990 preretirement distributions that job leavers 
did not put into IRAs, annuities, or employer plans (Table 5.11).
CONCLUSIONS
Preretirement lump sum distributions became increasingly available 
during the decade of the 1980s and the number of pension plan partici 
pants who exercised the option to receive a lump sum at job change is 
substantial, particularly among younger workers.
A large share of those who took a lump sum distribution did not roll 
it over into a tax-qualified vehicle or other retirement plan. However, 
the percentage of recipients using some part of a preretirement lump 
sum distribution for tax-qualified savings increased during the 1980s.
NOTE
1. This chapter was written by Phyllis Fernandez.
Pensions and Layoffs
Quits are the focal point for most studies investigating the effects of 
job change on pension benefit losses and the opposing effects of pen 
sion benefit losses on job change. 1 Quits and layoffs are behaviorally 
distinct, and portability policies designed to address quit-related issues 
may fail to address important issues related to layoffs. Moreover, 
unless layoffs are explicitly considered, portability policies could have 
an undesirable impact on workers who lose their jobs or on firms who 
must lay off workers to remain economically viable. This chapter pro 
vides information on the magnitude of layoffs in the U.S. economy and 
discusses the relative importance of quits versus layoffs. It also exam 
ines possible effects of layoffs on portability losses.
LAYOFFS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
Employers may find it necessary to dismiss their employees, either 
because of poor economic conditions or because of poor performance 
by the employee or the company. These dismissals can be temporary or 
permanent. In a temporary layoff, a worker may be off the job for 
weeks or months, but is eventually reemployed by the company that 
initiated the layoff. A worker who is permanently laid off must either 
find a new job or drop out of the labor force. Because temporary lay 
offs are not relevant to pension portability issues, this chapter is con 
cerned with permanent layoffs only.
Permanent layoffs sometimes result from deficient demand for the 
company's product. 2 Deficient demand can arise for two reasons. First, 
it can result from structural changes in the economy, brought about by 
competition from imports or loss of international competitiveness by 
U.S. firms, automation and other types of technological change, chang 
ing consumption patterns, or loss of regional competitiveness. Defi 
cient demand can also occur as part of the business cycle.3 Both
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structural and cyclical layoffs and layoffs associated with a company's 
poor performance manifest themselves through plant closings, plant 
relocations, shift or position phaseouts, or closure of the entire busi 
ness. Layoffs resulting from poor performance by the worker show up 
as individual dismissals.
Before the mid-1980s, information on the number of permanent lay 
offs was sketchy, and estimates ranged widely. However, in January 
1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics added a special supplement on 
displaced workers to the Current Population Survey. This supplement, 
which is referred to as the first Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), and 
two additional supplements added in January 1986 and January 1988 
are the primary sources for most of the information on the extent of 
permanent layoffs in the U.S. economy.4
As shown in table 6.1, estimates from the first Displaced Worker 
Survey indicate that 13.9 million workers 20 years of age and older 
lost their jobs between January 1979 and January 1984 because of 
plant closings, employers going out of business, or layoffs from which 
they had not been recalled (Flaim and Sehgal 1985). Eliminating the 
2.4 million workers who lost their jobs for seasonal reasons, or for 
other reasons that could not be classified, leaves an estimated 11.5 mil 
lion workers who were permanently laid off during this period. 5 The 
second survey, which examined layoffs between January 1981 and Jan 
uary 1986, estimates slightly fewer layoffs—approximately 10.8 mil 
lion over the five-year period (Horvath 1987). This represents 
approximately 2.2 million workers per year, as opposed to 2.3 million 
for the 1979-84 period.
The number of layoffs varies over the business cycle, with more lay 
offs occurring during economic downturns and fewer layoffs occurring 
during upswings. Because the periods covered by both the first and 
second surveys included severe recessions, layoff estimates of 2.2 and 
2.3 million workers per year are probably at the high end of the range 
when averaging over a business cycle. The third Displaced Worker 
Survey was conducted during an economic upswing; it examined lay 
offs between January 1983 and January 1988. Unfortunately, the infor 
mation published from this survey does not include an estimate of the 
total number of permanent layoffs; instead, it presents information on 
the number of permanent layoffs among workers with three or more 
years of tenure. By comparing this information with similar informa-
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tion from the first two surveys, it is estimated that during this period 
2.0 million workers per year were permanently laid off.6 Combining 
this estimate with the estimates from the two previous surveys suggests 
that during the decade of the 1980s an average of 2.0 to 2.3 million 
workers were permanently laid off from their jobs each year.
Table 6.1
Layoff Statistics, 1979-1988 
(in millions of workers)
Number of workers losing jobs
Number of workers permanently
laid off
-with 1 or more years of tenure
-with 2 or more years of tenure
-with 3 or more years of tenure
-with 5 or more years of tenure
First 
DWS
13.9
11.5
7.1
6.9
5.1
3.2
Second 
DWS
NA
10.8
6.8
NA
5.1
NA
Third 
DWS
NA
NA
NA
NA
4.6
NA
SOURCES. Flaim and Sehgal (1985), U.S. Department of Labor (1985); Horvath (1987); Herz
(1990).
NOTE: The first Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) covers the penod between January 1979 and
January 1984; the second DWS covers January 1981 through January 1986; and the third DWS
covers January 1983 through January 1988.
In general, there are more quits than layoffs in U.S. labor markets.7 
However, the quit rate, like the layoff rate, varies over the business 
cycle—except that quits are higher when the economy is booming and 
lower when the economy is in recession. As a result, there may be 
some years when layoffs exceed quits. Data from the Employment and 
Training Report of the President (1982, table C-13) show that although 
the (temporary and permanent) layoff rate was considerably higher 
than the quit rate throughout the first half of the 1960s, this was the 
case in only three years (1975, 1980, and 1981) between 1965 and 
1981.
The situation appears to be similar for pension plan participants; in 
general, for these workers the number of quits exceeds the number of 
layoffs. Using panel data for males age 31-50 from the 1983-86 Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the 1984-87 Panel Study of Income
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Dynamics (PSID), Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) show that 60 per 
cent of the males who had a pension on their initial job and who 
changed jobs reported that they changed jobs voluntarily. The statistics 
are similar to the rates for job changers who did not have a pension. 
According to the SCF, 59 percent of the job change by those without a 
pension on their initial job were voluntary; in the PSID, the figure was 
64 percent.8
LAYOFFS AND LOSS OF PENSION BENEFITS
As is the case with quits, layoffs can result in pension benefit losses. 
This section first attempts to identify the number of workers who are at 
risk of pension benefit loss. This is followed by a discussion of the 
types of benefit losses that may be incurred by workers who are laid 
off.
Pension Coverage of Laid-off Workers
Evidence on the number, or percentage, of laid-off workers who are 
covered by a pension is sketchy. Unfortunately, none of the three Dis 
placed Worker Surveys includes any questions about pensions, so they 
cannot be used to determine pension coverage among laid-off workers. 
Instead it is necessary to turn to other sources.
These sources suggest that a smaller portion of laid-off workers are 
covered by pension plans than is the case for workers as a whole. 9 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) present descriptive statistics indicat 
ing that 40.7 percent of the involuntary movers in their sample from 
the 1984-87 PSID were covered by a pension on their lost job, whereas 
60.6 percent of their entire sample was covered. Calculations based on 
descriptive statistics from the Survey of Income and Program Partici 
pation (SIPP) and the SCF make a similar point (Gustman and Stein 
meier 1990, tables 1, Al, and A4). In the SIPP, 39.6 percent of the 
involuntary movers had a pension in their initial job, while this figure 
was 63.7 percent for the sample as a whole. The SCF figures were 63.6 
percent and 74.8 percent. 10 All three samples consisted of males who 
were 31-50 years old at the beginning of the sample period.
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In an earlier study using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Mature Men, Fames and King (1977, p. 83) found that about half of 
their sample of displaced workers were covered by pensions, versus 
three-quarters of nondisplaced workers. They examined male wage 
and salary workers over age 45 who had been with their employer for 
over five years and who were permanently separated from the 
employer between 1966 and 1971.
It is tempting to conclude from this evidence that between 40 and 60 
percent of the 2.0 to 2.3 million workers who were permanently laid 
off each year during the 1980s were covered by a pension. However, 
because the samples cover males only, this is not correct. Females have 
a lower probability of being laid off than their male counterparts, and 
this results in an overrepresentation of males among displaced work 
ers. 11 Despite this problem, the information can be used, along with 
other data, to arrive at a rough estimate.
Estimates of the number of displaced workers (from the Displaced 
Worker Survey) include both male and female full-time and part-time 
workers. According to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
pension supplement, the pension coverage rate for full-time and part- 
time workers was 42 to 43 percent during the 1980s (Beller and 
Lawrence 1992). 12 Assuming that the ratio between the percentage of 
laid-off workers covered by a pension and the percentage of all work 
ers covered by a pension is roughly the same in the CPS data as it is in 
Gustman and Steinmeier's PSID data, and assuming that the distribu 
tion of full-time versus part-time workers in the CPS supplement on 
displaced workers is the same as it is in the CPS pension supplement, it 
is estimated that during the 1980s slightly less than 30 percent of the 
2.0 to 2.3 million laid-off workers were covered by a pension. This 
implies that between one-half and two-thirds of a million workers lose 
all or some of their pension benefits each year due to layoffs. 13
Pension Losses Associated with Vesting Requirements
Laid-off workers who are unvested lose their rights to future retire 
ment benefits. Although estimates of the number of unvested laid-off 
workers are not available, some information can be gleaned from the 
tenure statistics for displaced workers. Current regulations require 
vesting after five years for most workers. 14 According to the first Dis-
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placed Worker Survey, approximately 28 percent of the 11.5 million 
workers who were permanently laid off between January 1979 and 
January 1984 had five or more years of tenure (table 6.1). 15 This sug 
gests that about 70 percent of the 550,000 to 600,000 pension-covered 
workers who lose their jobs each year also lose their pensions because 
they have not vested.
This estimate is certainly too high. For pension participants as a 
whole, only 23 percent of all private-sector full-time pension plan par 
ticipants are not vested (Piacentini 1990b). 16 Because displaced work 
ers generally have less tenure than the population as a whole (Blau and 
Kahn 1981; Madden 1988), it is reasonable that a larger percentage of 
displaced workers will not be vested. However, a 50 percent differen 
tial is not realistic.
Part of the differential can be attributed to the fact that the data from 
the Displaced Worker Survey are not strictly comparable to those for 
all pension participants. In particular, the DWS statistics include part- 
time workers, which inflates the estimate of the percentage of workers 
who are not vested. Another part of the differential is due to the fact 
that a small number of pension plans offer full and immediate vesting, 
so that at least some of the displaced workers with fewer than five 
years of tenure will be vested. A third factor in the differential is that 
the pension participant statistics are for workers with partial as well as 
full vesting, whereas the Displaced Worker Survey tenure statistics are 
proxies for the full vesting standards. Finally, the major part of the dif 
ferential is probably due to tenure statistics being a poor proxy for 
vesting statistics.
The data for pension participants suggest that this is the case. Based 
on these data, 54 percent of all private-sector full-time workers have 
fewer than five years of tenure (Piacentini 1990b, table 1). However, 
data from the same source indicate that only 23 percent of all private- 
sector full-time pension plan participants are not vested. The most 
likely explanation for this discrepancy is that workers who participate 
in pension plans tend to have more years on the job than workers who 
do not participate. If this is true for displaced workers—and there is no 
reason to suggest it is not—then considerably less than 70 percent of 
the 550,000 to 600,000 pension-covered workers who lose their job 
each year are unvested.
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Pension Losses Associated with Back load ing
As is the case for workers who quit, a laid-off worker who is fully 
vested in a defined benefit plan will suffer a pension benefit loss even if 
he/she is able to immediately find a new job offering the same compen 
sation package as the old job. This is because in a defined benefit plan 
benefits are frequently tied to wages near retirement. A worker who is 
laid off before retirement will receive benefits based on his/her wage 
before the layoff. Because these benefits are generally not adjusted to 
take into account inflation occurring between the layoff and the time at 
which the employee would have been eligible to retire, the worker will 
suffer a benefit loss.
Displaced workers who are covered by defined contribution plans 
will generally not incur losses due to backloading. Thus whether this 
type of benefit loss is an important policy issue for displaced workers 
depends in part on how many of these workers are covered by defined 
benefit plans. In the workplace as a whole, about 68 percent of all 
workers in pension plans participate in a defined benefit plan (Beller 
and Lawrence 1992, p. 6). However, this percentage may not be as 
high for displaced workers. Dorsey (1987) finds a positive relationship 
between permanent layoffs and the primary pension plan being a 
defined contribution plan. Using industry layoff rates, he finds that a 
one standard deviation increase in the permanent layoff rate (.20 per 
100 workers) raises the likelihood of defined contribution coverage by 
about 2 percent. When the probability of permanent layoffs is high, 
companies may tend to offer defined contribution plans rather than 
defined benefit plans. This could occur, for example, if the company 
recognizes that it is susceptible to intense foreign or domestic competi 
tion, automation, or changing consumption patterns. In this way, 
employees will not suffer a loss from backloading if they are laid off. 17
Pension Losses Associated with Lump Sum Distributions
A third major source of pension portability loss stems from prere 
tirement lump sum distributions. It is likely that the percentage of laid- 
off workers who receive lump sum distributions is higher than for the 
workforce as a whole. Although laid-off workers frequently receive 
unemployment insurance, severance benefits, trade adjustment assis 
tance, and so forth, some may need additional money to carry them
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through a lengthy period of unemployment. For this reason, a higher 
percentage of laid-off workers may elect to receive a lump sum distri 
bution and use all or part of it for current consumption.
A low percentage of workers receiving lump sum distributions use 
them for expenses incurred during unemployment (Piacentini 1990b). 
Only 11 percent of lump-sum recipients use any of their distribution 
for nondiscretionary consumption (educational expenses and expenses 
incurred during a period of unemployment), and only 8 percent use all 
of the distribution for this purpose. 18 However, even though a small 
percentage of lump-sum recipients use their distribution to carry them 
through a period of unemployment, the distribution could be quite 
important for that minority.
CONCLUSIONS
At least half a million pension-covered workers are laid off each 
year. While some of them suffer large pension losses, as well as a loss 
in earnings, two factors mitigate the loss for many workers. First, 
workers who are laid off tend to have relatively short job tenure. Sec 
ond, workers who are laid off are more likely to have a primary defined 
contribution plan than are other pension covered workers.
NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Tabitha Doescher.
2. Some permanent layoffs manifest themselves as opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
firm. For example, a firm may promise pensions to some of its workers and then lay off some 
workers so that it does not have to meet its pension obligations. The firm could be engaging m 
deceptive behavior (which would be illegal) or it could be responding to unexpected changes in 
its situation (e.g., changes brought about by deficient demand).
3. Many of the layoffs associated with a cyclical downswing will be temporary rather than 
permanent. However, some cyclical layoffs become permanent layoffs. This would be the case for 
example, when a cyclical decline lasts for several years.
4. All respondents to the January 1984, 1986, and 1988 CPS were asked if they or a member 
of their household age 20 or older had lost or left a job in the previous five years because of a 
plant closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which the individual was not 
recalled, or other similar reasons. An affirmative response led to additional questions about the 
reason for the job loss, the nature of the lost job (e.g., when it was lost, years of tenure, and earn 
ings), and the individual's unemployment and reemployment experience. The three data bases
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compiled from these Displaced Worker Surveys thus contain a wealth of information about lay 
offs during the 1980s.
5. This estimate does not (in concept) include workers who were discharged for cause. As a 
result, data from the DWS slightly underestimate the number of permanent layoffs. Using a small 
sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of mature men, Parnes and King (1977) found that 
7.1 percent of the layoffs which occurred between 1966 and 1971 were discharges. The underesti 
mate from the DWS is probably not that large since some discharged workers may rationalize that 
they were laid off because of slack work rather than fired for cause and may therefore be included 
in the survey. Another possible source of underestimation is the recall bias which may occur when 
an individual is asked to recall a past event Some respondents apparently forget layoffs that 
occurred several years ago.
6. This estimate was obtained by (1) using both the first and second DWS to calculate the 
number of displaced workers with three or more years of tenure as a percentage of the number of 
workers who were permanently laid off (regardless of tenure), (2) taking the average of this per 
centage across both surveys and applying it to the number of displaced workers from the third 
DWS with three or more years of tenure to estimate total permanent layoffs over the five years 
covered by the third survey, and (3) dividing the estimate of total permanent layoffs by five to 
obtain an estimate of average annual layoffs. Data from the third DWS are from Herz (1990).
7. The distinction between quits and layoffs can be fuzzy Some workers may quit their jobs in 
anticipation of being laid off or fired, while others may be laid off or fired immediately before the 
time they would have quit on their own.
8. Gustman and Stemmeier also examine panel data for males age 31 - 50 from the 1984-87 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and these data tell a different story. First, in 
the SIPP data the number of quits is less than the number of layoffs among pension plan partici 
pants: only 43 percent of the SIPP job changers changed jobs voluntarily. Second, the SIPP data 
suggest that the incidence of involuntary turnover is considerably higher for job changers with 
pensions than for those without pensions: approximately 59 percent of the SIPP job changers who 
were without a pension on their initial job changed jobs voluntarily. In all likelihood, the reason 
for the discrepancy between the SIPP statistics and the SCF and PSID statistics rests with prob 
lems classifying job changes as quits or layoffs. In the SIPP data, of a total of 107 job changes, 
only 37 could be classified as either voluntary or involuntary. For this reason, the SCF and PSID 
data are probably more reliable for analyzing voluntary and involuntary turnover among job 
changers than the SIPP data.
9. One explanation for this is that jobs with a high probability of layoffs are less likely to offer 
pensions. Another possibility is that workers who are laid off have different characteristics than 
workers in general, and these characteristics are associated with low pension coverage. The evi 
dence on this second possibility is unclear. For example, a disproportionate number of laid-off 
workers are from the manufacturing industry, which typically has a high rate of pension coverage. 
Estimates from the DWS suggest that about 40 to 50 percent of displaced workers were in jobs in 
manufacturing (Flaim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990). In addition, a disproportion 
ate number of laid-off workers are male (about 64 percent in each of the three DWS), and males 
tend to have higher pension coverage rates. On the other hand, there is some speculation that 
small companies tend to have higher plant closing rates than large companies (Howland and 
Peterson 1988, p. 49); however, the pension coverage rate is lower at small firms than at large 
firms (Even and Macpherson 1990).
10. The reason for the difference in magnitude between the SCF statistics and the PSID and 
SIPP statistics is not clear, but may have something to do with small sample sizes and problems 
with the data (discussed in Gustman and Steinmeier 1990a and 1990b).
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11. Both Blau and Kahn (1981) and Maxwell and D'Amico (1986) find that women have a 
lower probability of being laid off. Each of the Displaced Worker Surveys shows that approxi 
mately two out of three displaced workers were men (Flaim and Sehgal 198S; Horvath 1987; Herz 
1990).
12. Covered workers includes those who have met a plan's eligibility requirements and are 
participating in the plan. It does not include workers who are employed with firms sponsoring a 
plan but who are not enrolled because they (a) do not meet age and/or service requirements, (b) 
are in an employee group excluded from the plan, or (c) chose not to participate.
13. This number should be used with caution. The estimate is based on the assumptions men 
tioned in the text, and it is not known whether these assumptions are valid. In addition, the reader 
should keep in mind that layoffs vary over the business cycle.
14. More specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 sets out the following minimum vesting 
requirements: for plans with cliff vesting, it requires 100 percent vesting after five years (ten years 
for multiemployer plans); for plans with graduated vesting, it requires 100 percent vesting after 
seven years (20 percent after three years and 20 percent additional in each of the next four years). 
See Graham (1988) for a more complete discussion.
15. For these workers, the minimum vesting requirements were those specified by ERISA: 
100 percent vesting after 10 years for plans with cliff vesting; 100 percent vesting after IS years 
for plans with graduated vesting; the "rule of 45" for plans with alternative graded vesting; and a 
provision that each class must vest after five years for plans with class-year vesting. Since the pur 
pose of this section is to get a ballpark estimate of the number of laid-off workers who might be 
expected to lose their pension rights under current regulations (rather than to estimate what actu 
ally happened to these particular workers), the current standard of five years of tenure is used.
16. Using the employee benefits supplement of the May 1988 CPS, Piacentim (1990b, Table 
3) reports that 37 percent of all private-sector full-time workers are at least partially vested on 
their current job. Since 48 percent of all private-sector full-time workers are currently participat 
ing in a pension plan (Piacentim 1990b, Table 1), this suggests that 77 percent of all private-sector 
full-time pension plan participants are vested. This implies that 23 percent are not vested.
17. Dorsey suggests an alternate explanation. He views the rate of permanent layoff as a proxy 
for firm-financed specific training, with a high layoff rate indicating a low level of specific train 
ing. Companies in which workers have low levels of specific training have less incentive to 
attempt to tie workers to the firm and thus exhibit a higher incidence of defined contribution plans.
18. Note that these statistics will vary over the business cycle.
Pension Portability 
in the United States
The U.S. pension system provides workers some portability through 
vesting, multiemployer plans, reciprocity, and portability networks. 
Although some portability arrangements currently benefit few work 
ers, they are a logical starting point for discussing portability policy 
because they demonstrate options that could be extended to more 
workers.
PORTABILITY OF BENEFITS
An unvested job leaver loses all rights to a pension. 1 Prior to the pas 
sage of ERISA in 1974, some plans required workers to stay until 
retirement to vest. Dan McGill (1972) wrote, "The most sensitive (pen 
sion) issue of the moment is whether a pension plan should be required 
by law to provide for vesting prior to retirement" (p. 322, italics from 
the original). For full-time workers in 1972, only 53 percent of men 
and 39 percent of women covered by a private pension plan who had 
worked 20 to 24 years for one employer were vested (table 7.1).
Many plans before ERISA required a sum of age and service for 
vesting, 40 being the norm (McGill 1972, p. 11). A break in service 
before vesting canceled all accumulated benefit credits, and they were 
usually not restored if the worker returned to the firm. Some plans 
made former employees forfeit benefits if they worked for a competi 
tor. Discouraging employees from working for competitors helped pre 
serve the firm's trade secrets and protected it from competing against 
workers it had trained. Some firms also denied benefits to any 
employee guilty of misconduct. This action punished workers and 
secured restitution.
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Table 7.1 
Vesting Status of Private Pension-Covered Workers, 1972
Length of 
employment 
(in years)
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more 
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more 
Total8
Less than 5
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 or more
Percentage distribution by vested status
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Vested
32
20
25
36
47
50
51
34
21
25
36
49
53
52
26
16
24
34
39
39
47
Not vested
Total
51
60
59
49
41
38
37
Men
50
59
58
48
39
36
37
Women
55
61
60
50
47
46
32
Don't 
know
15
20
16
15
11
12
10
15
19
16
14
10
11
9
18
22
15
15
14
13
14
No 
response
1
1
1
1
1
b
3
1
1
1
1
1
b
2
1
1
1
b
c
2
6
SOURCES: Bureau of the Census; Kolodrubetz and Landay (1973).
a. Vested status totals include workers not responding to length of employment on current job,
not shown separately.
b. Less than 0.5 percent.
c. Not calculated where base is less than 200,000.
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The passage of ERISA improved worker status by offering benefit 
protection through vesting requirements. Once vested, an employee 
cannot become divested. Plans may use any vesting method with a 
waiting period not exceeding ERISA standards. Two common methods 
are cliff vesting and graded vesting.
Under cliff vesting, in which a worker jumps from zero to full vest 
ing after working a specified period of time, ERISA initially required 
workers to fully vest within 10 years. Large defined benefit plans typi 
cally used this schedule. In a nationally representative survey taken 
prior to enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,90 percent of plans 
using cliff vesting had a 10-year waiting period (U.S. General 
Accounting Office 1990).
Under graded vesting, in which the percentage of vested benefits 
periodically rises until the worker is fully vested, ERISA's standard 
(initially) required that, at a minimum, a worker be partially vested 
after five years, and his/her vesting rights rise a fixed percentage yearly 
until reaching full vesting after 15 years. Small defined contribution 
plans used this schedule.
Disability, death, or early retirement benefits generally do not vest if 
they are more generous than the actuarial equivalent to normal retire 
ment benefits. To receive these benefits, the employee must be working 
for the employer when the contingency occurs.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 shortened vesting for single-employer 
pension plans. It cut the maximum years a worker must wait for full 
vesting from 10 to 5 for cliff vesting. For graded vesting, it cut the 5- 
to-15-year period to 3 to 7 years, with 20 percent vesting after 3 years. 
The Tax Reform Act lowered the minimum age for vesting credit from 
22 to 18 years old.
Multiemployer plans, to which several employers contribute under 
collective bargaining agreements, satisfy the Tax Reform Act's require 
ments if participants fully vest after 10 years. Participants in these 
plans earn credit for service with any employer funding the plan. Mul 
tiemployer lobbyists argue that longer vesting schedules are appropri 
ate for their plans because participants still earn service towards 
vesting after switching jobs. As a result, job leavers vest in situations 
where vesting would not occur in a single-employer plan.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1990) studied the accelerated 
vesting required by the Tax Reform Act. Under the old rules, many
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participants in cliff plans did not work long enough to become vested, 
but would be fully vested under the new rules. The GAO figured that 9 
of 10 plans of large employers had to cut the years required for vesting 
to comply with the Tax Reform Act. By contrast, half the plans of 
small employers had to change vesting rules. The Employee Benefit 
Research Institute estimated the added cost of five-year cliff vesting at 
2 to 7 percent of private pension plan contributions to the system as a 
whole (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1986a).
ERISA demands more stringent vesting standards in some cases. 
Accrued benefits deriving from the worker's contributions must vest 
immediately. Worker contributions and salary reduction contributions 
to a qualified cash or deferred arrangement—a 401(k) plan—as well as 
the investment earnings from those contributions, also must be fully 
vested and nonforfeitable at all times. Similarly, contributions to a 
Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) must vest immediately. SEPs 
were authorized through the Revenue Act of 1978 to enable smaller 
employers to start pensions without the complexity and administrative 
expense of a traditional pension plan.
Faster vesting standards, set by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi 
bility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), are also required for "top- heavy" plans. 
A top-heavy plan, by definition, provides most of the benefits to key 
workers, including the company's owners, officers, and highly com 
pensated workers. One of two vesting standards must be met. The first 
requires the worker to fully vest after three years. The second standard 
is six-year graded vesting, in which the worker must be at least 20 per 
cent vested after two years, with this percentage rising over four more 
years, until 100 percent vesting is reached after six years.
Congress enacted TEFRA legislation to ensure that plans of smaller 
employers provided broadly based coverage for all workers, not just 
for those with an ownership or management position. In 1987, 57 per 
cent of defined benefit plans were top-heavy. However, 84 percent of 
top-heavy plans had less than 10 participants (Turner and Beller 1992).
PORTABILITY OF SERVICE
Portability of service is the transfer of service credit between plans 
of different employers when a worker changes jobs. It is predomi-
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nantly an issue for defined benefit plans. It is usually not an issue for 
defined contribution plans because employer contributions are based 
only on current salary, with service not affecting the amount the 
employer or employee contributes to the plan. In some defined contri 
bution plans, however, the employer contributes a larger share of sal 
ary for workers with long tenure.
Multiemployer Plans
Multiemployer pension plans, which are predominantly defined 
benefit plans, provide portability of service. They are collectively bar 
gained plans covering workers in an industry or craft within a fixed 
geographic area. They enable workers to change jobs without losing 
service credit when they resume work with another employer in the 
plan.
Multiemployer plans typically develop in industries with certain 
features. First, the industry has many small firms within a single geo 
graphic labor market. Second, the industry has high turnover of firms. 
Third, the industry has high worker turnover. Fourth, the industry is 
skilled-labor-intensive. Multiemployer plans are common in construc 
tion, trucking, the merchant marine and coal mining. Of the 3,066 mul- 
tiemployer plans in 1988, 35 percent were defined contribution plans 
(Turner and Beller 1992, p. 590).
The decline in unionism has reduced the importance of multiem- 
ployer plans. The share of private pension participants in multiem- 
ployer plans fell from 19.8 to 14.8 percent from 1975 to 1988 (1\irner 
and Beller 1992, p. 592).
Reciprocity
Service-credit transfer arrangements among plans are known as rec 
iprocity agreements. Under these contracts, several plans, usually mul- 
tiemployer plans covering members of local unions with the same 
international union, agree to give pension credit for service under any 
of the plans. With reciprocity, "two, or more, financially independent 
pension plans will each recognize employee service credited in the 
other participating plan, or plans, for the purposes of (1) establishing 
an employee's eligibility to accrue benefit credits, (2) determining an 
employee's entitlement to receive benefits from a plan, and/or (3)
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determining the benefits payable to an employee" (McDonald 1975). 
Reciprocity may be between plans of unrelated employers, related 
employers, or the same employer.
Reciprocity agreements are common among multiemployer plans. 
In multiemployer arrangements, the plan rather than a particular 
employer ultimately pays the benefits. Between 45 and 50 percent of 
multiemployer plans have reciprocity with another plan (Meier and 
Bassett 1981). These agreements are concentrated in motor transporta 
tion, clothing, construction, and water transportation industries.
Reciprocity is uncommon among single-employer plans. The only 
study on portability and reciprocity agreements among single- 
employer plans, using 1975 data, found that only 8 percent of single- 
employer plans had reciprocity with unrelated employers (Grubbs 
1981). Reciprocity agreements are more common among very large 
plans. For plans with 1,000 or more participants, 20 percent of defined 
benefit plans and 19 percent of defined contribution plans had reciproc 
ity agreements.
The prevalence of reciprocity arrangements varies greatly by indus 
try and union status. For plans overall, 8 percent of both collectively 
bargained and noncollectively bargained plans had reciprocal arrange 
ments. In the finance, insurance, and real estate industry sector, 54 per 
cent of collectively bargained plans and 4 percent of noncollectively 
bargained plans had portability or reciprocity arrangements with plans 
of other employers. In manufacturing, however, the figures dropped to 
7 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Reciprocity agreements take two forms. 2 Under the "money follows 
the worker" approach, a pension member working temporarily in 
another jurisdiction has the pension contribution that jurisdiction 
requires sent to his/her "home" plan. The employee receives pension 
credits for the contributions according to the rules of the home plan. 
The second form of reciprocity agreement is the "pro rata" approach, 
where a pension participant accruing credits under several plans will 
receive a pension benefit from each. The sum due from each is figured 
as though combined service applied to that plan, and it is then prorated 
according to service in that plan. Under this approach money is not 
transferred between plans. Reciprocity preserves benefits by broaden 
ing the definition of continuing service. It is thus similar to break-in-
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service rules, allowing workers to return to an employer and count ser 
vice before and after the break.
Portability Networks
A portability network, or clearinghouse, holds pension funds and 
combined benefits from various plans. There are 11 centrally adminis 
tered networks or clearinghouses of unrelated employers, all but two of 
which have been operating since 1963.
Each of these networks covers a single industry's workers and per 
mits service portability for workers transferring between employers in 
the network. The largest network is the Teachers Insurance and Annu 
ity Association and the related College Retirement Equities Fund 
(TIAA-CREF). Some others are the National Automobile Dealers 
Association, the National Health and Welfare Mutual Life Insurance 
Association, the National Education Association, and the Savings 
Banks Retirement System.
The networks have various arrangements to transfer vested credits 
between employers. AT&T provides a good example. The divestiture 
of AT&T on January 1, 1984, prompted the formation of a new porta 
bility network, resulting in the division of two pension plans—cover 
ing one million workers—into eight plans (Schmitt 1988). The new 
plans for each regional holding company accepted the service credits 
for reassigned workers or those who otherwise moved between or 
among AT&T and the divested companies and former Bell System 
workers who returned to work with AT&T. Service credit for figuring 
benefit eligibility and amounts is recognized as if there were a single 
company.
Grubbs (1981) studied 25 portability networks, including networks 
among related employers. The networks were classified into two 
groups. The first consisted of the 10 centrally administered portability 
clearinghouses existing at the time covering employers not under com 
mon control. The second, comprised of other portability networks and 
plans with portability aspects, consisted of pension plans of a single 
employer or an employer group under common control, and some 
plans offering portability to any other pension plan.
Grubbs obtained data on nine of the ten centrally administered net 
works, the oldest of which began in 1918. Some networks, such as the
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National Automobile Dealers Association, were started by employer 
associations formed for other purposes. Others, like TIAA-CREF, 
formed to meet retirement needs of employers and workers in an 
industry, but are not affiliated with an employer association having 
other functions. Some networks have only a single plan or a single plan 
type; others sponsor various plans. Individual employers choose to par 
ticipate in one or more types. Together, the nine networks covered 2 
percent of active U.S. pension participants.
Because each network is limited to a single industry, workers often 
move among participating employers. If a social worker employed by 
one employer in the National Health and Welfare network ends 
employment, his/her next employer in all probability will be a partici 
pating employer in that network.
The nine networks are nonprofit, but with differing forms of organi 
zation. The TIAA-CREF and National Health and Welfare plans are 
organized as life insurance companies. Others are organized as trusts, 
with management by the trust or a related company. The portability 
they provide varies. Service with any participating employer is often 
treated as service with the current employer in figuring worker eligibil 
ity to participate in, vest in, or receive benefits from the plan. If a 
worker is entitled to benefits based on employment with several 
employers, most networks combine the benefits into a single check.
The clearinghouses allocate benefit liabilities differently. For 
defined contribution plans, each employer's cost for benefits is the sum 
of the contributions allocated to its workers. For defined benefit plans, 
actuaries figure costs for each employer as though a separate plan were 
maintained for that firm. Or, they figure costs for the network, or some 
segment of it, and an allocation is made to individual employers, per 
haps as an equal share of pay for all employers with the same benefit 
formula. Even if the network calculates costs separately for each 
employer, the service of all retired workers is usually combined. This 
is done by purchasing annuities at retirement or by using a similar 
uninsured approach.
All nine networks handle most of the administrative work for the 
plans, thus minimizing the administrative work for individual employ 
ers. The networks often maintain direct communication with individual 
participants. Four networks provided data showing that from 2 to 15
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percent of retiring participants receive benefits from employment with 
multiple employers.
Case Studies of Portability Networks
The National Automobile Dealers and Associates Retirement Trust 
(NADART) serves retail automobile dealerships belonging to the 
National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). If a worker trans 
fers between employers with NADART money purchase or profit shar 
ing plans and the new employer agrees, the worker's vested account 
balance is transferred to the new employer's plan. If a worker transfers 
between defined benefit plans, service in one plan counts towards vest 
ing in the other.
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) incorpo 
rated as a legal reserve life insurance company in 1918. The College 
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), founded in 1952, is a companion 
organization. CREF provides variable annuities with values depending 
on the common stocks in which the premiums are invested. All partici 
pating employers are nonprofit colleges, universities, independent 
schools, and related nonprofit research and educational institutions. In 
1981, 80 percent of four-year colleges and universities provided 
TIAA-CREF coverage. Of the 3,200 participating institutions, 450 
were publicly supported colleges and universities. The TIAA-CREF 
system uses fully portable individual annuity contracts. These con 
tracts are vested in and owned by individual workers from the date 
they are issued.
The Savings Banks Retirement System provides benefits for 
employees of mutual savings banks. This system consists of 120 
employers in seven states. Portability differs among the employers. In 
most plans, the service earned by a worker under a prior plan in the 
system counts towards eligibility for early retirement, disability retire 
ment, and preretirement spouse's benefits. Nineteen plans recognize 
prior service with a former system employer for figuring benefits. The 
benefit based on total service is offset by any benefit available from the 
prior plan. In effect, this results in the current employer raising the 
benefit accrued with prior employers.
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Controlled Groups
Portability is also available within a controlled group, which is 
defined as a group of firms with 80 percent or more common owner 
ship. 3 While pension law does not require service portability among 
unrelated employers, it does require some service portability among 
related employers, which includes firms under common control, trades 
or businesses (whether or not incorporated) under common control, 
and some affiliated service groups.
ERISA requires that work for all employers in a controlled group be 
counted as work for a single employer in calculating a worker's eligi 
bility to participate and, later, to vest in a plan. Thus, the service of a 
worker transferring to a related employer must be used in figuring 
whether the worker is vested under the new employer's plan, but it 
need not be used in calculating a worker's benefit. As a business prac 
tice, some employers count all service with controlled group members 
when determining benefit levels.
If a firm is sold to a new owner, federal law also requires an 
employer maintaining a plan of a predecessor employer to treat service 
for the predecessor as service for the current employer.
Large Firms
The extent of portability can be measured by the relationship 
between the plans having such arrangements. The most extensive situ 
ation is portability applying to unrelated employers. Less extensive is 
portability applying to plans of related (controlled group) employers. 
Least extensive is portability applying only to the same employer's 
plans. If a job change within a large firm requires the worker to change 
pension plans, the plans generally are set up so that the worker loses no 
future pension benefits.
PORTABILITY OF ASSETS
Preretirement Distributions
Portability of assets is the transfer of a worker's pension assets from 
one plan to another when he/she changes jobs. Defined contribution
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plans often give the worker a lump sum of money when he/she leaves 
the firm. The cashout is the worker's account value.
Present law allows portability of assets by permitting them to be 
rolled over, or transferred, from one tax-favored retirement arrange 
ment to another. It also induces workers to save money received from 
pension plans for retirement. Vested workers enrolled in defined contri 
bution plans do not lose benefits unless they opt to receive a lump sum. 
If they leave their money in the plan, the account accumulates invest 
ment earnings as if the workers had not changed jobs.
Transfers from Plans
Funds generally cannot be distributed to a worker from a pension 
plan before the end of employment, but contributions to profit-sharing 
and stock bonus plans are distributable within two years of the contri 
bution, even if the job has not ended. Some employers prefer not to 
offer lump sum distributions from defined benefit plans because doing 
so reduces the plan's funding ratio for underfunded plans.
Many plans cash out benefits of under $3,500 because the employer 
wants to avoid the administrative burden of managing small accounts 
for former employees. If the worker's present value of benefits exceeds 
$3,500, the benefit cannot be distributed before the earliest of normal 
retirement age or 62, unless the worker consents to the distribution. 
Workers with benefits with present values of more than $3,500 may opt 
to leave the benefits in the plan until retirement age, thus preserving 
the benefits until retirement.
Tax Treatment of Preretirement Distributions
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 encourages workers to save preretire 
ment lump sum distributions. It imposes a 10 percent tax if lump sum 
distributions are not rolled over into an IRA or an employer-sponsored 
plan within 60 days of receipt. Because the tax is an income tax, it 
applies to the part of a lump sum ineluctable in income. In 1992 the fur 
ther requirement of 20 percent withholding was added on distributions 
not rolled over within 60 days.
The tax does not apply to the following distributions: (1) those 
received after age 59 1/2; (2) those received due to the individual's 
death; (3) those received due to the individual's disability; (4) those
108 Pension Portability in the United States
used to pay medical expenses that would be deductible if the individual 
itemized deductions (not applicable to IRAs);4 (5) those paid as equal 
periodic payments over the life expectancy of the individual (or the 
joint life expectancies of the individual and spouse); (6) those made for 
a worker separating from service after age 55 (not applicable to IRAs); 
(7) those received from an employee stock ownership plan; or (8) those 
made under a qualified domestic relations order in a divorce settlement 
(not applicable to IRAs).
The Tax Reform Act further induces workers not to take preretire 
ment distributions. Under prior law, an individual receiving a lump 
sum distribution could apply 10-year income averaging to the distribu 
tion. The Act phased out 10-year forward averaging, allowing workers 
instead a one-time five-year forward average for a lump sum distribu 
tion after the worker reaches age 59-1/2. Also, under prior law, that 
portion of a distribution attributable to contributions before January 1, 
1974, could qualify as a long-term capital gain. The Act phased out the 
use of long- term capital gains treatment over six years.
The Tax Reform Act also changed rules on the treatment of tax basis 
when an individual receives a distribution from a tax-favored retire 
ment arrangement to which he/she and the employer have contributed. 
If the worker received a sum before the date the plan began paying the 
worker an annuity, prior law treated the worker as first receiving non- 
taxable income and then receiving taxable income. The Act modified 
the basis recovery rules for pre-annuity starting date distributions to 
provide for the pro-rata recovery of basis. Thus, a worker is entitled to 
exclude from taxation a portion of the payment figured by multiplying 
the payment by the ratio of his/her basis to the accrued benefit under 
the plan. In making this change, Congress decided the prior rule per 
mitted the accelerated tax-free recovery of worker contributions and 
thus encouraged the nonretirement use of tax-favored retirement 
arrangements.
Rollovers
A rollover is a tax-free transfer of pension assets from one plan to 
another. A worker receiving a lump sum distribution from an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan may transfer it, less any after-tax 
employee contributions, to an IRA where it can still receive tax-
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deferred investment income.9 The tax code also permits the funds to be 
transferred into another employer's plan, but few plans accept such 
rollovers. Partial rollovers of lump sum distributions into an IRA are 
permitted if at least half the worker's account balance is rolled over.
A rollover into an IRA is a substitute strategy for making a portabil 
ity transfer to another employer's plan. A distribution rolled over into 
an IRA is excluded from income and is not subject to the 10 percent 
excise tax on early distributions. When such sums are later distributed 
from the IRA, they are includable in income. A total distribution may 
be rolled over to an IRA if made due to the individual's death; after the 
individual has reached age 59 1/2; due to ending employment (other 
than for a self-employed person); or for self-employed persons only, if 
the person becomes permanently disabled. Only employer contribu 
tions (and income on employer or worker contributions) may be rolled 
over into an IRA. Distributions of worker contributions cannot be 
rolled over. 5
Distributions from qualified retirement plans are rolled over into 
another qualified plan on the same basis that distributions are rolled 
over into an IRA. Law does not require plans to permit transfers or 
rollovers from another qualified plan. Plans permitting such transac 
tions are most common among related employers or with a merger or 
acquisition.
Grubbs (1981) surveyed plans to investigate the acceptance of roll 
overs by pension plans. He found that 93 percent of plans did not 
accept rollovers. Of the plans accepting rollovers, 96 percent placed 
the rollovers in individual accounts and 4 percent did not specify how 
the rollover would be treated. Two percent of defined benefit plans 
with fewer than 100 participants and 1 percent of plans with 100 or 
more participants accepted rollovers. Nine percent of defined contribu 
tion plans with fewer than 100 participants and 5 percent with 100 or 
more participants accepted rollovers.
SOCIAL SECURITY
Social security provides the majority of retirement income for most 
workers. In 1988 only 2 percent of elderly households received at least
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50 percent of income from private pensions, while 55 percent received 
at least 50 percent from social security (1\irner and Beller 1992). Most 
workers are now covered by social security, and benefit accruals are 
portable among all employers included in the system. Social security 
portability is possible because plan design, funding, and administration 
are done centrally, by Congress and the Social Security Administra 
tion. Social security benefits are based on lifetime earnings, so a 
worker changing jobs loses no benefits under this plan. Expanding 
social security would solve portability problems. Projections show, 
however, that the rising old-age dependency ratio will reduce social 
security benefits relative to earnings (Doescher and Turner 1988).
NOTES
1. The discussion in this section draws heavily from U.S. Genera] Accounting Office (1990).
2. The following discussion of reciprocity is taken from Brownlee (1989).
3. Material in this section is taken largely from Joint Committee on Taxation (1988).
4. The tax does not apply to lump sum distributions that are used to pay medical expenses that 
are deductible for federal income tax purposes (that is, in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross 
income).
5. Employee contributions are treated differently because such contributions (other than to 
401(k) plans) are taxable.
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Pension Reform Debate
Inevitably, raising pension benefits or reducing risks involves costly 
changes, and there are winners and losers. Reformers must identify the 
market imperfection that suggests the need for government interven 
tion and analyze the arguments for pension reform, which fall into five 
overlapping categories: (1) equity, (2) tax and budget policy, (3) gov 
ernment regulation, (4) economic effects, and (5) financial responsibil 
ity.
Rather than analyzing the arguments, this chapter debates them— 
first presenting the strongest argument in favor of pension reform and 
then the strongest argument against it. On the final issue of financial 
responsibility, the debate is not pro or con but who should pay— 
employers, government, or workers.
EQUITY
Equity arguments are motivated by value judgments about fair treat 
ment of similar and dissimilar groups. Opinions differ as to what 
defines an equitable balance between costs and benefits for competing 
groups. Workers, firms, and taxpayers compete for lower taxes, higher 
tax subsidies, lower costs, and higher and more secure benefits. In the 
case of pension reform, at least one group bears costs when another 
benefits.
Short-Tenure versus Long-Tenure Workers
Pension portability raises the benefits of short-tenure workers. In a 
fixed-benefits budget, this advantage comes at the expense of other 
workers.
in
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Pro
A full pension should not depend on 30 years of tenure with one 
employer. With incomplete pension portability, job leavers receive 
reduced benefits for the years they have worked. Because women in 
pensions plans have shorter job tenure than men, pay via pensions 
favors men at women's expense. Tax-favored pensions should not be 
an employer monopoly. Short-tenure workers and job leavers cannot 
compensate for their disadvantage in pension plans by maintaining 
comparable tax-favored savings because the only comparable form of 
savings, IRAs, has low contribution limits. Workers should be free to 
receive a tax-favored pension without tying themselves to one 
employer.
Con
Employers value long-tenure workers and should be able to reward 
them through generous pensions. While pension portability raises the 
benefits of short-tenure workers, those workers may have preferred 
higher wages. When this is the case, short-tenure workers view them 
selves as worse off with pension portability. The frequency with which 
job leavers take lump sum distributions supports this point.
Workers versus Firms
Equity issues between workers and firms depend on who owns the 
pension assets. Are they owned by workers, firms, or both? Whose 
interests should the plan favor? Pension law requires plans to invest 
assets solely in the interest of participants. It does not require, how 
ever, that all elements of pensions favor workers at the firm's expense. 
Elements of plan design that allow inflation to erode retirement bene 
fits if taken before retirement are precisely those elements employers 
depend on to encourage loyalty and long service.
Pro
Workers want the reduced risk of benefit loss that government regu 
lations provide, and portability reduces the risk that workers will lose 
benefits due to job change. Employers favor pension regulations with 
which they already comply. These regulations may cut the risk of ben 
efit loss perceived by workers even though the plan is already comply-
Pension Reform Debate 113
ing with the regulation. Some employers favor pension reforms forcing 
competitors to bear the same benefit costs they do.
Con
Favoring long-service workers is a good compensation strategy for 
many employers. Workers and firms both gain from long-term commit 
ments from workers to firms.
TAX AND BUDGET POLICY
The tax issue raised in pension reform deals with two important ele 
ments: who benefits from the tax expenditures, and how much does 
pension reform cost the Treasury Department in lost revenue. 1 In a 
period of large budget deficits, political reality requires pension 
reform to refrain from adding to the budget deficit. This translates into 
a demand that pension reform be revenue neutral: it must be packaged 
so that higher tax expenditures for some aspects of pensions are offset 
elsewhere in the budget by higher tax revenues or lower tax expendi 
tures.
Pro
It is wrong that pension tax advantages are enjoyed disproportion 
ately by long-tenure workers, because the primary public purpose of 
pension plans is to provide retirement income, not to reward worker 
longevity. 2 Further, the longevity subsidy depends largely on inflation, 
which is beyond the control of employers or employees. Even if favor 
ing longevity were desirable, subsidizing job tenure in an inflation- 
dependent way is a questionable undertaking given inflation rate vari 
ability.
Con
Congress uses the tax system for many social purposes, and there is 
no reason why worker longevity should not be included.
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GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As budget deficits grow, the federal government looks increasingly 
at the option of mandating benefits. This intervention, however, raises 
the issue of government's role as regulator.
Pro
If it expands choices, government intervention through pension 
reform is desirable. The value of freedom of choice is raised by 
expanding the range of alternatives and giving workers more control 
over their pension arrangements. Because government subsidizes ben 
efits, it has a right and duty to decide how that tax subsidy should be 
distributed and how job change should reduce tax benefits. It also has 
an obligation to set minimum standards to protect relatively powerless 
workers.
While a basic conflict of goals exists between maintaining a free 
market and protecting workers from economic risks, protecting work 
ers, at least to a point, overrides philosophical concerns about an unfet 
tered market. Moreover, government mandates are often not aimed at 
protecting the typical worker, but are motivated by social goals already 
achieved by many workers. Mandates aim at protecting vulnerable 
workers.
Workers, even if given options, do not always make the "right" 
choices. Paternalistic reformers identify "merit goods," and argue that 
these should be provided even if workers do not choose them. Pater 
nalistic reformers argue that workers undersave for retirement due to 
an inability to plan for distant needs; thus, portability must be man 
dated to raise retirement savings.
Poor information exchange further justifies government interven 
tion. Workers or firms who are poorly informed about the advantages 
and costs of a benefit arrangement may seek less than adequate benefit 
plans. For example, workers frequently underestimate their life expect 
ancies and save too little for retirement. When information problems 
are difficult to correct, it may be necessary for government to require 
benefit coverage.
Externalities (costs to third parties) also justify government inter 
vention. Because government provides public benefits to indigent retir-
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ees, retirees with low savings impose costs on society. Government 
may force workers to internalize the costs by requiring minimum 
retirement saving or may favor raising pension benefits to shrink social 
security's burden as the population ages. Finally, economies of scale 
argue for government intervention. Government could operate a porta 
bility clearinghouse more efficiently than the private sector, given the 
economies of large operations.
Con
Government intervention through pension reform coerces firms and 
workers and distorts market outcomes, allocating resources subopti- 
mally. The labor market decides the optimal level and mix of benefits. 
It does so based on differing values placed on nonwage compensation 
by firms, workers, and labor unions.
Pension reform restricts choices by interfering when management 
and labor negotiate salaries. Requiring uniform minimum treatment of 
covered workers, pension reform restricts employer freedom to negoti 
ate packages that meet worker needs. It arbitrarily assigns higher prior 
ity to one benefit at the expense of others. Pension reform may restrict 
worker consumption by prohibiting preretirement lump sum distribu 
tions. Worker well-being declines when workers prefer cash wages 
over the extra benefits that reform forces them to accept.
The expanded choices that result from government intervention 
cause adverse selection. This occurs because workers with longer than 
actuarial life expectancy choose a benefit available on better terms 
considering their own knowledge of life expectancy. The more choices 
there are, the more room there is for adverse selection. Such behavior 
raises the cost to employers of pension benefits.
Mandating portability disrupts pension plan administration. Any 
mandated change requires new plan practices, and plans must hire 
attorneys and employee-benefit specialists to assure compliance. To 
achieve a goal over the range of possible situations, government regu 
lations often become highly complex, eventually making simplification 
itself a goal of reform. Mandates often require government to provide 
services and enforce new regulations, thus increasing the federal 
bureaucracy. Lacking a profit motive, government is less efficient than 
the private sector.
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Underlying the paternalistic arguments for pension reform is the 
question of adequacy: do workers save adequately for retirement? 
Most undoubtedly do. The mandate of a paternalistic government 
diminishes incentive for responsible individual behavior and private 
charity. Further, and of most importance, mandates designed to raise 
benefits ultimately do the opposite. By raising costs, mandates fre 
quently force firms to reduce or end benefits. 3
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Pension reform alters behavior of workers and firms, affecting job 
mobility and productivity. It also impacts retirement savings, affecting 
the type of pension plan firms provide and whether, in fact, they pro 
vide a plan. It may affect the ages and numbers of workers firms hire.
Job Mobility and Labor Market Efficiency
The loss of pension benefit with job change penalizes and reduces 
mobility. The economic efficiency of pensions affecting labor mobility 
varies between firms and over time, depending on economic condi 
tions.
Pro
Some workers must change jobs to adjust to a dynamic economy. 
Changes in technology and imports, and growing and declining 
employment in different geographic areas and businesses, cause work 
ers to change jobs. The United States, facing greater competition in the 
world economy, needs to foster job mobility. Higher workforce flexi 
bility is essential for efficiency. The flexibility of the U.S. labor force 
would rise if pensions were linked to the worker rather than the job.
Con
The view that impediments to job change are undesirable supposes 
that worker productivity is highly transferable between jobs, and that 
any shift in relative prices or technology makes job change efficient. In 
contrast, labor economists stress causes and effects of long-duration 
jobs. The contract theories of long-duration jobs imply that reduced job
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mobility is efficient. Defined benefit pensions appear to have a produc 
tivity-augmenting role by discouraging quits, encouraging firms to 
invest in workers, and penalizing workers who "shirk."
Government portability mandates reduce efficiency by making it 
more difficult for firms to retain labor. Workers would be more likely 
to change jobs, and, consequently, employers might find it less advan 
tageous to train workers. Portability also worsens labor-management 
relations by reducing worker loyalty to employers.
Unlike mandated social security participation, workers can choose 
whether or not to participate in the private pension system. That firms 
and workers agree on pension plans with quit penalties suggests that 
mobility would otherwise be excessive. Why would both voluntarily 
impede worker freedom to change jobs when an alternative—the 
defined contribution plan—offers tax advantages without penalizing 
separation?
Cost and International Competitiveness
Imports and exports are playing an increasingly large role in the 
U.S. economy, causing international competitiveness to be an increas 
ingly important consideration in labor market decisions.
Pro
Portability increases labor market flexibility, raising U.S. interna 
tional competitiveness. Portability may raise the cost of benefits, but 
the higher costs imposed on employers by pension reform are offset by 
lower cash wages than they would otherwise have to pay. Because such 
an offset occurs, the higher initial costs imposed on employers would 
not reduce their international competitiveness. In any case, exchange 
rates adjust and international trade is based on comparative advantage 
rather than absolute advantage.
Con
Pension reform makes domestic firms less competitive than foreign 
firms, raising employer costs, reducing U.S. competitiveness, and cost 
ing jobs. Higher costs cause firms to hire fewer workers or to favor 
some workers over others. If firms view women as short-tenure work 
ers, and pension reform reduces the penalty on short-tenure work, a
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firm needing long-tenure workers for efficient operations would favor 
hiring men over women.
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Plans
Will mandated pension portability raise employer costs and reduce 
pension coverage, especially by defined benefit plans? Are defined 
benefit plans better for workers than defined contribution plans? An 
answer of "no" to either question greatly simplifies (he portability 
issue. Defined benefit plans could be required to provide greater porta 
bility. That would raise costs and reduce their advantages to employers, 
accelerating the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans. Or all pensions could be required to be defined contribution 
plans with benefits locked in until retirement.
Pro
For many portability proposals affecting defined benefit plans, con 
verting a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan would be 
an attractive alternative to the employer. While defined benefit plans 
offer important advantages over defined contribution plans, problems 
triggered by mandating portability cause a shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans. Employers have discovered the advantages 
of defined contribution plans: predictable costs, fairly easy administra 
tion, less government interference, and highly portable assets.
Con
Mandating portability raises pension costs, which results in firms 
opting out of pension coverage. While terminating a plan may seem 
drastic, defined benefit plan terminations were common in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Thus, regulations intended to provide workers with a 
more secure pension instead trigger the end of the pension.
Many analysts have concluded that defined benefit plans provide 
more retirement income security than defined contribution plans. The 
employer is primarily responsible for the investment risk in defined 
benefit plans, while the worker bears the investment risk in defined 
contribution plans. Defined benefit plans are more widely used than 
defined contribution plans in nearly all countries, probably because 
firms are better able than workers to bear the investment risk. Also,
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most defined benefit plan benefits are guaranteed by the Pension Bene 
fit Guaranty Corporation. Defined benefit plans benefit employers by 
affecting workforce age structure. Workers are encouraged to stay dur 
ing prime productivity years, and are encouraged, by early retirement 
incentives, to quit when they grow older.
Old-Age Economic Security and National Savings
Private pensions play an important role in old age security and 
national savings. With the aging U.S. population and low U.S. savings 
rates, some analysts are concerned as to whether the private pension 
system is performing adequately.
Pro
Mandating portability raises pension benefits for some retirees, 
increasing old age security. Banning preretirement distributions has a 
similar effect. Such an approach could also raise national savings, by 
encouraging greater savings in pensions.
Con
The raised savings and benefit security would be undone if reform 
decreased the likelihood that firms would provide pensions, or caused 
them to provide less generous pensions. Also, workers frequently undo 
higher savings by reducing other forms of retirement assets. Thus, the 
positive effects on national savings and benefit security are likely to be 
minimal.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Regardless of how desirable portability reform is for equity, tax pol 
icy, government regulation, or economic effects, someone must pay for 
the higher benefits. Pension reform changes contractual relationships. 
Reforms effectively take financial assets from some people and give 
them to others. In the long run, the issue becomes, who pays?
Three parties may pay for pension reform: (1) employers (and ulti 
mately consumers and stockholders), (2) government (taxpayers), (3) 
other workers covered by pensions and workers benefiting from pen-
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sion reform. A complete analysis considers the minimizing strategies 
the paying party will entertain.
Employers
Many proposals designate employers as payers. The proposals do 
so, in part, because it seems unfair to make a job stayer pay for a job 
leaver's pension. If employers pay, the burden is borne by the firm the 
worker is leaving, the firm the worker is joining, or both. When 
employers pay, pension reform compels shareholders to surrender 
financial assets to mobile workers.
Actuaries and employee benefit consultants would intensely scruti 
nize pension portability reform to reduce employer cost and search for 
ways to redesign pension plans to provide satisfactory benefits at 
affordable prices. To compete in both labor and product markets, 
employers may redesign pension plans to keep costs at a previous level 
and shift costs by reducing pension generosity and/or by providing 
smaller cost-of-living increases for retirees.
Mandating that employers pay for pension reform does not resolve 
who ultimately pays. In addition to dropping a defined benefit plan or 
cutting its generosity, employers may try to shift the burden within the 
plan to the remaining workers and to retirees. Most employers, how 
ever, feel more responsibility for their retirees and current workers 
than for former workers.
Pension reform affects firms unequally. Because reform raises costs, 
established firms with a higher percentage of older workers bear a 
heavier burden.4 It is thus misleading in analyzing pension reform to 
focus on average costs; one should consider the range of cost impacts 
on employers.
Government
Some argue that if inflation is the culprit in most portability loss, 
government should pay the cost. Perhaps this burden would make gov 
ernment more circumspect about inflationary policies. Due to the 
unpredictability of inflation, most employers are unwilling to take on 
the inherent liability. Whether that argument is accepted, mandating 
portability may cost government dearly in lost tax revenue. Any 
change in pension regulations that raises pension contributions,
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reduces lump sum cashouts, and raises pension assets, will decrease 
federal tax revenue.
Workers
The manner in which labor markets set wages and pension coverage 
is an important pension policy element. Economists base their views 
on the theory of equalizing differences, which holds that for costs paid 
by employers, workers, in turn, pay for pensions and pension reform 
through reduced cash wages and other benefits. The theory holds that 
employers in competitive markets offer equivalent compensation pack 
ages to similar workers. Thus, pension-covered workers must receive 
lower wages than similar workers without pensions. 5
Because competitive forces set the value of compensation, employ 
ers tailor benefit packages to attract the workers they want. Employers 
wishing to attract long-term workers offer better pension benefits and 
lower current wages. Employers not needing long- tenure workers 
offer packages with greater immediate rewards. If the labor market 
operates as suggested by this theory, workers pay for pension reform 
by exchanging wages for future pension benefits. The total compensa 
tion they receive is unchanged. The theory does not imply that each 
worker exactly pays through reduced wages for the benefits he/she 
receives, but that as a group workers pay. While the theory is intellec 
tually appealing, it has thus far proven too difficult to verify empiri 
cally.
NOTES
1. Tax expenditures are the forgone tax revenues that arise due to tax deductions and the pref 
erential nontaxation of some forms of income. Tax expenditures are logically equivalent to other 
government expenditures in that both reduce the amount of money left to the Treasury for other 
expenditures.
2. See, for example, Ozanne and Lindeman (1987).
3. This discussion is based in part on Mitchell (1991).
4. This discussion is taken largely from Conklin (1991).
5. This offset may be reduced if pension coverage increases worker productivity.

Policy Options 
for Pension Portability
Numerous options would reduce pension benefit losses of workers 
who leave jobs before retirement. A brief history will demonstrate the 
range of alternatives that U.S. policymakers have considered but not 
enacted. This is followed by an examination of various options
Public policymakers have studied pension portability since the mid- 
1960s. In 1965 the President's Committee on Corporate Pension 
Funds, formed by President Kennedy, proposed a central clearinghouse 
to receive pension benefit distributions for job leavers. The Social 
Security Administration was to administer the clearinghouse. In the 
early 1970s, several years before passage of ERISA, pension reformers 
introduced bills in Congress that included voluntary portability 
arrangements. Senator Jacob Javits of New York in 1974 proposed the 
formation of a central fund where job leavers could transfer pension 
assets.
In 1980 the President's Commission on Pension Policy issued a 
report recommending a Minimum Universal Pension System. Under 
this system, all workers would be covered by a minimum mandated 
employer pension with immediate vesting. A portability clearinghouse 
would handle job leavers' benefits.
In 1988 a Department of Labor advisory group issued a report 
including the following recommendations: require preretirement distri 
butions to go to an IRA or another employer's plan; maintain or 
enhance disincentives for preretirement distributions; study whether 
plans should be required to accept rollovers from other plans; require 
employers to set up Simplified Employee Pensions (SEPs) upon 
employee request; and study options to expand pension coverage, 
including mandating pensions for all employers. 1
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EARLIER VESTING
Private pension portability would be improved by requiring shorter 
vesting. Such proposals aim at defined benefit plans, which generally 
vest more slowly than defined contribution plans. Vesting could be 
reduced to three-year cliff vesting or could occur immediately. Imme 
diate vesting would reduce the benefits the average pension-covered 
worker loses by 4 percent (from 14.8 to 14.2 percent) (table 9.1).
Table 9.1 
Portability Loss with Full and Immediate Vesting
Percentage of covered workers
Immediate
Portability loss Current vesting vesting 
(%) requirements requirements
40 to 49
30 to 39
20 to 29
10 to 19
Ito9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss
6.3
13.4
19.4
15.2
4.6
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3
6.0
13.6
19.2
14.9
3.0
39.2
4.2
100.0
14.2
23.4
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the 
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last 
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least 
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the 
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35 
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."
A typical pension plan in the late 1980s provided annual pension 
benefit accrual of $100 to $500 early in a career (Hay/Huggins 1988, p. 
iii). For most workers the lump sum value for four years of work 
ranges from $400 to $2,000; thus, typical losses for unvested workers 
in single-employer plans with five-year vesting are less than $2,000.
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Workers who change jobs after a short tenure have small benefits 
because of the brevity of their tenure and because most of them are 
young, low-income workers.
If vesting requirements were tightened, employers would probably 
react by paying lump sums to terminating employees with short ser 
vice. If these small lump sum distributions were not rolled over into an 
IRA or saved, they would be unavailable for retirement income, and 
the shorter vesting would not have reduced portability losses.
PRERETIREMENT INDEXING OF BENEFITS
Second only to benefit losses due to preretirement cashouts are port 
ability losses that occur because deferred vested benefits of job leavers 
are unindexed. Pension benefits of workers who change jobs erode in 
real value because the wages used to calculate the benefit are unin 
dexed for future wage growth or inflation. Had these workers remained 
with the original employer, their accrued benefits would have been 
indexed by their growing wages.
Two policies could greatly reduce this cause of portability loss. The 
first would be to require that vested benefits be adjusted for preretire 
ment inflation if they are left in the plan, or require the plan to incorpo 
rate expected inflation to adjust the final salary for calculating a lump 
sum distribution. The second would be to require that defined benefit 
plans credit workers for service at prior jobs.
Price Indexing
One option for pension preservation would require employers to 
calculate benefits at job change, and then index them to maintain real 
value until retirement. This approach would amend the tax code to 
require that defined benefit plans take the salary base they use to calcu 
late deferred annuities and adjust it for inflation occurring between job 
end and initial receipt of pension benefits. Workers in career-average 
and flat-dollar benefit plans, as well as those in final-pay plans, would 
be protected.
This option would determine the present value of benefits using a 
nominal (market) interest rate to discount future liabilities, and then
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index that value. A computational alternative yielding a similar result 
would discount future benefits with a real interest rate.2 For example, 
with a real interest rate of say 2 percent, a higher present value of ben 
efits results than if a nominal market interest rate were used. The plan 
then would maintain this benefit value unindexed. This option places 
the cost of portability reform, at least initially, on the employer who 
loses an employee. Revising defined benefit plans this way raises 
aggregate plan costs or redistributes benefits to short-service workers.
Under a second alternative, vested pension credits and an appropri 
ate sum would be transferred to a pension clearinghouse or central pen 
sion bank. The clearinghouse would index benefits for preretirement 
inflation, and assess all participating employers an annual charge to 
cover the preceding year's cost of inflation. The clearinghouse must 
assess how much money should be transferred from a pension fund to 
the clearinghouse for a pension credit; and it must assess, allocate, and 
collect the annual cost of inflation, including possible charges or cred 
its for bad or good investment returns. Any requirement should avoid 
price indexing that exceeds what former workers would have received 
had they stayed with the firm. The increase in the index could be lim 
ited to inflation or to average growth in wages for workers covered by 
the plan, whichever is smaller.
A related option would require that benefits of job leavers be 
indexed for preretirement inflation, but if inflation exceeds a cap, bene 
fits would increase at the cap rate. Mandatory indexing could be set at 
the lesser of 5 percent or the Consumer Price Index. Other alternatives 
include indexation at the inflation rate minus a stated percent. In addi 
tion, indexing need not use a specific index, such as the Consumer 
Price Index, but could take the indirect form of adding years to a work 
er's service used for calculating benefits. 3
Plans could still cash out small deferred annuities. Present value cal 
culations, however, would discount the deferred annuity, using the real 
interest rate implied by the plan's actuarial assumptions (the nominal 
interest rate minus the inflation rate), rather than its nominal interest 
rate assumption. This change would be required to adjust for increases 
in nominal benefits needed to maintain the real value of benefits. 
Indexing could also be targeted to groups such as workers involun 
tarily separated due to plant closings or plan terminations. This policy
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would levy a benefit-related surcharge on plant closings and pension 
terminations.
If the government required employers to price index job-leaver ben 
efits, employers might demand that the government provide an asset 
for funding these liabilities. Inflation-dependent deferred vested liabili 
ties would add a new risk to the financial risks borne by the firm. There 
are currently no U.S. assets with values that match the fluctuations in 
that liability. If the government issued indexed bonds—bonds whose 
rate of return is the inflation rate plus a stipulated real interest rate— 
that asset would eliminate the inflation risk that firms would otherwise 
bear in funding the liability for indexed deferred annuities.
Wage Indexing
An alternative approach to price indexing would require plans to 
index preretirement earnings for wage growth, as does social security. 
That indexing would cost firms more because wages generally rise 
faster than prices.
Requiring plans to index salaries in benefit calculations would not 
affect liabilities for workers who immediately retire at job separation. 
However, liabilities for deferred annuities—amounts a plan must pay 
employees who leave before the plan's early retirement age—could 
increase greatly.
Instead of indexing for actual inflation or actual wage growth, 
deferred pensions could be indexed for expected inflation or expected 
wage growth. This would reduce the financial risk to the firm because 
its liability would be certain. The firm's risk falls because the risk of 
future inflation has been shifted to workers. Depending on how high 
inflation actually is, such indexing may much exceed or fall far short of 
the amount needed to maintain the pension's real value.
Cost of Indexing
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost of indexing 
the deferred vested benefits of job leavers. Plans that price-index bene 
fits of job leavers up to retirement would have increases in annual costs 
ranging from 6 to 28 percent (Ozanne and Lindeman 1987). These 
costs equal 0.6 to 2.8 percent of annual compensation. If the policy 
only required indexed deferred annuities to be provided to job leavers
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with 10 or more years of work, the cost increase would be much 
smaller—4 to 19 percent. This expense may be viewed as small— 
roughly equal to one year's typical wage increase. However, the 
increase would be permanent. If increased costs were borne by workers 
as reduced wages, 0.4 to 2.8 percent of lifetime compensation, depend 
ing on the proposal, would permanently shift from wages to retirement 
benefits.
If benefits were indexed up to retirement to the Consumer Price 
Index, average portability losses (excluding those due to preretirement 
distributions) would decrease from 15 to 5 percent of pension wealth 
(table 9.2), and the share of the covered workforce experiencing such 
losses would fall from 59 to 41 percent (Hay/Huggins 1988). Only 3 
percent of covered workers would lose over 19 percent of a full-career 
benefit.
Table 9.2 
Portability Loss with Inflation Protection
Percentage of covered workers
Immediate 
Portability loss Current vesting vesting
requirements requirements
40 to 49
30 to 39
20 to 29
10 to 19
Ito9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss
6.3
13.4
19.4
15.2
4.6
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3
0.0
0.0
3.0
23.3
14.8
40.5
18.4
100.0
5.0
9.3
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988). 
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the 
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last 
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least 
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the 
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35 
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."
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Indexing to general wage growth reduces benefit losses further. 
Such indexing would nearly eliminate portability losses for most work 
ers. In the Hay/Huggins (1988) model, indexing vested pension bene 
fits by general wage growth reduces average portability loss from 15 to 
2 percent. For workers with losses, the average loss would fall from 23 
to 5 percent (table 9.3). The Hay/Huggins model, however, excludes 
losses caused by lump sum distributions greater than $3,500.
Table 93 
Portability Loss with Inflation and Productivity Protection
(Percentage of covered workers)
Immediate
Portability loss Current vesting vesting 
(%) requirements requirements
40 to 49
30 to 39
20 to 29
10 to 19
Ito9
None
Gain
Total
Average loss for all workers
Average loss for workers with a loss
6.3
13.4
19.4
15.2
4.6
38.4
2.7
100.0
14.8
23.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.8
17.3
38.2
41.7
100.0
1.5
5.0
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins (1988).
NOTE: The portability loss is the percentage difference between the retirement benefit the 
worker would have received if all service had been covered by the retirement plan of the last 
employer and the benefit that the worker actually received. A worker who worked from at least 
age 30 to age 65 under one pension plan would not have a loss under this definition, since the 
maximum credited service for the plans in the model was 35 years. A worker who worked for 35 
years under one plan and received a vested benefit from a second plan would show a "gain."
The tax revenue consequences of this option are uncertain. Employ 
ers might adjust to the option by reducing overall benefit levels. Work 
ers, bearing the costs through lower wages, shift compensation from 
immediately taxable wages to pension compensation nontaxable until 
paid as benefits. That shift sets the upper bound of revenue loss. If 
firms accommodated the change by decreasing other aspects of pen-
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sion benefits or other nontaxable compensation, no revenue would be 
lost.
Service Credit
An option eliminating plan design portability losses would require 
the final employer to credit all service from previous employers with a 
pension. The final employer would pay the part of the benefit in excess 
of vested benefits from other employers. For a worker employed 20 
years by each of two employers, both providing a benefit of 1.5 percent 
of the high-five average salary times years of work, the retirement ben 
efit to be paid from the pension plan of the second employer would be 
paid as follows (Hay/Huggins 1988):
1. High-five average salary with first employer $25,000
2. Benefit for 20 years from first employer's plan $7,500
3. High-five average salary with second employer $97,000
4. Benefit for 20 years from second employer's plan $29,100
5. Benefit for 40 years from second employer's plan $58,200
6. Second employer benefit if all service credited ((5) minus (2)) $50,700
Under current pension law, the second employer provides a benefit 
of $29,100. The worker loses benefits of 37 percent, because he/she 
receives a combined benefit of $36,600 rather than $58,200. If the sec 
ond employer credited all service, the second employer would pay a 
benefit of $50,700 and no benefits would be lost. This proposal only 
benefits employees who go to a second employer who has a pension 
plan.
Both preretirement indexing and transfer of service credits increase 
employer costs for a defined benefit plan. The first increases cost of 
workers leaving before retirement by requiring the initial employer to 
increase benefits for subsequent wage or price increases. The second 
increases the cost of hiring job leavers by requiring the last employer 
to pay benefits for service with prior employers.
Both approaches induce employers to be selective in whom they 
hire. The first might cause employers to avoid hiring young workers, 
seen as likely job leavers. Employers might hire fewer young women, 
viewing them as likely to change jobs more frequently than older
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women or men. The second approach might cause employers to avoid 
hiring older workers with past service to be credited. Hutchens (1986) 
has found that firms with pensions are less likely to hire older workers.
Portability Clearinghouse
A federal clearinghouse for retirement benefits could aid in asset 
transfers between plans or hold and invest assets of workers who have 
left pension-covered jobs. Those favoring a clearinghouse argue that a 
central administrative agency would ease administration of portability. 
Opponents argue that it would create a costly and unnecessary new 
agency or further burden existing agencies. Moreover, it would unnec 
essarily involve the federal government in the private sector by invest 
ing pension funds. Further, IRAs were created as an alternative to a 
clearinghouse.
Age-Weighted Profit-Sharing Plans
Some policies being considered for reasons other than enhancing 
portability may increase portability losses. An example is an age- 
weighted profit sharing plan.4 Small employers frequently face the 
dilemma of reconciling their desire for tax-sheltered retirement savings 
and worker desire for current income. One proposal would allow 
employers to adopt plans to which they contribute more money for 
workers nearing retirement and less for younger workers.5 An 
employer could do this with a defined contribution plan, where contri 
butions increase with age or service.
LIMITING LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
The largest cause of benefit loss is the cashout of preretirement lump 
sum distributions by job changers. Most defined contribution plans 
allow preretirement distributions; except for small sums, most defined 
benefit plans do not, although they could and some evidence suggests 
that increasingly they are.
Prohibiting preretirement distributions would raise retirement bene 
fits. It would raise administrative costs but would cost relatively little
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because no additional benefits would be required. A variation would 
allow preretirement cashouts if they were rolled over into another pen 
sion plan or an IRA. With such a requirement, defined contribution 
plans could be obligated to accept transfers of lump sum distributions 
from other plans.
Alternatives would permit, but discourage, preretirement distribu 
tions. Some would differentiate between treatment of employer and 
employee contributions. Employee contributions are common as elec 
tive deferrals for 401(k) plans. 6 One variation would allow preretire 
ment cashouts of accumulated assets based on employee contributions 
only (including employee contributions to 401(k) plans). An alterna 
tive to requiring a pension plan to provide these options would deny 
tax deducibility by ending tax qualification for noncomplying plans. 
Another option would penalize workers instead of employers, increas 
ing the excise tax on preretirement lump sum distributions from 10 to 
20 percent. This policy would discourage workers from taking lump 
sum distributions, but preserve the option to do so. Employer- and 
employee-derived distributions could be taxed at different rates.
These proposals can be combined. The excise tax on preretirement 
distributions attributable to employee contributions could be raised, 
while benefits attributable to employer contributions could be locked- 
in until retirement age. To enhance flexibility for workers, individuals 
could retain the availability of loans and hardship distributions based 
on employer contributions. The resulting revenue from these tax-based 
proposals would offset the tax revenue lost from employees who 
decide not to take distributions.
Any proposal to prohibit or limit preretirement lump sum distribu 
tions costs the federal government tax revenue in the short run, 
because the government no longer receives the 10 percent excise tax 
and the income tax paid on the distributions. Such a change, however, 
would raise future tax revenue by postponing receipt and taxation of 
benefits.
Because lump sum benefit calculations are based on standard mor 
tality tables, workers with lower than average life expectancy gain by 
taking benefits as a lump sum distribution rather than as an annuity 
over a shortened life expectancy. This may induce some workers to opt 
for lump sum distributions. While plans can require workers to have a
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doctor certify that they are in good health to qualify for a lump sum 
distribution, this is rarely done.
Policy Options for Rollovers
If defined benefit plans were required to accept benefit credits and 
assets from other plans, difficult administrative problems would arise.7 
Benefits to be transferred are calculated by figuring accrued benefits 
under the old plan and converting them into equal credit under a new 
and perhaps totally different benefit accrual structure. The actuarial 
assumptions and methods used to calculate present value of accrued 
benefits must be set with careful thought to ensure equity between old 
and new employers.
With the wide range of funding methods and assumptions used by 
plans, the amount the old employer had accumulated for the terminat 
ing employee would not equal the amount that the new employer needs 
to fund all past liabilities for that employee. The amount transferred 
would have to be a compromise between the accumulated liabilities 
under the old and new employers' actuarial methods and assumptions.
An employee in a single-employer pension plan rarely moves to a 
job with an identical plan. Thus, as well as determining which 
employer pays for the benefits the worker otherwise would have lost, 
the new employer must determine the service to be credited under the 
new plan. If the new plan is more generous than the old one, then the 
new plan would credit less service than the employee had previously 
worked. The lesser service rewarded at the more generous rate would 
give the equivalent benefit to that accrued under the old plan for more 
years of service rewarded at a lower rate.8
The present value of accrued liabilities is greatly affected by the 
actuarial assumptions used in the pension plan. For a plan with a nor 
mal retirement age of 65 and typical mortality and interest assump 
tions, a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate lowers the 
accrued liability by approximately 25 percent for a worker age 40. For 
a worker age 20, a 1 percentage point increase decreases the accrued 
liability by 38 percent (Hay/Huggins 1990a). Changes in the annual 
salary increase assumption have a similarly large effect. A 1 percent 
age point increase in the salary growth rate assumption increases the 
accrued liability by 27 percent for a worker age 40 and increases it by
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54 percent for a worker age 20. Actuaries do not have free rein in 
choosing assumptions, however, but are statutorily required to ensure 
that each is reasonable.
A solution to problems arising from plans using different actuarial 
assumptions requires that all plans use prescribed assumptions when 
dealing with portability transfers. If portability law requires no speci 
fied set of assumptions, the amount transferred would vary widely. 
Plans would pick actuarial assumptions that limit losses due to the 
transfer in and out of workers, shifting the costs to other employers.
MANDATING UNIFORM PLAN FEATURES
Benefit loss could be reduced by requiring employers to provide 
pensions with specified features. Converting the pension system 
entirely to career-average defined benefit plans, some analysts have 
argued, would eliminate portability loss due to plan design. However, 
career-average defined benefit plans are periodically upgraded to offset 
inflation, and thus also cause job leavers to lose benefits due to infla 
tion. Service portability could be achieved by using standardized bene 
fit formulas, with employers crediting full service for all jobs.
Requiring Defined Contribution Plans
If all workers were enrolled in defined contribution plans with 
locked-in contributions, the portability problem would be solved. 
However, in nearly all countries with well-developed private pension 
systems, defined benefit plans cover more workers and provide greater 
benefits than do defined contribution plans (Turner and Dailey 1991), 
perhaps because firms are better ble to bear the investment risk.
If employers were required to replace defined benefit plans with 
defined contribution plans, more of total benefits would be paid to 
short-service workers and less to career workers. If an employer 
replaced a defined benefit plan that cost 10 percent of salary with a 
defined contribution plan, the retirement benefits for a full-career 
employee would have to be lowered by 30 percent to keep the cost of 
the plan at 10 percent for a typical group of workers (Bureau of 
National Affairs 1988).
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Requiring Defined Contribution Coverage as an Option
Defined contribution plans are not the best coverage for all workers. 
Instead of requiring defined contribution coverage, the government 
could require employers to provide it as an alternative to defined bene 
fit coverage.9 Employees could then plan for job change by choosing a 
defined contribution plan. Another alternative would permit only work 
ers with special need for job mobility (engineers, nurses, scientists or 
secretaries) to qualify for this option.
All employers could be required to offer salary reduction 401(k) 
plans to employees requesting them. This requirement would impose 
administrative costs and fiduciary duties on employers. However, 
under current law the administrative costs of qualified plans can be 
charged against employee accounts. Further, ERISA offers options, 
such as self-directed accounts for each employee, that could be used by 
employers to minimize fiduciary exposure.
MANDATING PENSIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
The Minimum Universal Pension System, proposed by the Presi 
dent's Commission on Pension Policy in 1980, would have required 
employers to contribute 3 percent of compensation to a defined contri 
bution plan for each worker over age 25 who had been with the firm at 
least one year. Contributions would be immediately 100 percent 
vested. Employers preferring not to administer a pension plan would 
contribute to a portability clearinghouse, which would transfer funds to 
a central portability fund for investment. Those favoring this manda 
tory pension proposal argue that it would ensure a minimum benefit for 
all workers and provide a fully funded portable pension.
Proposals for mandating pensions may limit the requirement to 
employers hiring over a minimum number of workers, or by including 
only workers who work over a minimum number of hours a year. Man 
dating private pension coverage, however, conflicts with the voluntary 
nature of the U.S. private pension system. Moreover, critics argue that 
if a more expansive mandatory retirement system is desirable, it would 
be more efficient to expand social security rather than create a new
136 Policy Options for Pension Portability
entity. They also argue that the 3 percent payroll tax may hurt small 
and marginal businesses. Moreover, many low-income and young 
workers—those most likely to lack pension coverage—might not 
desire such a program if it resulted in lower cash wages. If the objec 
tive were to increase the retirement income of low-income workers, a 
more direct way of doing so would be to increase social security with 
its progressive benefit structure. Social security, however, is mostly 
unfunded, while a mandatory pension system would be fully funded.
Encouraging Increased Coverage
An alternative to mandating increased pension coverage would be to 
encourage coverage by offering attractive options to employers who 
adopt pension plans. Most large employers offer pensions, but many 
small employers do not. An option making pension provision more 
desirable to small employers exists in Japan, where small employers 
with pension plans receive a subsidy unavailable to large employers.
Another alternative would be to reduce the cost of pensions. The 
Internal Revenue Code and Title I of ERISA provide special treatment 
for Simplified Employee Pension plans (SEPs). A small employer who 
offers a SEP for which 25 or fewer employees qualify may offer a 
"cash or deferred arrangement" (CODA). These plans are commonly 
known as 408(k) plans. With these, the employee contributes by hav 
ing the employer reduce his/her salary. In 1991, employees could con 
tribute up to $8,475 to a SEP and reduce taxable income by the 
contribution. These plans may reduce the burden on employers 
because the employee makes the contribution.
One proposal for reducing portability losses by expanding coverage 
would raise the limit for employers who may offer SEP- COD As to 50 
eligible employees. The Department of Labor estimates that this pro 
posal in 1990 could have extended plan coverage to 3.5 million work 
ers in firms with 26 to 50 employees who were not covered by pension 
plans.
Increasing Availability of IRAs
Another way to address the disadvantages of short-service workers 
would be to increase their access to tax-favored savings independent of 
their employers. This change would also aid workers who are not
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already covered by an employer-provided pension plan. IRAs could be 
offered to all workers up to the defined contribution limit of 25 percent 
of earnings or $30,000. The increased availability of IRAs might 
encourage workers who change jobs to roll over pensions if they 
already were participating in an IRA.
Expanding Social Security
Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) provides 
fully portable benefits that are locked in until retirement. Credit for all 
social-security-covered employment is given when calculating benefit 
amounts. Thus, expanding social security, probably at the expense of 
employer-sponsored plans, would enhance portability. However, 
expanding mandatory social security would limit employer flexibility 
in designing compensation packages to meet worker needs.
NOTES
1. The Portability and Preservation of Pensions Work Group of the ERIS A Advisory Council 
on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans.
2. The real interest rate is the rate of expected investment earnings less the expected rate of 
inflation. The result would be equivalent if expected and actual inflation were equal.
3. This discussion is taken largely from Ozanne and Lindeman (1987).
4. The material from this section is taken from Christl (1991).
5. This is proposed 401(a)(4) regulations from the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
6. With the exception of contributions to 401 (k) plans, employee contributions to pension 
plans are not tax deductible. For this reason, employee contnbutions are treated differently in 
some proposals than are employer contributions.
7. These issues are discussed in Hay/Huggins (1990).
8. Assume that two plans have identical benefit structures except that the new plan provides a 
benefit at age 60 of 1.5 percent of final pay for each year of service, while the old plan provides a 
benefit at age 60 of 1.25 percent of final pay per year of service. For simplicity, assume that the 
worker's initial salary with the new employer equals his/her salary under the old employer: then 
10 years of work under the old plan translates to 8.3 years under the new plan (8.3=10x(1.25/ 
1.5)). If the worker qualified to receive the benefit at a younger age under the new plan than under 
the old one, the 8.3 years would be further reduced.
9. This proposal has been advanced by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
Inc.
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Portability Economics
Good public policy analysis must assess behavioral reactions, includ 
ing the implications of policies for labor supply and demand, job quits, 
savings, investment, and other economic behaviors of workers and 
firms. Prior chapters examined potential costs of portability to firms. 
This chapter examines how pension portability affects behavior of 
workers and firms.
WHY FIRMS OFFER PENSIONS
Employers are less willing to offer pensions when portability poli 
cies reduce their advantages or raise their costs to firms. To anticipate 
how a policy will affect a firm and its workers requires understanding 
what firms gain by offering pensions.
The tax system encourages employers to provide pensions. 
Employer contributions are tax deductions for corporations and are 
untaxable personal income to workers. Returns earned on contributions 
also are untaxed as they accrue. The worker pays personal income 
taxes when he/she receives the benefits at retirement, but the marginal 
tax rate for most retirees is lower than their tax rate when working.
While it offers a rationale for why firms provide pensions, the tax 
system cannot explain why firms impose pension penalties on job 
changers. Pension penalties may aid firms by reducing turnover and 
increasing productivity, but these effects are absent in simple economic 
models where the labor market continuously equilibrates. 1 In these 
models, contemporaneous demand and supply set pay as if labor ser 
vices were auctioned each period.
In such models, the only purpose for pay is to allocate workers to 
their most productive jobs; firms pay workers each period according to 
the value of the marginal product. Maximum labor market efficiency 
and national output result from the free flow of workers. In contrast,
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when jobs require firm-specific human capital, long job tenure raises 
efficiency by encouraging workers and firms to invest in worker skills.2 
Workers have firm-specific human capital when they have training that 
only increases their productivity with one employer. Workers who bear 
the full cost for training that raises their productivity only in their cur 
rent firm suffer a capital loss from layoffs. But if the worker's wage 
with specific training is under the marginal value product, the firm also 
loses from a layoff.
For a firm to provide training, both worker and employer must have 
incentives to continue employment. The worker's wage must be above 
the alternative wage but below the value of the marginal product 
(Decker 1976). The optimal split of investment costs and returns 
between worker and firm depends on who is more likely to end the job, 
with that party being required to bear a larger cost. By sharing invest 
ment costs, a worker accepts reduced wages at an earlier age, causing 
wages to grow more rapidly with experience. This steepening of the 
wage profile encourages the worker to stay with the firm to receive 
higher wages later. The worker is induced to stay if the wage exceeds 
the current or projected alternative. Defined benefit pensions also 
encourage worker tenure, being deferred compensation with a value 
that increases with tenure.
Deferred pay also motivates workers in the "shirking" model. 
Employers may defer pay in jobs difficult to monitor, and in situations 
where workers are unproductive, steal, or otherwise shirk (Becker and 
Stigler 1974). Both worker and employer recognize that shirking is 
costly, and that reducing it benefits both parties by making workers 
more productive and raising their wages. A solution to shirking has the 
worker post "bond," forfeited if the employer detects shirking. While 
workers rarely post bond in cash, the firm may require workers to post 
bond by paying them under the value of marginal product early in their 
career and more than the marginal product value later. A terminated 
worker forfeits the bond (the deferred wages).
Pensions explicitly enter the shirking model (Lazear 1979). The 
pension separation penalty is like a bond. Workers sacrifice wages 
expecting to receive a pension based on work with the firm until retire 
ment. If dismissed before retirement, they receive a pension valued at 
less than their implicit contributions via forgone wages.The difference
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between the wages they have forfeited and the lower pension they 
receive is the bond they forfeit.
Because of the tax structure, it is less costly to reduce turnover by 
backloading pensions than by deferring wages. Tilting the wage profile 
shifts taxable income from a low-tax-rate period—early tenure years, 
with lower income—to a high-tax-rate period—later working years 
with higher income. With a pension, however, compensation is shifted 
to retirement, when workers often face lower tax rates. 3 These marginal 
tax rate arguments are of greater economic importance during periods 
when the tax code is more progressive.
The human capital model and the shirking model justify long-tenure 
employment. The models may justify job separation penalties to pro 
vide incentives for long tenure, but in a dynamic economy some jobs 
should be temporary. The key question is whether the separation pen 
alty in defined benefit plans raises productivity through long tenure or 
impedes efficient job mobility. To analyze the efficiency of mobility, 
consider an employment contract with firm-specific worker productiv 
ity. Worker and firm agree on an initial wage W. Both expect that the 
value of the marginal product will exceed the wage, which will exceed 
the worker's alternative wage. But, after the firm invests in the work 
er's productivity, that productivity rises for other reasons outside the 
firm. Now the worker's alternative wage exceeds the value of marginal 
product in the firm. The worker has an incentive to quit, but if he/she 
does, the firm loses its investment in the worker.
The firm requires the worker to pay via reduced wages for a "stay 
pension," which is the pension valued on the assumption that the 
worker will stay with the firm until retirement. If the worker quits, he/ 
she must pay severance, which takes the form of portability loss, to 
compensate the firm for the lost training investment. The worker loses 
pension benefits if he/she quits, because the pension will be valued on 
current wage rather than projected wage at retirement.
If the worker loses pension benefits equal to the firm's loss on its 
investment in the worker, efficient quits are guaranteed. The worker 
quits only if capitalized earnings gained on the new job offset the pen 
sion benefits lost from the old one. Thus, quit penalties arising from 
nonportable pensions not only encourage investment in firm- specific 
capital, but also preserve efficient job matches under demand and sup 
ply shocks.
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When a worker's productivity declines, the employer may wish to 
terminate him/her, but damage to an employer's reputation in the labor 
market may be sufficient to prevent that action. As an alternative, a 
firm could offer severance pay sufficient to offset lost wages plus 
reduced pension value. If that amount is less than the difference 
between the worker's wages and his/her value of marginal product, 
both worker and firm are better off.
Workers whose alternative value of marginal product exceeds their 
wage prefer to change jobs, but by discharge (rather than resignation) 
to avoid the quit penalty. They have an incentive to reduce current pro 
ductivity to cause that result. Similarly, a firm wishing to lay off a 
worker has an incentive to create working conditions that prompt the 
worker to quit. An implicit contract creating such incentives would 
reduce worker productivity and is in neither side's interest.
Such moral hazard problems, however, would be mitigated by limit 
ing severance payments to major layoffs such as plant closings. The 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has liabilities of over 
$1 billion due to plant closing benefits (Lockhart 1990), providing evi 
dence on the extent that these benefits are offered. These liabilities 
were 25 percent of PBGC claims in 1990, mostly for collectively bar 
gained plant-closing benefits in the steel and automobile industries. In 
some U.S. plans workers have shorter vesting schedules or are credited 
with extra years of work if job ending is due to layoff. In Japan, pen 
sion benefits are generally higher for laid-off workers than for volun 
tary job leavers.
In sum, a nonportable defined benefit pension may act as an efficient 
severance tax, discouraging excessive quits. When conditions call for 
layoffs, however, the employer must pay severance to the worker to 
honor the implicit contract and not lose reputation in the labor market. 
But given problems in calculating sufficient severance pay, portability 
loss may impede efficient firm-initiated separations.
PENSIONS AND TURNOVER
This book has examined how job change causes workers to lose 
pension benefits. Now the reverse is examined: How does pension ben 
efit loss affect the odds that a worker will change jobs?
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Empirical studies have produced overwhelming statistical evidence 
that pensions correlate with reduced worker turnover. In addition to 
vesting, which has already been discussed, three factors contribute to 
that correlation. First, pension benefits are often backloaded, rewarding 
long tenure. Second, workers who are inherently less likely to quit or 
be fired—"stayers"—may prefer jobs offering pensions more than do 
workers more likely to change jobs—"movers." Third, jobs with pen 
sions often offer higher wages than those found elsewhere, reducing 
quits and thus reducing turnover.
Backloading
Defined benefit plans are backloaded. This means benefits—relative 
to earnings—accrue more rapidly the nearer the worker is to retire 
ment, or the more years he/she has worked. While ERISA limits back- 
loading by requiring vesting after a fixed period and by restricting 
pension benefit formulas, it permits some backloading in benefit for 
mulas.
Backloading occurs in a benefit formula by raising pension accrual 
with age or service or by making options available to workers who 
leave the firm at retirement age and unavailable to workers leaving ear 
lier. Career-average benefit formulas can be backloaded by giving 
more credit for later service in computing the average. More com 
monly, benefit formulas are backloaded by being based on final salary. 
The federal Civil Service Retirement System, for example, uses a 
backloaded benefit formula.4 It provides annual benefit accrual of 1.5 
percent for the first five years of work, 1.75 percent for the next five 
years, and 2 percent beyond the first 10 years, the percentage applying 
to the average of the three consecutive years of highest salary.
Backloading also occurs by giving higher postretirement cost-of- 
living adjustments to retirees with greater years worked, or higher 
adjustments to retirees who stayed with the firm until retirement age. It 
occurs by giving employees who work until the early retirement age 
the option of receiving benefits earlier than employees who leave the 
firm at younger ages. Backloading rewards workers with steep earn 
ings profiles, and it thus can be used by firms to reward successful 
workers with positions of responsibility.
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Final-salary defined benefit plans are implicitly backloaded because 
they are tied to end-of-job salary. In 1989,64 percent of participants in 
defined benefit plans in large and medium-size firms were in plans 
using final-salary formulas (Mitchell 1992). However, most other 
defined benefit plans are implicitly tied to final salary through ad hoc 
adjustments in benefit formulas to keep pace with wages.
Backloading occurs in some defined contribution plans, for example 
those that distribute forfeited nonvested benefits of early leavers to 
remaining participants based on account balances. This procedure 
rewards long-tenure workers due to their large account balances.
Integrating pension benefits with social security causes backloading. 
Because workers typically have higher earnings later in life, benefit 
formulas with higher accrual rates at higher earnings back load. Social 
security integration causes backloading because pension accrual rates 
are higher for workers earning above the social security taxable maxi 
mum earnings. Companies may integrate both defined contribution and 
defined benefit plans with social security.
How common is explicit backloading? In 1989, 46 percent of work 
ers in defined benefit plans with final-salary formulas were in plans 
where the accrual rate explicitly varied by service, age, or earnings 
(table 10.1). The comparable figure for workers in plans with career- 
average formulas is 59 percent, and when that formula is integrated 
with social security the figure is 95 percent. In flat-dollar benefit for 
mulas, the benefit per year of service varies by earnings or service for 
17 percent of participants. In deferred profit-sharing plans of large and 
medium-size firms in 1989, 9 percent of participants were in plans 
varying the accrual rate based on service (table 10.2). Thus the view 
that defined contribution plans are never explicitly backloaded is false. 
Backloading through integration with social security is also common 
among plans offered by large and medium-size firms (table 10.3). In 
1989, 63 percent of participants in these plans were in integrated plans. 
This percentage varied greatly by plan type. For final-salary and 
career-average plans, 86 percent and 62 percent of participants, respec 
tively, were in integrated plans, while under 0.5 percent of participants 
in flat-dollar plans were in integrated plans.
Backloading also occurs through higher cost-of-living adjustments 
to retirees with long tenure (Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1992). For 
workers in large and medium-size firms receiving a postretirement
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benefit increase during 1984-88, 24 percent were in plans where the 
increase depended on years worked.
Table 10.1
Percentage of Full-Tune Participants in Defined Benefit Plans 
Where the Benefit Formula Varies 
by Service, Age, or Earnings, 1989
Terminal earnings 
benefit formulas
Career earnings 
benefit formulas
Percent per year varies
By service
By earnings
By age
By earnings and service
Total
46
16
24
3
3
With
integrated
formula
53
17
30
3
3
Total
59
4
43
a
12
With
integrated
formula
95
3
71
a
20
Dollar amount benefit formula
Amount per year of services 
varies 17
By earnings 15
By service 2
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1990), pp. 89,92 
a. Less than 0.5 percent.
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Table 10.2
Percentage of Full-Time Participants in Deferred
Profit-Sharing Plans Where the Allocation Varies
by the Participants' Earnings or Service
1986,1988,1989
Percent of full-time participants
Type of formula
Employer contributions
(1) Based on stated formula
Fixed percent of profits
Variable percent of profits
Other formulas
(2) No formula
Allocation of profits to employees
Equally to all
Based on earnings
Based on earnings and service
Other
Loans from employees' accounts
Permitted
Not permitted
1986
59
NA
NA
NA
41
1
61
10
8
25
75
1988
55
16
12
27
45
1
74
12
13
32
68
1989
60
10
18
33
40
1
64
9
26
19
81
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1990). 
NOTES: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of round- 
ing. NA means data not available.
Table 10.3 
Percentage of Full-Time Participants in Defined Benefit Plans that Integrate, 1980-1989
Percent of full-time participants
Type of formula
Without integrated formula
With integrated formula
Benefit offset by SS
payment*
Excess formula**
1980
55
45
30
16
1981
57
43
33
10
1982
55
45
35
10
1983
45
55
35
20
1984
44
56
36
20
1985
39
61
40
27
1986
38
62
43
24
1988
38
62
39
26
1989
37
63
41
24
SOURCE: Mitchell (1992).
NOTES: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of founding.
'"Pension benefit calculated is reduced by a portion of primary social secunty payments.
**Pension formula applies lower benefit rate to earnings subject to social secunty taxes or below a specified dollar threshold.
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Measuring Backloading
ERISA limits explicit backloading, trying to assure that benefits 
accrue steadily over a worker's career. But even if a defined benefit 
formula weighs equally all years so that it is not explicitly backloaded, 
considerable backloading occurs in most of the formulas.
Backloading in a defined benefit plan can be measured as follows. 
First, calculate the constant contribution rate needed for a defined con 
tribution plan to equal the defined benefit plan's value at the projected 
retirement date. Next, figure the current value of this hypothetical 
defined contribution plan. This current value measures the value the 
defined benefit plan would have accrued were it not backloaded. The 
gap between this value and the defined benefit plan's current value 
measures backloading.5
Assume, for simplicity, that the benefit formula is 1 percent times 
final salary times years worked, with immediate vesting. The worker 
joins a firm at age 40 with a salary of $100,000, so that the first year of 
work adds $1,000 to his/her annual benefit at retirement. By age 50 the 
worker has a salary of $200,000 and adds $2,000 to his annual benefit 
at retirement (1 percent x $200,000). But because this salary is higher 
than his/her age 49 salary, and because he/she now has already worked 
10 years, 1 percent times 10 times the difference between his/her salary 
of $200,000 and his/her salary at 49, say $190,000, is also added. This 
is another $1,000; that is, the prior year the future annual retirement 
benefit equaled 1 percent times 10 years times $190,000. This year the 
future annual retirement benefit equals 1 percent times 11 years times 
$200,000. The greater annual retirement benefits gained by working 
another year at age 50 are caused by the added year of service and the 
higher salary interacted with past service. The total rise is $3,000.
Assume the worker's salary rose from $100,000 at age 40 to 
$200,000 at age 50 because the price level doubled. (This occurs with 
7 percent inflation.) In real dollars, the worker's salary is equal in both 
years, being $200,000 in age-50 dollars. But his/her year of work at 
age 40 raised the nominal benefits at retirement by $1,000 (or 0.5 per 
cent of real salary), while his/her year of work at age 50 raised the 
nominal benefits at retirement by $3,000 (or 1.5 percent of salary). 
Thus, for equal real salary, his/her year of work at age 50 had three 
times as large an effect on annual benefits at retirement. With no infla-
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tion, the same salary pattern provides a much smaller increase in pen 
sion accrual relative to salary. With no inflation—the worker's salary 
rising from $100,000 to $200,000 solely due to greater productivity- 
pension accrual rises from 1 percent of real wages to 1.5 percent.
This example demonstrates how typical defined benefit pension for 
mulas backload benefit accruals. It also shows how the degree of back- 
loading depends heavily on inflation. But it understates backloading by 
ignoring interest discounting, which reduces the value of pension 
accruals early in life relative to those late in life. It also understates the 
difference in the two examples, because in the inflation example the 
discounting would be greater due to the increase in the nominal interest 
rate. These calculations also understate backloading by ignoring the 
effect of awarding greater percentage cost-of-living adjustments to 
retirees with long careers and by assuming no explicit backloading.
Backloading has a disadvantage to employers as a job-tenure incen 
tive: it is heavily influenced by inflation, which employers do not con 
trol. Why would employers want job leavers to lose more when 
inflation is higher? This arrangement may be a second-best solution 
because ERISA limits the extent to which benefit formulas explicitly 
backload (Ippolito 1986a). With no economic reason why mobility 
should be lower when inflation is high, it would appear that during 
inflationary periods some workers may be discouraged from quitting 
when it otherwise would be efficient to do so.
Backloading and Job Change
The effect of backloading on job change depends on the underlying 
employment contract. Pensions impose a penalty on early separations 
when firms implicitly promise workers a job until retirement—an 
"implicit lifetime contract" (Ippolito 1985). The term describes the 
unstated but implied promises a firm makes about future benefits and 
employment. The contract takes this form because explicit agreements 
on future employment are rarely made. Exceptions occur predomi 
nantly in collectively bargained agreements.
Implicit contracts regarding future benefits are not legally enforce 
able. For that reason, and because later they may conflict with the 
firm's interest, implicit contracts must have an economic rather than 
legal enforcement mechanism for workers to rely on. To be viable and 
retain credibility, they must be self-enforcing. It must be in each par-
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ty's long-run interest to maintain the contract, though it may not 
always be in each party's short-run interest.
With an implicit contract, at least one party's earnings must exceed 
the best alternative. Two potential sources of surplus in the employ 
ment relationship are the productivity gains of job-specific human cap 
ital and the savings in direct mobility costs for each party if they need 
not find new partners.
The crucial factor in long-term implicit contracts is a firm's ability 
to credibly commit itself. If the firm violates implicit contracts, it will 
be unable to exercise this option in the future and will lose the benefits 
of raised productivity. The firm will also have more difficulty in hiring 
workers. Because larger firms fail less and may care more about repu 
tation in the labor market, larger firms more commonly make implicit 
contracts.
Implicit contracts may explain why larger firms offering pensions 
grant ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments to retirees, though they are not 
legally or contractually obligated to do so. It may also explain why 
firms with low predicted failure rates, and thus more credible implicit 
contracts, more commonly offer pensions (Curme and Kahn 1990).
A backloaded pension does not affect job change if the worker 
expects to leave the employer long before retirement. The worker only 
gives up wages in exchange for a pension based on current earnings, 
which are lower than final earnings. This labor market, where the 
worker is only hired for one period at a time, is called a spot market. It 
is also characterized as the legal view of the market because firms are 
only legally obligated to provide pension accrual based on current 
worker earnings (Bulow 1982).
In a spot labor market, a worker's current wage equals his/her mar 
ginal productivity. The worker realizes that layoff may occur due to 
bankruptcy or decreased demand for the firm's product; the firm real 
izes that the worker may find a better job and leave. Thus, both parties 
require full pay in each period, with the wage being constantly renego 
tiated as labor market conditions change. When workers change jobs in 
a spot market they lose nothing, though their pension benefits are 
lower than otherwise, because they have not paid for those benefits 
through forgone wages. Thus, though their future benefits are reduced, 
with no capital loss workers are not discouraged from changing jobs.
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Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) compare the spot market value of 
pension accrual to pension accrual with continued employment. For 
workers age 25 to 34 with tenure up to 10 years, the accrual based on 
the spot market assumption averaged 0.6 percent of earnings, versus 
14.1 percent for employment to retirement. At ages 45 to 54 with 21 to 
30 years worked, the two averages were 10.4 and 15.8 percent. The 
diminishing gap between the two averages indicates backloading.
The amount a job leaver loses in pension benefits under a long-ten 
ure implicit contract depends on the worker's age and tenure. The pen 
sion portability loss curve over a lifetime is hill shaped, rising and then 
falling as age of separation rises. Low service and earnings cause the 
pension portability loss initially to be low, but it grows with tenure due 
to rising accrued benefits. Under a wide variety of assumptions, the 
loss peaks around age 45 or 50 and then declines. The decline occurs 
because the gap between separation earnings and retirement age earn 
ings shrinks, offsetting the rising accrued benefits against which a loss 
is suffered. The portability loss falls to zero at retirement age.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1988) estimate that job leavers age 40 
to 55 generally lose benefits equal to between one-half and two-thirds 
of annual earnings. Considering the time over which workers recoup 
these losses through higher earnings at alternative employment, the 
capital loss could be a powerful impediment to job change for older 
workers. Further, for firms caring about their reputation as employers, 
the capital loss also results in fewer layoffs because layoffs reduce 
retirement benefits for workers.
Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) calculate how much pension wealth 
workers lose when changing jobs and compare that to the workers' 
expected future wages. Their calculations range from 2 to 50 percent of 
future wages, depending on age of hire, normal retirement age, and age 
of job change. Most losses are less than 10 percent, but they vary by 
plan. A worker starting work at age 31 and changing jobs at age 41 has 
accrued for that period on average only 72 percent of the pension 
wealth of a worker staying with the firm until retirement.
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Sorting
The sorting hypothesis provides another explanation for why work 
ers with pensions tend to have long job tenure. The sorting hypothesis 
states that firms use pension plans to select workers least likely to 
leave. If some workers are "stayers" while others are "movers," the 
firm has an incentive to sort out movers. A bonus conditional on long- 
term attachment is worth less to a mover, or to a person with a low dis 
count rate, and will thus achieve the desired goal (Salop and Salop 
1976). Such a bonus improves the firm's productivity because by 
attracting low turnover workers the firm's search, hiring, and training 
costs are reduced. Without deferred pay, workers have little incentive 
to consider how job change affects their employer.
Some analysts criticize this theory because defined benefit plans are 
inefficient in screening out quitters at hire. For firms where training 
costs occur at the beginning of employment, turnover shortly after hire 
is the most costly. Defined benefit plans lightly penalize short-tenure 
workers; however, for firms who train workers over a long period, pen 
sions may be effective.
Efficiency Wages
Another reason for the correlation between pensions and long job 
tenure involves an employer's use of additional compensation to 
encourage long tenure. One such aspect of compensation has been 
called "efficiency wages." Some analysts argue that pension jobs pay 
high wages to deter worker turnover. According to this argument, the 
high wages rather than features of pension plans are the cause of the 
correlation between pensions and low job turnover.
STATISTICAL STUDIES
Studies have demonstrated that pension coverage negatively corre 
lates with reduced turnover, quits, and layoffs6 and is positively related
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to tenure.7 Two studies investigate how pensions affect worker job 
mobility by modeling the impact of vesting standards—Schiller and 
Weiss (1979) and Wolf and Levy (1984). Neither study estimates the 
value of benefits job leavers lose.
Schiller and Weiss (1979) hypothesized that workers considering 
job change compare the discounted value of wages and pensions on the 
current job to the discounted value of those streams of compensation 
on alternative jobs. They found that higher values of unvested benefits 
reduced the odds of job change, and that vested workers were more 
likely to change jobs. They found that workers age 25 to 39 in plans 
with longer vesting periods had higher odds of quitting before vesting. 
Because they used pre-ERISA data, some plans may have required 
over 10 years for vesting.
Wolf and Levy (1984) examined the relationship between pension 
coverage, pension vesting rules, and job tenure. They found the odds of 
leaving a job with 10-year vesting are four times greater the year after 
vesting than the year before.
With ERISA rules, pension accruals are small at vesting so workers 
of most ages lose little due to job change during early years of work on 
a job (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987). For workers vesting at older 
ages due to having started working on a pension-covered job later in 
life, being unvested reduces job change more. This may be due to 
backloading, which would cause the unvested benefits of older workers 
to be greater than for younger workers.
Using a sample of 1,000 pension plans, and using intermediate wage 
and interest rate assumptions, Kotlikoff and Wise found that the pen 
sion wealth gain for those vesting at age 40 is 14 percent of annual 
earnings for 10-year vesting. The pension wealth gain is much larger 
for workers vesting at later ages—36 percent at 50 and 66 percent at 
age 60. Ten-year vesting is now banned in single- employer plans, but 
permitted in multiemployer plans. The gains are smaller with five-year 
vesting; nonetheless, vesting could be important in reducing the mobil 
ity of older workers before they attain vesting. Studies thus find that 
vesting reduces mobility for workers approaching the vesting limit.
Mitchell (1982) examined effects of pension coverage on job turn 
over and found that a male worker with a pension plan quit 10 percent 
less frequently than his counterpart without a plan. She also found that 
higher wages reduced job change.
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Monitoring theories of compensation predict that pensions at small 
firms will be less backloaded and have a smaller impact on the quit rate 
of workers than pensions at large firms. This prediction is based on the 
assumption that smaller firms are better able to monitor their workers 
and do not as much need to use deferred compensation as an incentive 
device. Further, firms with backloaded pensions may honor promises 
of deferred compensation by offering a lower risk of permanent layoff. 
If small firms do not backload pensions to reduce turnover, their pen 
sions should have a smaller effect on quits and layoffs. Even and 
Macpherson (1990a) test these implications of monitoring theories. 
They find quits and job changes are more likely to occur at small firms. 
Between 1983 and 1986, the quit and job change rates are 26 and 39 
percent at small firms, but 15 and 24 percent at large firms. Estimating 
a probit model of quits and job changes shows that pensions do not 
affect quits or job changes at small firms, but affect both at large firms.
This pattern may occur because defined contribution plans are more 
common at small firms. Bodie and Papke (1990) and others have found 
that defined contribution plans are less costly for small firms than are 
defined benefit plans. Dorsey (1987) shows that small firms choose 
defined contribution over defined benefit plans even after controlling 
for worker and industry attributes.
In a second empirical specification, Even and Macpherson (1990a) 
test whether the mobility effect depends on which plan is in use— 
defined benefit or defined contribution. The results show that neither 
plan reduces mobility at small firms, whereas both reduce mobility at 
large firms. This supports the prediction that larger firms, being more 
concerned with labor turnover, more commonly design pensions to 
impede mobility, but leaves unanswered why defined contribution 
plans have this effect
The next two studies concentrate on the benefits workers lose due to 
backloading in defined benefit plans. Both studies estimate the dollar 
value of losses. Alien, Clark and McDermed (1990) found that stayers 
seek jobs offering pension coverage, and that sorting of workers asso 
ciates pensions with reduced turnover. Backloading pension benefit 
accruals had less effect, and reduced layoffs more than quits. These 
results suggest that policy changes for calculating vesting or benefits 
are unlikely to raise labor mobility.
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In contrast, Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) argue that the wage pre 
mium on pension jobs explains most of the reduced mobility of pen 
sion-covered workers. They marshal evidence suggesting that 
backloading does not cause the correlation between pension coverage 
and long job tenure. First, for workers in their early forties and 
younger, the loss from backloading is a small part of compensation, so 
that workers gaining from a move easily offset the pension benefits 
they lose. Second, estimates of mobility equations show the puzzling 
finding that defined contribution plans, generally not backloaded, 
reduce turnover as much as defined benefit plans. This result suggests 
that backloading does not cause lower turnover rates. Finally, when a 
compensation premium measure is included in the mobility equation, 
the compensation premium measure and not backloading accounts for 
most of the difference in mobility rates between pension- and nonpen- 
sion-covered workers. Their results suggest that benefit backloading is 
statistically significant in reducing worker mobility, but has a small 
effect.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) used data on males age 31 to 50 
working at least 30 hours a week in private sector, nonagricultural jobs 
from the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participa 
tion (SIPP). They found that of workers who left jobs voluntarily, 59 
percent were in nonpension jobs, while 43 percent had held pension 
jobs.8 The accuracy of these statistics was unclear, however, because of 
data problems concerning reasons for job leaving. Using a different 
data set—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with 1984 
data—Gustman and Steinmeier find that 64 percent of nonpension- 
covered workers and 61 percent of pension-covered workers were vol 
untary job movers.
Both data sets have weaknesses that reduce reliability. Further, the 
number of involuntary job leavers with pensions rises during economic 
downturns, so that a single statistic for a short period does not reflect a 
business cycle. While complete data on voluntary and involuntary job 
change for pension-covered workers are unavailable, the available data 
show that involuntary job leavers are an important aspect of the pen 
sion portability issue.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) find individuals initially without 
pensions are over three times more likely (19.5 versus 6.1 percent) to 
change jobs than individuals with pensions. The gap between movers
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from pension and nonpension jobs is even wider when coverage in the 
new jobs is considered. Of movers from nonpension jobs, 14 percent 
gained pensions, while 64 percent of movers from pension jobs lost 
coverage in the move. Pension figures for the new job include only 
workers in a pension plan as of the 1985 survey. If you include those 
excluded because they "have not worked for the employer long 
enough," the share of movers from nonpension jobs who gained pen 
sions rises to 21 percent, and the share of movers from pension jobs 
losing pensions drops to 56 percent (table 10.4).9
The figures for those who lost pension coverage in a job change 
show a far different reality from what is commonly assumed. The Hay/ 
Muggins (1988) study of portability assumed that job leavers with pen 
sions went to jobs with pensions. The study bases the assumption on 
the hypothesis of two worker types: (1) lower-income workers receiv 
ing adequate social security benefits to maintain their living standard 
and thus never covered by a pension; and (2) higher-income workers 
needing a pension to supplement social security benefits in retirement 
and thus covered by a pension. The statistics from the Gustman and 
Steinmeier study show that many workers leaving pension jobs take 
nonpension jobs.
Gustman and Steinmeier figure the value of backloading versus pro 
jected compensation for pension-covered workers. Backloading is 
expressed in dollars per hour of work until retirement because the 
worker must stay until retirement to avoid losing the backloaded bene 
fits. This is compared to cumulative wages until retirement, again in 
dollars per hour until retirement. They find backloading averages only 
2.5 percent of projected compensation for pension-covered workers. 
This represents 21 percent of pension wealth for the workers in this 
sample. 10 In the empirical estimations, they find backloading accounts 
for 5 percent of the difference in mobility rates between pensioned 
workers and nonpensioned workers. For workers age 45 to 50, back- 
loading accounts for 8 percent of the difference in mobility rates 
between pension- and nonpension-covered workers.
The results of Gustman and Steinmeier thus imply that making pen 
sions perfectly portable would have little effect on job tenure for most 
pension-covered workers. They conclude that pension coverage is 
associated with efficiency wages that are higher than market wages. 
Pension-covered workers generally have a higher wage on the current
Table 10.4 
Wages, Pensions, and Mobility, 1984
Stayers Movers
No pension in 1984 job
Percent movers 
Mean wage in 1984 
Mean wage in 1985 
Percent with 1985 pension
Percent movers 
Mean wage in 1984 
Mean wage in 1985 
Percent with 1985 pension
Percent movers 
Mean wage in 1984 
Mean wage in 1985 
Percent with 1985 pension
Percent movers 
Mean wage in 1984
19.5% (998)
$8.71 (654) 
$8.86 (654)
$7.72 (133) 
$8.23 (133) 
13.8% (160)
Pension in 1984 job
6.1% (1753)
$11.87 (1490) 
$11.89 (1490)
$11.22 (88) 
$10.52 (88) 
35.8% (107)
Defined benefit pension in 1984 job
6.0% (1126)
$11.95 (960) 
$11.94 (960)
$11.94 (58) 
$10.81 (58) 
42.9% (63)
Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (including profit-sharing plans)
6.2% (627)
$11.73 (530) $9.94 (30)
Table 10.4 (continued) 
Wages, Pensions, and Mobility, 1984
Stayers Movers
Mean wage in 1985 $11.82 (530) $9.96 (30) 
Percent with 1985 pension __________________________________21.9% (32)_____
Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (excluding profit-sharing plans)
Percent movers 6.9% (174)
Mean wage in 1984 $11.53 (149) $12.03 (8)
Mean wage in 1985 $11.44 (149) $10.70 (8)
Percent with 1985 pension_____________________________________22.2% (9)______
SOURCE: Gustman and Stemmeier (1990)
NOTES: Figures in parentheses are numbers of observations. Wages are indexed to 1984 dollars by the Index of Average Hourly Earnings (1989 Eco 
nomic Report of the President, table B-44) and are included in the means only if valid wage observations are available in both years. Means are geometric 
means (i.e., antilogs of mean log wages). Wages less than $1 or greater than $50 are excluded from the analysis.
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job than that attainable from the next best job. That wage premium 
reduces turnover and may help to explain the reduced turnover 
ascribed to pension coverage.
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF PENSIONS
Econometric studies suggest that pensions reduce mobility for some 
workers, particularly older workers in large firms. Less attention has 
been paid to the effect of pension-reduced mobility on labor market 
efficiency."
Whether a defined benefit pension raises labor market efficiency is 
an empirical question hinging on whether the quit penalty in the pen 
sion is systematically related to the value a firm places on long job ten 
ure. While the quit penalty may be explained as a tool to reduce 
inefficient quits, evidence is needed to support that contention. If the 
amount of benefits workers lose is unrelated to training, monitoring 
costs, or the need to attract stable workers, the result will be ineffi 
ciency due to reduced labor market flexibility.
Deferred compensation reduces worker shirking. Thus firms are 
likely to use that tactic when direct monitoring of worker effort would 
be costly. It follows that jobs where monitoring costs are high are more 
likely to offer pensions. Hutchens (1987) found that jobs classified as 
repetitive in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles had a 9 percentage 
point lower probability of pension coverage than other jobs. Further, 
jobs classified as repetitive strongly correlated with a Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles measure of the time required to obtain the skills 
needed for the jobs. When this training index is added to the pension 
coverage equation, the estimated coefficient on training is positive and 
large. This finding supports the argument that pension-induced long 
tenure raises the benefit from firm-specific training.
Dorsey (1990) investigated the relationship between the required 
training for a job and pension coverage and provides evidence that 
pension coverage is associated with training. 12 This presumably occurs 
by reducing quits, so that the firm can count on recouping training 
expenses. In another study, Dorsey (1987) used IRS data on pension 
plan sponsors to estimate the causes of primary defined benefit versus
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defined contribution coverage. If nonportability raises worker produc 
tivity, firms with production processes requiring greater training or 
monitoring should be more likely to provide defined benefit coverage. 
Dorsey's estimates show that industries with high concentrations of 
professional, managerial, and craftsmen occupations were more likely 
to have defined benefit pensions.
In sum, indirect evidence is consistent with a correlation between 
pensions and increased productivity. The pattern of pension coverage 
supports predictions from the training and shirking models, where pen 
sions have a productivity augmenting role. Moreover, some initial 
direct evidence shows that pension coverage occurs more commonly in 
firms providing greater training. Finally, employers are more reluctant 
to discharge workers facing a high pension separation penalty. This 
result suggests that employers have valuable investments in those 
workers.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Reducing the vesting period from five years is likely to have little 
effect on job change except for short-tenure workers, who may be 
induced to stay on the job long enough to vest when the vesting period 
is reduced. After vesting, the odds of job change rise, so that reducing 
the vesting period may ultimately increase job change. Indexing 
deferred vested benefits for inflation would also raise mobility, for the 
same reason. But imposing standards to guarantee benefit preserva 
tion—prevent preretirement cashouts—might reduce mobility because 
workers could not access pension assets by changing jobs.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990) argue that raising portability by 
reducing the benefits workers lose due to backloading would little 
affect job change, because backloading has little effect on job change. 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1990) agree, but from a different 
premise. They argue that there would be little effect on job change 
because backloading, for the most part, reduces layoffs, an effect 
examined more closely in the next chapter. If either argument is cor 
rect, reducing backloading would not affect job change.
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NOTES
1. This discussion largely follows Dorsey (1990).
2. This theory was pioneered by Gary Becker (1964) and Walter Oi (1962).
3. There are also tax advantages to employers for defemng compensation through pensions, 
rather than deferring by paying higher wages later. The returns on employer contributions to a 
pension plan are not taxed while they accrue. However, if the employer had funded deferred 
wages by investing in the firm, the retained earnings invested in the firm would not be tax deduct 
ible, and the returns on the capital in the firm would be taxed at the marginal corporate income tax 
rate.
4. The Civil Service Retirement System is unregulated by ERISA.
5. This method of calculating backloading, used by Gustman and Stemmeier (1990), is a gen 
eralization of the method used by Ippolito (1986a).
6. These studies have been surveyed in Andrews (1990) and Gustman and Mitchell (1991).
7. See for instance Wolf and Levy (1984).
8. The Census Bureau regards these data as preliminary and requires the following statement 
regarding their use: "This report uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
1984 Panel (Preliminary) Wave 6 Core plus Topical Module File, which was released by the Cen 
sus Bureau for research to improve understanding and analysis of SIPP data. The data on the file 
are preliminary and should be analyzed and interpreted with caution. At the time the file was cre 
ated, the Census Bureau was still exploring certain unresolved technical and methodological 
issues associated with the creation of this data set. The Census Bureau does not approve or 
endorse the use of these data for official estimates."
9. The percentage of job movers who had a pension on a previous job but not on the current 
job is higher than Piacentim (1990b) found, but the Piacentini results are for movers who had a 
pension on any previous job, while the Gustman and Stemmeier results are only for a one-year 
time period.
10. The magnitude of the backloading loss found by Gustman and Stemmeier (1990) is con 
sistent with that found by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1990).
11. This discussion is drawn largely from Dorsey (1990).
12. He uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

II
Layoffs and Portability Issues
This chapter examines the relationship between pensions, pension 
portability, and layoffs and focuses on two interrelated policy issues: 
the impact of pensions on layoffs and the reverse impact of layoffs on 
pension benefits. The discussion of these issues suggests that special 
portability policies may be needed to aid workers who are laid off. 1
THE IMPACT OF PENSIONS ON LAYOFFS
There are two ways in which pensions could affect layoffs. First, 
firms that offer pensions could engage in the opportunistic behavior of 
laying off pensioned workers more readily than nonpensioned workers. 
Opportunistic behavior could also be in evidence when firms that offer 
pension coverage exhibit higher layoff rates than firms that do not offer 
pension coverage. There could be financial gain for the firm from lay 
ing off unvested workers or from laying off older workers who are cov 
ered by defined benefit plans and who have not yet reached the age of 
benefit eligibility. (Backloading of pension liabilities creates an incen 
tive for firms to dismiss this latter group of workers.) Such actions, 
however, may violate pension law.
Second, pensions could discourage layoffs, either because of some 
feature of a plan that inhibits layoff or some characteristic of pension- 
covered jobs or the workers in these jobs that is also associated with 
low layoff rates. Theories to explain this effect vary widely.
Opportunistic Behavior by Firms
Firms engaged in opportunistic behavior, for example, when they 
offer pensions to workers whom they intend to dismiss long before the 
workers can collect the full value of their pension benefits. While there 
may be financial gain for firms from this behavior, there are reputa- 
tional costs to consider.2 Firms can also hire workers with the intent of
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fulfilling pension obligations, but then dismiss them prematurely 
because of unexpected change in the firm's situation (e.g., a technolog 
ical breakthrough or unexpected foreign competition). Again, this can 
result in financial gains to the firm. In both cases, whether behaving in 
a deceptive manner or responding to an unexpected change, the firm is 
said to be engaging in opportunistic behavior.
Most of the evidence of opportunistic behavior by employers takes 
the form of specific court cases, two of which are discussed here. In 
both instances, the presence of a pension increased the risk of layoff.
DeSoto, Inc.
Four former employees of DeSoto have charged that in 1989 the 
company laid off 10 percent of its workforce in an effort to increase the 
overfunding in its pension plan and thereby help avert a takeover 
attempt.3 The laid-off employees filed suit in U.S. District Court in 
Chicago to stop the company from terminating its pension plan and 
from distributing $28 million in after-tax surplus assets to its share 
holders. The plaintiffs, who had each worked at the company for 
between 16 and 29 years, argued that DeSoto had laid off 200 employ 
ees late in 1989 as part of an effort to thwart a $50-per-share hostile 
takeover bid by Sutton Holding Corporation of New York. As of late 
1992, this case had not been decided.
Continental Can Company
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a nation 
wide program at Continental Can Company targeted for layoff those 
employees who were approaching pension eligibility and thus violated 
the terms of ERISA.4 This upheld a district court judge's injunction 
against the use of the plan (McLendon v. Continental Can Co., CA 3, 
No. 89-5596, 7/26/90).
Under a 1977 collective bargaining agreement with the United Steel 
Workers, Continental established "magic number" pension benefits to 
ensure benefits for employees subjected to periodic (temporary) lay 
offs. Benefits under the plan, which accrued when the employee 
reached a certain age and a certain number of years of service, included 
layoff benefits to those employees experiencing a break-in-service of 
two years or more from plant shutdowns, involuntary layoffs, or physi 
cal disability.
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Faced with both substantial unfunded liabilities under the pension 
plan and a dwindling market for steel beverage cans, Continental Can 
devised the "bell system," a nationwide program subsequently found 
by a federal judge to stand as a reverse acronym for "Let's Limit 
Employee Benefits" or "Lowest Level of Employee Benefits." A com 
puter program generated printouts of the workforce with codes 
attached to each worker showing benefit eligibility and identifying 
which employees were close to vesting.
Four employees who lost their jobs brought a class action against 
the company in 1983, charging that Continental had implemented the 
"bell system" to avoid pension liabilities in violation of section 510 of 
ERISA. The plaintiffs maintained that they were laid off because they 
were approaching eligibility for magic number pension benefits, and 
that Continental kept them on permanent layoff, even when jobs were 
available, to prevent them from achieving a vested right to benefits.
The company claimed that the system was strictly informational and 
that the employees who were laid off lost their jobs because of the 
industry slowdown. In 1989, Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the U.S. District 
Court in New Jersey found that Continental had "engaged in a com 
plex, secret and deliberate scheme to deny its workers bargained-for 
pensions (that) raises questions of corporate morality, ethics and 
decency which far transcend the factual and legal issues posed by this 
matter." After several appeals, Continental Can agreed to a $45 million 
settlement as a final resolution of the case.
Evidence of Pensions Associated with Fewer Layoffs
These court cases appear to be isolated examples of situations in 
which the presence of a pension increased the likelihood of layoffs. 
Virtually all economic studies that examine the more general experi 
ence conclude the opposite: workers who are covered by a pension are 
less likely to be laid off than workers who are not covered.
Several studies have examined both quits and layoffs (i.e., Mitchell 
1982; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1986; Even and Macpherson 
1990a). In general, these studies find that the relationship between pen 
sions and worker mobility is even more negative for total job change 
than for quits. 5 Only a few studies explicitly examine the impact of
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pensions on layoffs (Fames, Gagen, and King 1981; Cornwell, Dorsey, 
and Mehrzad 1991; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1990).
Parnes, Gagen, and King (1981) investigate whether the presence of 
a pension affects the likelihood of being permanently laid off. Using 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men, they identify men 
who at the time of the initial (1966) survey had been with their current 
employer for at least five years and who were permanently separated 
from that employer sometime between 1966 and 1975. Because their 
concern is with displaced workers for whom layoffs are unaccustomed 
events, Parnes, Gagen, and King exclude workers in construction and 
agriculture. According to their multiple classification analysis, older 
male workers with pensions are considerably less likely to be displaced 
than older male workers without pensions: the likelihood of displace 
ment is approximately 5 percent for men with pensions and 12 percent 
for men without pensions.
Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991) also use the National Longi 
tudinal Survey of Mature Men; however, they select men who were 
discharged between 1971 and 1976 and do not exclude workers in con 
struction and agriculture. (They do, however, exclude self-employed 
workers.) Despite these differences, their results are similar to those of 
Parnes, Gagen, and King. They find that, on average, the likelihood 
that an older pension-covered worker will be laid off is 4.6 to 5.4 per 
centage points lower than that for an older, noncovered worker.6
In addition, Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad examine whether the 
value of potential pension loss affects dismissals among older male 
workers. Their results on this are mixed. When the pension loss calcu 
lations are based on a constant wage-pension tradeoff, the pension loss 
coefficient is zero and is insignificant.7 Coupled with the negative and 
significant coefficient on the pension coverage variable, this signifies 
that while workers with pensions are less likely to be discharged, the 
risk among covered workers is no higher for workers with greater 
potential losses. However, when the pension loss calculations ignore 
the wage-pension tradeoff, the pension loss coefficient becomes larger 
and significant, signifying that a higher loss raises the risk of layoff.
The Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad study tests whether firms 
behave in an opportunistic manner. Although the authors find no 
empirical support for the idea that pensions raise the risk of layoff for 
older male workers, they point out that, because the agreed-upon risk
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of discharge will probably be lower for pension-covered workers in an 
implicit contract, their findings do not necessarily rule out opportunis 
tic behavior. As a further examination of the issue of opportunistic 
behavior, they investigate whether unanticipated pension losses 
increase the likelihood of layoffs. They find that workers with greater 
unexpected losses are more likely to be discharged. They also attempt 
to test whether firms with declining profits and declining reputation 
capital are more likely to behave in an opportunistic manner, but their 
results are insignificant. Their final test is an examination of the effect 
of ERISA on the probability of dismissal. They cannot reject the 
hypothesis that ERISA had no effect on the propensity of employers to 
dismiss workers who were covered by pensions.
Like Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991), Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1990) explore whether pension losses affect layoffs. How 
ever, because they use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
rather than the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men, they look 
at all workers rather than just older male workers. Their PSID sample, 
which covers the period 1975-82, consists of private wage and salary 
workers who were employed at the time of the 1975 survey and 
reported earnings. They selected only those workers under age 55 (in 
1975) who were heads of household working 35 or more hours per 
week, and they excluded individuals employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and unclassified trade industries. Alien, Clark, and McDermed 
find that for these workers the probability of being laid off falls by 1.3 
percent for each $1,000 increase in the capital loss of the pension.8 
(Recall that this is not consistent with the findings of Cornwell, 
Dorsey, and Mehrzad, who find a positive relationship between the 
two.)9 The capital loss has a much larger effect on layoffs than on quits. 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed do not explain why there is a smaller 
impact on quits, but they point out that the observed negative relation 
ship between layoffs and capital loss is consistent with models that 
portray pensions as "part of an implicit contract where bonding pre 
vents shirking and reputational concerns prevent employers from 
pocketing... (the capital /ass)...by firing their workers" (Alien, Clark, 
and McDermed 1990, p. 26).
In summary, econometric studies on the relationship between pen 
sions and layoffs suggest that the presence of a pension is associated 
with fewer layoffs. However, the evidence on the relationship between
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pension loss and the probability of layoff is mixed. In general, the 
research findings are consistent with models that view pensions as part 
of an implicit contract between workers and firms. Although none of 
the findings rules out opportunistic behavior by firms, they suggest that 
opportunism does not dominate.
Researchers have not yet fully explored the reasons why these 
empirical studies indicate a negative relationship between pension cov 
erage and layoffs. This remains fertile ground for future research.
THE IMPACT OF LAYOFFS ON PENSION BENEFITS
Pension-covered workers who are laid off can suffer the same porta 
bility losses as workers who quit their jobs. However, laid-off workers 
may incur additional losses as well. These losses are associated with 
the inability of many displaced workers to find jobs equivalent to the 
ones from which they were laid off (i.e., their new job may offer a 
lower wage or a less generous pension or no pension at all). In addi 
tion, laid-off workers may decide to drop out of the labor force because 
the job prospects are so bleak, or they may experience lengthy periods 
of unemployment. Some displaced workers may receive benefits (i.e., 
severance pay) to help compensate them for their losses. However, in 
many cases, these benefits fail to compensate them for lost earnings, let 
alone pension benefit loses.
Although laid-off workers do not inevitably find themselves in these 
situation, one of the empirical regularities that distinguishes quits from 
layoffs is that laid-off workers are far more likely to encounter these 
adversities than workers who quit. Policymakers who are concerned 
with the impact of turnover on pension benefit loss should be aware of 
these potential situations and take them into account when designing 
policy.
Nonportability Losses
In addition to portability losses, workers who are laid off may incur 
other pension losses based on their subsequent employment experi 
ence.
Layoffs and Portability Issues 169
Losses from Lower Wages or Less Generous Pension
Reemployed displaced workers may suffer pension benefit losses 
either because their new job offers a pension with less generous terms 
or because their reemployment wage (and subsequent earnings path) is 
lower than what it otherwise would have been. There is no evidence on 
the likelihood that a laid-off worker will be reemployed in a job offer 
ing a pension with less generous terms. However, there is a consider 
able amount of research on the impact of layoffs on reemployment 
wages which affect the pension benefits of covered workers.
In summarizing the literature on wage loss associated with layoffs, 
Hamermesh (1989) states that, on average, reemployment wages are 5 
to 15 percent below wages on the terminated job. Gustman and Stein- 
meier (1990) present evidence that pension-covered jobs may be at the 
high end of this range. Using data from the 1984-87 PSID for males 
age 31 to 50, they estimate that the mean wage of involuntary movers 
from pension-covered jobs falls by 9.1 percent, while the wage of 
involuntary movers from non-pension-covered jobs rises by 4.1 per 
cent. 10
Examining the average wage loss associated with layoffs obscures 
the substantial variation in what happens to workers when they are laid 
off. Each of the three Displaced Worker Surveys shows that about half 
of the displaced workers earn as much or more in their new job as they 
did in the job from which they were terminated. However, approxi 
mately 30 percent of the workers earn 20 percent or more less (Flaim 
and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990). If this decline in wages 
persists over time, the pension-covered workers in this group will suf 
fer moderate benefit losses (assuming benefits are based on earnings).
Losses from having No Pension
Some displaced workers find themselves without a pension after 
they are laid off. This can occur for two reasons. Either the new job 
does not offer a pension, or the worker remains unemployed and may 
permanently drop out of the labor force. Only a small percentage of 
workers who were laid off permanently drop out of the labor force. 
Information on the dropout rate is limited, but using the longitudinal 
capabilities of the CPS, Devens (1986) provides evidence that less than 
15 percent of displaced workers remain permanently out of the labor
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force. Those workers who were covered by a pension may suffer con 
siderable loss of benefits.
Similarly, pension-covered displaced workers who are reemployed 
in jobs that do not offer pensions may also suffer losses. There are sev 
eral reasons why laid-off workers may be reemployed in nonpension 
jobs. First, some workers may decide to take part-time jobs, which are 
less likely to offer a pension than full-time jobs. According to the first 
and second Displaced Worker Surveys, of the displaced workers with 
three or more years of tenure who worked full time on their terminated 
job and who were able to find new jobs after being laid off, approxi 
mately 10 to 12 percent were in part-time jobs. Another 8 percent were 
self-employed, and the remainder were in full-time wage and salary 
jobs (Flaim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987). 11 A second reason is that 
some laid-off workers, particularly those who lose jobs in declining 
industries, must switch industries in order to find a new job. As shown 
in table 11.1, the general tendency is for workers to move from jobs in 
the goods-producing industries (especially manufacturing), where pen 
sion coverage is high, to jobs in the services and trade industries, 
where pension coverage is low. For example, only 39.8 percent of the 
(reemployed) workers who were displaced from jobs in durable goods 
manufacturing were reemployed in that industry. Almost 17 percent 
went into wholesale and retail trade, where pension coverage rates 
were considerably lower. Another 16 percent went into services.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1990, tables Al and A4) present wide- 
ranging evidence on the extent to which pension-covered displaced 
workers are reemployed in jobs that do not offer pensions. Using panel 
data from the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for males 
31-50 years old, they find that 48 percent of involuntary movers who 
had a pension on their terminated job did not have a pension on their 
new job. Their data from the 1984-85 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), which also covers males 31-50 years old, show a 
much higher percentage: 71 percent of involuntary movers who had a 
pension on their initial job did not have a pension on their new job. 
There are several possible reasons for these varying estimates, includ 
ing small sample sizes and problems with both the SCF and SIPP data 
(discussed in Gustman and Steinmeier 1990). 12
Hutchens (1986) also presents evidence relevant to this issue. He 
finds that firms offering pensions are less likely to hire older workers
Table 11.1
Reemployed Workers by Industry of Lost Job and Industry of Job Held in January 1984 
and Pension Coverage Rates by Industry, 1983
Percentage distribution by industry in January 1984
Manufacturing Transportation
Industry of 
lost job
Total
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable
goods
Transportation & 
public utilities
Wholesale &
retail trade
Services
Other
Total 
(OOOs) Construction Total
3,058
281
1,474
980
493
198
455
347
300
10.6
43.6
7.4
8.5
5.1
11.6
4.1
7.6
8.7
28.3
6.2
47.1
46.1
48.6
12.3
14.6
12.0
7.4
Durable Nondurable 
goods goods
18.7
4.0
31.1
39.8
14.0
7.7
9.0
8.1
5.0
9.6
2.2
15.8
6.3
34.7
4.6
5.6
3.9
2.3
& public 
utilities
7.5
4.2
5.0
5.4
4.4
42.6
5.4
3.6
6.3
Wholesale 
& retail 
trade
20.7
12.6
15.4
16.7
12.9
11.8
50.1
19.4
17.7
Services
21.0
23.2
16.8
15.6
19.3
11.5
16.8
46.4
23.5
Other
11.8
10.3
8.4
7.8
9.7
10.2
8.9
10.9
36.4
Pension 
coverage 
rates 
1983
47
32
NA
67
59
53 (T) 
81 (PU)
47 (WT)
35
SOURCE: Seller and Lawrence (1992).
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(over age 55). Thus, older workers laid off from a pension job are prob 
ably less likely to find another pension job than are younger laid-off 
workers.
Income Replacement for Laid-OrT Workers
Laid-off workers may receive compensation from a variety of fed 
eral, state, and private sources. These include unemployment insur 
ance, supplemental unemployment insurance, severance pay, trade 
adjustment assistance, plant closing benefits, and pension-vesting 
credit for an extra year of service. There are two reasons why compen 
sation is important to consider vis a vis pension benefit losses. First, if 
the compensation either partially or fully offsets the pension losses, 
then the losses incurred by laid-off workers may not be an especially 
important policy issue. The policy debate can focus generally on the 
impact of turnover on pension benefit losses without taking the laid-off 
workers explicitly into account.
The existence of compensation for laid-off workers provides a test 
of implicit contract theory. Dorsey (1990) points out that the portability 
losses incurred by workers who quit act as a penalty to these workers 
for breaking an implicit long-term contract with their employers. How 
ever, workers who are laid off also suffer these portability losses. 
Dorsey argues that, in the case of layoffs, firms are breaking the 
implicit contract, and there should therefore be a penalty to the firm (if 
indeed implicit contract theory accurately describes the employer- 
employee relationship). If the firm pays laid-off workers directly (e.g., 
through severance pay) or indirectly (e.g., through contributions to an 
unemployment insurance fund), then this can represent a partial pen 
alty to the firm. In both cases, the magnitude of compensation relative 
to the wage and pension losses is of interest.
The three Displaced Worker Surveys, which feature the most com 
plete set of information on laid-off workers, include questions on 
unemployment insurance only. These data suggest that a considerable 
number of displaced workers fail to receive enough benefits to cover 
their lost earnings, let alone their pension losses. According to these 
surveys, about half of the laid-off workers who received unemploy 
ment insurance had exhausted their benefits by the time of the survey 
(Raim and Sehgal 1985; Horvath 1987; Herz 1990).
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This conclusion is supported by findings from a 1983-84 survey of 
379 workers who were put on indefinite layoff by a major automobile 
manufacturer in April 1983 (cited in Flaim and Sehgal 1985, p. 14). 
This survey found that, on average, compensation payments covered 
about 30 percent of the displaced workers' income loss. The amount of 
income offset by these benefits was lower the longer the layoff period. 
The benefits covered about 55 percent of lost income for workers laid 
off for less than one year; however, they covered only 13 percent for 
workers laid off for more than two years. The proportion of lost 
income offset by the compensation payments also varied with senior 
ity. The benefits received by workers with more than 10 years of 
seniority replaced a larger proportion of lost income than those 
received by workers with less seniority.
Thus, there is some limited evidence that for some workers compen 
sation benefits fail to offset lost income. However, there is other evi 
dence that this is not the case for all laid-off workers. Flaim and Sehgal 
(1985, p. 14) cite the following finding from a demonstration study 
(conducted in the early 1980s) involving laid-off automobile workers 
from the Detroit metropolitan area:
Depending upon the particular plant from which they had been 
laid off, the workers were found to have received either unem 
ployment insurance benefits, or unemployment insurance coupled 
with company-funded supplemental unemployment benefits, or, 
in some cases, both of these benefits as well as trade adjustment 
assistance, which was paid to those whose jobs were deemed to 
have been lost because of imports. Therefore, some of the workers 
had their pre-layoff earnings almost entirely replaced by benefits, 
at least for a time.
Moreover, there is some indication that under certain circumstances 
some severance plans can compensate laid-off workers for more than 
just lost earnings. For example, some severance plans are structured so 
that, regardless of how long it takes to find a new job, an eligible laid- 
off employee receives a certain number of weeks of salary based on 
years of service. 13 Under this type of plan, a worker who is laid off 
after 10 years of service may receive 10 weeks of severance pay (at the 
rate of pay before termination). If the worker finds a new job after two 
weeks and if the new job features at least the same rate of pay as the 
old job, then the worker will receive eight weeks of compensation in
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excess of lost earnings. This could offset some of the worker's loss in 
pension wealth. Other severance plans stop payments when the worker 
begins a new job. However, some of these plans offer laid-off workers 
a guaranteed minimum, i.e., if the employee is entitled to a maximum 
of 18 weeks of severance pay but finds a job within three weeks, that 
employee receives the guaranteed minimum, say 13 weeks of sever 
ance pay. Again, in cases like this, certain laid-off employees may 
receive more than their lost earnings, and thus be compensated for 
some of their loss of pension wealth.
It is not known how common these particular types of severance 
plans are. In general, however, severance plans are fairly common. The 
most recent Employee Benefits Survey shows that 39 percent of all 
full-time employees in medium-size and large firms (defined as 
employing at least 100 workers) were eligible for severance pay (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1990). The percentage is higher for professional 
and administrative employees (54 percent) and technical and clerical 
workers (46 percent) than for production and service employees (27 
percent). 14 These figures are similar to those from a U.S. Government 
Accounting Office (1986) survey conducted in the mid-1980s. This 
survey covered firms that appeared to have laid off workers recently 
and found that 54 percent of these firms offered severance pay. The 
percentages were higher for white-collar workers (53 percent) than for 
blue-collar workers (34 percent).15 Doescher and Dorsey (1992) found 
that explicit pension plan provisions for early retirement bonuses in the 
event of a major layoff are common. Allowing older workers to begin 
receiving benefits immediately reduces or eliminates their pension 
losses. They also found that severance pay plans were more likely in 
firms that also sponsored defined benefit pensions. This result is con 
sistent with the prediction that employers will attempt to offset defined 
benefit pension losses of job losers. Clearly, further research is needed 
to identify the extent to which benefits paid to laid-off workers com 
pensate them for lost earnings and lost pension wealth. At issue is 
whether these benefits in any way offset the pension wealth losses 
incurred by workers when they are laid off.
Layoffs and Portability Issues 175
Policy Implications of Layoffs
The effect of layoffs on pension benefit losses is an important policy 
issue, not because it affects a large number of workers, but because it is 
such an important issue for those it does affect To date, most of the 
policy focus has been on preserving the pension benefits of mobile 
workers in general, with little distinction between workers who quit 
and those who are laid off. This section first discusses how the general 
policy proposals will affect laid-off workers. It then suggests the kinds 
of policies that could help the small minority of high-tenure workers 
who suffer serious pension losses when they are laid off.
In general, the policies directed at preserving the pension benefits of 
mobile workers can be classified as either policies that affect the porta 
bility of pensions or policies explicitly designed to preserve retirement 
income. While these policies may meet most of the needs of workers 
who voluntarily quit their jobs, they only address some of the concerns 
of workers who are involuntarily laid off. The policies designed to 
enhance portability generally focus on plan design changes. Some pro 
posals call for more liberal vesting requirements, while others attempt 
to expand service portability.
Requiring shorter vesting schedules would enhance portability by 
allowing more short-tenure workers to carry accrued pension benefits 
with them when they change jobs. About 70 percent of all laid-off 
workers had less than five years of tenure. While not all of these work 
ers are covered by pension plans, this statistic suggests that a high per 
centage of displaced workers lose their pension benefits because they 
are not vested. Policies to tighten vesting requirements will reduce the 
number of short-tenure workers who must forfeit their accrued benefits 
when they are laid off.
Policies designed to enhance service portability will also help dis 
placed workers. A vested worker who is covered by a defined benefit 
plan and is laid off will suffer a pension benefit loss due to backload- 
ing. Policies requiring either that the vested benefits of separated par 
ticipants be adjusted for inflation or the defined benefit plans give 
participants credit for service at previous jobs or that permit only 
defined contribution plans would help blunt this loss. A policy that 
requires indexing would eliminate most of the loss from backloading, 
as would a policy that permits only defined contribution plans. How-
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ever, policies that call for pooling of service credits or require employ 
ers to credit all years of service in the workforce would only be 
effective for workers who are reemployed in jobs that offer pension 
coverage. Because the general tendency is for laid-off workers to leave 
jobs in industries where pension coverage is high for jobs in industries 
where pension coverage is lower (table 11.1), these types of policies 
could seriously undermine elimination of losses due to backloading for 
laid-off workers.
While the portability policies discussed above will help laid-off 
workers, it is not clear that the policies designed to preserve retirement 
income will do so. The primary focus of policies designed to preserve 
retirement income is to limit the use of lump-sum distributions for cur 
rent consumption. This involves placing limits on preretirement distri 
butions, increasing the tax penalties on distributions that are not rolled 
over, and simplifying the transfer of distributions into qualified retire 
ment accounts. As is the case for workers in general, these types of pol 
icies will help preserve retirement income for laid-off workers. 
However, some displaced workers may be better off if they can use 
their accrued pension benefits to help them through a lengthy period of 
unemployment. Policies permitting hardship distributions would be 
one way to help displaced workers.
It is important to note that neither the portability policies nor the 
preservation-of-retirement-income policies address some of the more 
significant pension benefit losses incurred by some displaced workers, 
in particular losses associated with failure to find a new job or with tak 
ing a new job that does not offer a pension. These losses must be 
addressed through other channels. 16 One way to do this might be to 
require that pension plans offer laid-off workers some kind of nonmon- 
etary bonus or credit to compensate them for their loss. For example, 
some pension plans automatically vest laid-off workers. Others credit 
laid-off workers with an extra year of service for vesting purposes 
(Pension Rights Center 1990-1991). Requiring plans to include either 
of these provisions, or a similar provision (e.g., offering laid-off work 
ers an extra year of service for purposes of computing benefits), could 
help compensate displaced workers for their loss in pension wealth.
Another approach might be to directly compensate workers for their 
pension losses. This could occur through any of the programs currently 
in place to compensate displaced workers for their lost earnings. For
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example, the trade adjustment assistance program and perhaps the 
unemployment insurance program could be expanded to cover com 
pensation for lost pension wealth. Similarly, severance payments and 
plant-closing benefits could be structured so that they include pension 
wealth compensation for laid-off workers.
Any serious consideration of these proposals should include an 
assessment of costs. It is also important to determine to what extent 
laid-off workers are currently compensated for their wage and pension 
losses. The current literature offers only scant information on this 
point.
CONCLUSIONS
Both workers who quit and workers who are laid off can incur sev 
eral different types of losses. Portability policies will help with the 
vesting losses and backloading losses incurred by workers experienc 
ing both types of turnover; preservation-of-retirement-income policies, 
on the other hand, will help workers who quit, but may make displaced 
workers worse off. The other categories of pension wealth loss—losses 
incurred because of either a less generous pension on the new job or no 
pension at all following the layoff—will not be addressed by current 
proposals to enhance portability and preserve retirement income. For 
workers who quit, this is not a major concern because they voluntarily 
incur the pension losses. For laid-off workers, however, it is important 
to know the extent to which the benefits paid compensate them for lost 
earnings and lost pension wealth. If the benefits either fully or partially 
offset the pension wealth losses, then policies designed to enhance 
pension, portability may be sufficient to meet the needs of laid-off 
workers. However, if the benefits do not offset their losses, then there 
may be a need to develop special policies for workers who incur losses 
in their pension wealth due to being laid off.
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NOTES
1. This chapter was written by Tabitha Doescher.
2. Firms that engage in this type of deceptive behavior may have considerable difficulties 
recruiting a quality workforce. Further, some aspects of this type of behavior would violate fed 
eral pension law.
3. This case was reported in Chernoff (1990, pp. 2,38).
4. This case was reported in Bureau of National Affairs (1990).
5. Although this finding seems to suggest that pensions deter layoffs even more than they deter 
quits, the results are sometimes confounded by the inclusion of temporary layoffs in total job 
changes.
6. This may include temporary, as well as permanent, layoffs.
7. In this regression, the pension loss calculations assume that workers receive a pension in 
lieu of higher wages. Thus, the pension loss calculations net out the sacrifice of future wages. The 
tradeoff is assumed to be a constant fraction of the wage.
8. This may include temporary, as well as permanent, layoffs.
9. Corn well, Dorsey, and Mehrzad obtained their pension loss data from Robert Clark, so the 
difference between the two studies cannot be attributed to differences in calculating the pension 
loss (or capital loss) variable. One possible explanation is that Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad 
look at older male workers only, whereas Alien, Clark, and McDermed examine workers who 
were under age 55 at the beginning of the study.
10. These figures from both Hamermesh and Gustman and Stemmeier are simply compari 
sons between the real wage at the time of the layoff and the real reemployment wage; they do not 
take into account any merit or productivity wage increases which may have occurred in the 
absence of displacement. For those workers with lengthy periods of unemployment, this could be 
a sizable omission.
11. These surveys were conducted during downturns in the economy. The statistics may vary 
over the business cycle.
12. It is interesting to contrast these data with information on the current pension status of 
workers who participated in a pension plan on a prior job. Using the May 1988 CPS, Piacentini 
(1990a, table 2) reports that 69 percent of private-sector, full- time workers who participated in a 
pension plan on a prior job were covered by a pension on their current job; 53 percent reported 
that they were currently participating in a plan. These figures were 70 percent and 56 percent, 
respectively, for the males in the sample (tabulations for males ages 31-50, the group used by 
Gustman and Stemmeier, were not available). Thus, 30 percent of the males who had a pension on 
a previous job were not covered by a pension on their current job, while 44 percent were not cur 
rently participating in a pension plan. (Note that these data include males who quit their previous 
job, as well as those who were laid off.) This is only a slightly lower percentage than that found by 
Gustman and Steinmeier for laid-off males included in the Survey of Consumer Finances; how 
ever, it is a considerably higher percentage than that found in the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation.
13. With this type of plan, there is no built-in disincentive to avoid job search.
14. The Employee Benefits Survey also contains information on supplemental unemployment 
benefits, which are much less common than severance plans. Five percent of all full-time employ 
ees are eligible for supplemental unemployment benefits. The percentage is higher for production 
and service employees (9 percent) than for professional and administrative employees and techni 
cal and clerical workers (2 percent each).
15. The General Accounting Office survey also shows that 16 percent of the firms offered 
early retirement to laid-off workers, 15 percent offered pay in lieu of notice, 10 percent offered
Layoffs and Portability Issues 179
lump-sum payments, 10 percent offered supplementary unemployment benefits, 43 percent 
offered continuation of health insurance, and 28 percent offered continuation of life insurance. 
Except for supplementary unemployment benefits, the white-collar percentages were higher than 
the blue-collar percentages.
16. These losses may also be incurred by workers who quit their jobs. However, workers who 
quit are presumably doing so voluntarily. There is no perceived policy need to compensate them 
for these losses. Laid-off workers are a different matter. Because these workers leave their jobs 
involuntarily, it may be desirable to provide them with some kind of compensation.

12
An International Perspective 
on Pension Portability
In searching for solutions to the pension portability problem, policy 
analysts should consider all available evidence on the range and feasi 
bility of policies. Because several countries have done more than the 
United States to reduce pension benefit loss, a close look at their poli 
cies might answer a number of feasibility questions faced by U.S. poli- 
cymakers. 1
This chapter examines portability policies in countries with private 
pension systems similar to those of the United States and focuses on 
policy aspects that may be applicable to the U.S. pension system.2 The 
countries considered are Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. Each has a well-developed private pension system 
where employers voluntarily provide pension benefits. Other western 
industrialized countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have pen 
sion systems that differ considerably from those of the United States, 
and for that reason they are considered in less detail.
BACKGROUND
Employer-sponsored private pension systems in Japan, the Nether 
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States are regulated by the 
national government. In contrast, pensions in Canada are regulated by 
the provincial governments, with each province having separate stan 
dards for its pension plans. 3
The province of Ontario employs 40 percent of Canada's private- 
sector workers and thus represents a major part of the country's experi 
ence. Ontario has been a leader in pension reform, with other provinces 
often copying its policies. For this reason, Ontario is treated as repre 
senting Canadian pension policy for purposes of this chapter.
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Employer-sponsored pensions in the Netherlands are nearly univer 
sal for full-time workers. By contrast, less than half of the private-sec 
tor labor force in the United States, Canada, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom is covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan. The 
three English-speaking countries, however, all provide tax advantages 
for individual retirement accounts, which can substitute for employer- 
sponsored pensions. Workers may use IRAs for pension portability, 
since they can transfer preretirement distributions from employer- 
sponsored pensions to an individual account. Workers also may choose 
an individual plan as a portable alternative to an employer-sponsored 
pension. While individual plans are not available in Japan, until 
recently Japanese workers could have tax free savings accounts, which 
could be used like an IRA.
Patterns of job change vary across countries (table 12.1), possibly 
reflecting the differing attitudes towards job change. Only 4 percent of 
Japanese workers left their jobs over a one-year period (Yumiba 1991), 
while 11 percent of British workers did so (Daykin 1991). In the Neth 
erlands and the United States, 7 percent of workers changed jobs in a 
year (Keizer 1991). In all four countries, women more commonly 
changed jobs than men (table 12.1). In Japan and the United Kingdom, 
young males more commonly changed jobs than older males (table 
12.2).
Table 12.1 
Job Changers as a Percentage of Labor Force
Japan
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
Total
4.2
6.7
11.0
6.5
Males
3.8
6.5
10.0
NA
Females
4.8
7.3
14.0
NA
SOURCE: Turner and Dailey (1991).
Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom have a two-tiered social 
security system. The first tier provides a flat benefit per person, and the 
second tier provides an earnings-related benefit. Japan and the United 
Kingdom allow workers to "contract out" of the earnings-related part 
of social security. Employers can cut social security payments if they
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fund equivalent pensions, and the contracted-out pension plans have all 
of the portability features of social security. British workers also can 
opt out of the earnings-related part of social security (the State Earn 
ings Related Pension) by contributing to an individual Personal Pen 
sion Plan. But it is only financially beneficial for workers under the 
ages of 40 to 45 to do so because of the long period needed to accumu 
late sufficient benefits in a Personal Pension Plan. Non-contracted-out 
pensions are the ones that correspond most closely to U.S. private pen 
sions.
In Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, defined bene 
fit plans are often contributory—workers and employers both contrib 
ute to the plan. This creates portability problems not faced in the 
United States, where contributory defined benefit plans are rare. In 
Japan and the Netherlands almost all plans are defined benefit plans. 
Canada and the United Kingdom have some defined contribution 
plans, but they are not as common as in the United States. Thus, while 
the United States does not have some portability features provided in 
other countries, portability features of U.S. defined contribution plans 
generally are not found elsewhere.
Table 12.2
Percentage of Males Who Changed Jobs as a Percentage 
of All Male Employees by Age, 1987 and 1989
Age range
<25
25-34
35-44
45-54 1 
55-59 I 
60-64
65>
United Kingdom
(1987)
21.6
12.0
7.0
4.0 
4.0 
2.0
NA
Japan 
(1989)
11.0
4.8
2.6
2.0 
3.1
1.7
SOURCE: Turner and Dailey (1991).
Most Japanese pension plans are severance pay plans, yielding lump 
sum benefits whenever employment ends, whether at retirement age or 
earlier. Vested deferred benefits for job leavers are not maintained with 
the former employer.
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PORTABILITY POLICIES
The following section focuses on particular portability policies that 
have been adopted in other countries, comparing vesting standards, 
preretirement indexing, service portability, and lump sum distribution. 
Because the Netherlands is the only European country where a new 
employer bears liability for a worker's pensionable service with a prior 
employer, the manner in which the Dutch handle service portability is 
examined in depth.
Vesting Standards
The maximum period for a Dutch, British, or Canadian worker to 
vest is less than for an American. In the Netherlands, workers must 
vest after participating one year in a plan, though participation may be 
restricted until age 25 or later. The United Kingdom requires vesting 
after two years of participation, but workers are usually eligible to par 
ticipate at age 19 after one year of work. Ontario requires vesting after 
two years of tenure in a plan.
Japan is the only one of these countries with no legislated vesting 
rules, yet Japanese pension plans provide rapid vesting even without 
regulations.4 Less than 15 percent of workers are in plans that require 
over two years if separation is initiated by the employer. By contrast, 
60 percent of workers are in plans that require over two years if separa 
tion is voluntary. Even for long service, the firm pays higher lump 
sums if the firm rather than the worker ends the job.
Vesting is immediate in France, but it requires 10 years of service 
and age 35, or 12 years of service, in Germany. In Denmark contribu 
tions vest, but benefits do not. 5
Preretirement Indexing
When a worker changes jobs and the plan indexes deferred benefits 
for inflation, the employer pays for much of the portability loss that 
otherwise occurs with job change. In the Netherlands, most plans vol 
untarily index deferred vested benefits. Also in the Netherlands, if the 
plan awards benefit increases or cost-of-living adjustments to its retir 
ees, it must grant the same increases to former workers with deferred 
pensions.
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British law requires plans to inflation-index deferred vested benefits. 
Legislation requires plans to index benefits before retirement for job 
leavers, up to 5 percent annually based on increases in retail prices. Ire 
land, starting in 1996, will require plans to index deferred vested bene 
fits up to 4 percent annually. Because of the caps, these systems 
completely index benefits only if inflation is low.6 Plans are not 
required to index deferred vested benefits in Canada or the United 
States and rarely do so.
Japanese plans do not index deferred vested benefits because job 
leavers receive accrued benefits as a lump sum payment at separation. 
Japan has considered lifetime employment with one employer as the 
most desirable career pattern; thus policymakers have had little con 
cern for minimizing portability losses.
Portability of Service
Plans transfer deferred vested benefits in the Netherlands through 
five portability clearinghouses called transfer circuits. A plan may par 
ticipate in a portability clearinghouse, and most large pension plans do. 
The private sector set up clearinghouses in 1987 after the Dutch gov 
ernment indicated that it would mandate a solution if the private sector 
did not develop a way to eliminate pension benefit losses for job leav 
ers.
The clearinghouses require plans to use benefit formulas based on 
final average salary and years worked and allow insured and nonin- 
sured plans to participate. In 1988, 78 percent of workers (including 
government employees) in a pension plan were in a plan belonging to a 
portability clearinghouse (Keizer 1991). A job leaver may leave the 
vested rights in a former employer's pension plan or use a clearing 
house to transfer them to a new employer's plan.
Small pension plans in the Netherlands provide portability in a dif 
ferent manner. Most are insured through purchase of individual poli 
cies under a group arrangement and may transfer the paid-up policy to 
job leavers.
A Dutch worker who leaves a job has a right to a deferred pension in 
proportion to his/her service relative to a full career. Before the mid 
1980s, the worker only had a right to a deferred pension based on the 
paid-up premiums (for an insured plan). The funding methods used
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often made the former sum much less than the pension figured in pro 
portion to service.
Key to reducing portability losses through an employer-based sys 
tem is deciding who pays for the losses—the former employer or the 
new employer. This issue is complicated when plans use different actu 
arial assumptions. The interest rate and wage growth rate assumptions 
strongly affect the calculated value of pension liabilities. The gap 
between these two assumptions is key in figuring whether the old or 
new employer pays the extra sum needed to cut the portability loss.
Usually the interest rate assumption is 1 or 2 percentage points 
higher than the wage growth rate assumption for figuring liabilities in 
an ongoing plan. The more the interest rate assumption exceeds the 
wage growth rate assumption the less the sum transferred by the 
former employer. With a difference between the two assumptions of 1 
or 2 percentage points for figuring a job leaver's liability, the former 
employer would pay for the portability loss otherwise occurring. That 
pattern of assumptions is equivalent to projecting wages and using a 
market interest rate.
In the Netherlands, to figure the sum transferred by the former 
employer to the clearinghouse, uniform actuarial assumptions must be 
used. These assumptions exclude decrements to pension liabilities 
other than mortality (no job turnover assumed) and future salary 
increases (a zero wage growth rate assumption), and include a 4 per 
cent interest rate for discounting future liabilities. With a 4 percent 
interest rate assumption and a zero wage growth assumption, the old 
employer transfers more assets than had he/she assumed a market 
interest rate, say 7 percent, and a zero wage growth assumption. Future 
liabilities are discounted at a lower real rate in the first instance. With 
these assumptions, the former employer pays for some future benefits 
arising due to the effect on benefits of future wage growth credited to 
past service.
When figuring asset transfer value in the Netherlands, however, the 
accrued liability's present value derived by using these assumptions is 
further cut. It is reduced by a percentage depending on the difference 
between the 4 percent interest rate and the interest rate on a portfolio of 
government bonds. The cut is not sufficiently large to make the liabil 
ity equivalent to that figured using a zero wage growth rate assumption 
and a market interest rate.
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These adjustments produce a liability causing the former employer 
to pay for part of the effect of future salary increases on the benefit for 
the transferred service. The new employer, however, must pay a large 
part of the effect of future wage growth on past service.7 The Nether 
lands is the only European Community country where the new 
employer has a liability for the effect of future wage growth on pen 
sionable service with a prior employer. In all other countries, the 
worker loses this advantage.
Japan has two portability clearinghouses—one that handles large 
plans and one that is dedicated to smaller groups. Until 1989, the clear 
inghouse for large plans—run by the government Pension Fund Asso 
ciation—only accepted transfers of pensions up to the sum contracted 
out of social security. Since 1989, it has accepted the contracted-out 
portion of a pension as well as any additional pension benefit. The 
clearinghouse for small plans—Smaller Enterprise Retirement Allow 
ances Mutual Aid Plans—is used by only 3 percent of eligible job leav 
ers.
In the United Kingdom some nationalized British industries operate 
"transfer clubs," where uniform actuarial factors determine the accrued 
vested benefit to which a worker is entitled. The receiving plan grants 
added years of service using the same factors; however, few employers 
have taken advantage of these arrangements (Atkins 1991).
A British worker changing jobs may transfer his/her benefit to an 
approved individual insurance policy. The benefit value must be fig 
ured using a current long-term interest rate. The calculation need not 
consider future pay raises, but must consider statutory preretirement 
inflation indexing.
One of the more bureaucratically efficient pension portability sys 
tems is found in Israel, where most workers are covered under a single 
pension plan sponsored by the major labor union. Thus, when workers 
change jobs, they lose no benefits because they do not change pension 
plans.
Lump Sum Distributions
In contrast to Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 
workers in Japan normally receive a lump sum payment of accrued 
benefits when they change jobs. (Lump sum payment is also the nor-
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mal benefit payment at retirement.) Because Japanese savings rates 
have been high, Japanese policymakers have not been concerned that 
preretirement distributions would be used for nonretirement purposes. 
Their lack of concern contrasts with the concern of U.S. policymakers 
that workers save too little for retirement when allowed to spend retire 
ment savings.
In Ontario, vested pension benefits cannot be received in a preretire 
ment lump sum distribution. They must be locked in and can only be 
received as a lifetime annuity paid during retirement.8 The only lump 
sum distributions permitted are for disabled persons, pensions below a 
stipulated value, and 25 percent of the value of deferred pensions 
accrued pre-1987. In cases where benefits are only plan-vested and not 
statutorily vested (the plan has more rapid vesting than law requires), 
such sums may be refunded if the plan allows. If a worker has contrib 
uted to a pension plan but has not worked long enough to vest, the con 
tributions plus interest are returned to the worker when he/she changes 
jobs.
In Canada, transfers of assets can be made to a Registered Retire 
ment Savings Plan (RRSP), which is like an American IRA. The assets 
in an RRSP, however, are locked in with no possibility of withdrawal 
until retirement age. In theory, assets can be transferred to a new 
employer's plan, but most employers will not accept such assets. If the 
plan rules specify, the deferred pension's present value can also be 
used to purchase a life annuity from an insurance company; however, 
the annuity must not begin before the worker is eligible for early retire 
ment. A divorced spouse with an order for spousal benefits under the 
Family Law Act of 1986 must have the same benefit options as the par 
ticipant.
The Netherlands permits preretirement lump sum distributions only 
of the worker's contributions before vesting, transfer of funds to 
another plan, or emigration.
In the United Kingdom only unvested contributions can be returned 
to the participant who is changing jobs; all other benefits are locked 
in.9 Thus, after two years in a plan, workers cannot receive preretire 
ment distributions. Recent legislation, however, gives job leavers 
options for transferring funds. Preretirement distributions may be 
moved to another plan, placed in a Personal Pension Plan, or used to
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buy back into the national social security system if the distribution is 
from contracted-out contributions.
Funds can also be used to purchase an insurance policy or annuity 
contract. Any member of a pension plan—not just job leavers—may 
ask for a transfer value or cash equivalent of his/her accrued pension 
rights. The plan trustees must arrange for the transfer to a statutory 
alternative chosen by the member. Although it may occur anytime, this 
transfer usually occurs at job change.
The United Kingdom provides two options for portable individual 
retirement savings. First, workers enrolled in private pension plans are 
entitled to purchase Free-Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions 
from an insurance company, provided the combined benefits to which 
they are entitled do not exceed statutory limits for tax exemption. 
These contributions allow members of employer-sponsored plans to 
increase retirement benefits through individual contributions, similar to 
an IRA. Such benefits are portable because, like individual account 
plans, they are not tied to an employer. The second option extends Per 
sonal Pension Plan eligibility to all employed individuals regardless of 
whether they participate in an employer-sponsored plan. Workers cov 
ered by a private pension may opt out of that arrangement and set up a 
Personal Pension Plan. Instead of preserving a job-leaver's benefit 
rights within the plan, a British worker may use the accrued rights to 
purchase an annuity. A plan used for contracting-out may pay a pre 
mium to government to repurchase in social security pension rights 
that would have replaced social security benefits.
Some British plans reject asset transfers or only accept transfers for 
workers below a set age. This occurs when the employer would be 
forced to subsidize prior service in a salary-related plan. Some plans 
guarantee to index pension rights in line with earnings. If the member 
suffers a pay cut in a new job, he/she may opt to retain rights in a prior 
plan.
The United Kingdom offers job leavers many pension options 
because British Conservative political philosophy highly values indi 
vidual choice. With the range of options, however, individuals may 
"game the system," seeking the arrangement most favorable to their 
circumstances. The more options available, the more serious is this 
problem of adverse selection, with workers of like attributes bunching 
into the pension types most favorable to their life expectancy or
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income. Current U.K. pension law has been fully in place for only a 
few years, and more time is needed to evaluate whether so many 
choices will create funding problems for any plans due to adverse 
selection in plan choice.
CONCLUSIONS
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada have done more 
than the United States to cut portability losses. These countries require 
short vesting periods and stringently restrict lump sum distributions. 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom index vested benefits for 
most early leavers.
Japan and the United States are the only countries in this group 
allowing virtually unrestricted lump sum distributions at job change. In 
the other countries, retirement benefits are preserved by requiring 
workers to use one or more options: retain benefits with the prior 
employer, transfer vested benefits to the new employer, or transfer ben 
efits to a portability vehicle like an IRA, where the benefits lock in 
until retirement.
What lessons can be learned from countries with more pension port 
ability than the United States? Many American and Canadian observ 
ers suggest that the cost of indexing benefits for early leavers (people 
with deferred vested benefits) would greatly reduce pension plan 
growth. Though it has not been rigorously analyzed, the experience in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom appears to reject that posi 
tion.
NOTES
1. This chapter draws heavily on material presented m Turner and Dailey (1991), and espe 
cially Andrews (1991). For further information about private pension systems in other countries, 
refer to Turner and Dailey (1991).
2. For example, this chapter does not discuss the issues of pension portability across national 
borders, which European pension policy analysts are currently discussing because of the creation 
of a single European labor market (see Jolliffe 1990).
3. This chapter compares the countries feature by feature. For an explanation of portability on 
a country-by-country basis, see Turner and Dailey (1991).
4. For a discussion of portability in Japan, see Murakami (1991).
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5. Vesting is not required in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Belgium (for 
self-administered plans) (Jolliffe 1990).
6. In the United Kingdom, the statutory requirement to revalue vested benefit rights originally 
existed only for benefit rights accruing since January 1, 1985. Under the Social Security Act of 
1990, the requirement now applies to all accrued benefits.
7. An additional technical calculation must then be made to determine the number of years of 
service credited under the new plan. For example, assume that two plans have identical benefit 
structures, except that the gaining plan provides a benefit at age 60 of 1.5 percent of final pay for 
each year of service while the losing plan only provides a benefit at age 65 of 1.25 percent of final 
pay. The 40-year-old member with 10 years of service was making $40,000 a year at termination 
with the first employer and started with the second employer at $45,000 a year. The 10 years of 
service would be shortened (to 4.82 years) for purposes of calculating benefits in the new plan 
because the new benefit accrual rate and salary base are both greater. Both the old and the new 
employers are responsible for funding any actuarial loss generated in their own plans by the port 
ability transfer.
8. For a discussion of portability in Canada see Conklin (1991).
9. This discussion of portability in the United Kingdom is drawn largely from Birmingham 
(1991).

13 
Conclusions
Tradeoffs and Options
Any changes in portability policy will be made after balancing com 
peting interests. Policies that help one group or further some of their 
goals may hurt another group or detract from their goals. Direct and 
indirect costs diminish the extent goals are achieved or interest groups 
are helped. Workers and firms may undo mandated changes in income 
flows by changing compensation outside the pension plan.
Before making decisions, policymakers must clarify priorities 
among goals and between groups. This book provides no answers 
about priorities, which are ultimately political decisions, but clarifies 
many of the conflicts and tradeoffs. This final chapter summarizes con 
flicting interests that should be considered in making portability policy 
and offers a selective list of policies that will reduce portability losses.
For several reasons, portability policies that rely on a job leaver 
finding another job with a pension will not work well in the United 
States. Econometric evidence indicates that although firms offering 
pensions employ older workers, they are less likely to hire older work 
ers. This finding is supported by statistics showing that many workers, 
especially women, who had a pension on a previous job did not have 
one on their current job.
Econometric studies suggest that making pensions portable will 
have only a small effect on job mobility in the United States. Pensions 
alone do not inhibit mobility much. Pension-covered workers are less 
likely to change jobs than noncovered workers for a number of rea 
sons: (1) people covered by pensions are less likely to be laid off; (2) 
jobs offering pensions tend to select workers who are less likely to 
change jobs; (3) jobs offering pensions tend to pay a high enough wage 
to discourage job change; and (4) other aspects of compensation, such 
as retiree health benefits, also discourage job change.
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TRADEOFFS AMONG WORKERS
Many portability options raise benefits for short-tenure workers. 
The net increase in wealth for these workers and the presumed 
decrease in wealth for long-tenure workers depends, however, on 
whether workers pay for pension reform with reduced wages. If that is 
the case, then gains or losses in wealth due to pension reform will be 
offset by changes in wages. The wage-pension tradeoff, however, 
probably results in an imperfect adjustment of compensation costs 
because it is not possible to perfectly determine in advance who will be 
a short-tenure worker.
The interests of women, who traditionally have had more job mobil 
ity than men, may be favored by portability policy. But mobility statis 
tics comparing full-time male and female workers overstate the 
difference because women covered by a pension have job mobility that 
more closely resembles job mobility of men. Portability policy will 
raise labor market efficiency for some workers by lowering the cost of 
changing jobs, but may reduce labor market efficiency for others by 
discouraging long tenure and investment in job skills. The balance 
between these two groups will vary depending upon factors such as 
import competition and technological changes that affect the stability 
of employment in the economy.
TRADEOFFS BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS
If portability policy reduces employer willingness to offer a pension 
plan or causes employers to offer defined contribution plans when 
workers would rather have defined benefit plans, employees may be 
hurt. Because portability policy would reduce income gains from job 
stability, firms would use defined benefit pension plans less frequently 
for retaining and rewarding long-service workers. Firms needing 
highly trained and stable workforces may be hurt relative to firms 
where high labor turnover has little effect on the firm's costs.
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TRADEOFFS BETWEEN GOALS
In government budgeting, portability policies that cost the treasury 
tax revenue must compete with other possible cash expenditures and 
tax expenditures of government funds. More fundamentally, the goals 
of labor market efficiency, retirement income adequacy, greater 
national savings, governmental nonintervention, and tax equity may 
conflict Pension portability may raise retirement income while reduc 
ing efficiency for some firms where long worker tenure is needed 
because of the lengthy worker training required. The goal of greater 
national savings could possibly be achieved via unrestricted IRAs. 
That goal, however, may conflict with tax equity if the tax benefits go 
largely to high income workers.
With the possible negative and positive effects of portability policy, 
along with little evidence on the relative importance of various trade 
offs, it could be argued by a self-interested party that any major policy 
would be "the straw that broke the back of defined benefit plans." In 
this regard, foreign experience provides a good idea of the range of 
feasible policies and suggests that the United States could do a lot 
more to reduce the pension benefit losses of job changers.
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, Can 
ada have all gone further than the United States in reducing the porta 
bility losses suffered by a mobile workforce. All three countries have 
virtually ended preretirement lump sum distributions. The United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands have indexed benefits for deferred 
vested (early) job leavers. Of less importance, all three offer more 
rapid vesting than the United States. Japan, however, reflecting the 
view of the productivity- raising effect of a lifetime commitment to 
one job, has done much less than the United States to reduce pension 
benefit loss due to job change.
Policy Options
A wide range of feasible options could reduce the loss of pension 
benefits due to job change. The following is a selective list.
1. Prohibit plans that grant lower percentage cost-of-living adjust 
ments for retirees with less service or who end employment prior to 
retirement.
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2. Prohibit plans from requiring a later age for initial benefit receipt 
for workers ending employment prior to retirement
3. In defined contribution plans, prohibit contribution rates that rise 
with service, age, or earnings.
4. In defined contribution plans, prohibit the distribution of forfeited 
account balances to remaining participants based on account balances. 
Instead, require that the distribution be based on annual contributions 
or earnings.
5. In defined benefit plans, prohibit plans from having formulas with 
higher accrual rates at higher years worked or older ages.
6. Reduce to four the years required for vesting for both multiem- 
ployer and single-employer plans.
7. Require that preretirement lump sum distributions from defined 
benefit plans be calculated using a real interest rate, such as 3 percent.
8. Prohibit preretirement lump sum distributions except at job 
change for small sums or for financial hardship. Alternatively, require 
that all sums withdrawn from a pension before retirement be rolled 
over into an IRA. These restrictions could be limited to workers age 30 
to 59.
9. Require inflation indexing up to 4 percent annually of wages used 
to figure benefits for early leavers in final-pay plans. Alternatively, 
require such indexing only for early leavers who have worked 10 or 
more years for the employer.
10. Require flat-benefit plans and career-average plans to upgrade 
benefits for early leavers using the same formula that they use for cur 
rent workers.
11. Require firms to provide extra years of credit in defined benefit 
plans and extra contributions in defined contribution plans for laid-off 
workers.
12. Amend the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act so that displaced 
workers are compensated for lost pension benefits as well as lost 
wages.
American workers using the political system have increasingly 
required firms to provide pension benefits that are unreduced by job 
change. That trend is likely to continue. This book has shown that 
many policy options could be chosen to further protect pension bene 
fits from losses that occur when workers change jobs.
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